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ABSTRACT
The question whether monetary policy should be subject to discretion or whether 
some kind of rule should be imposed upon its conduct has been and is subject to 
intensive debate. The theoretical rationale for central bank independence is to be 
found in the 'time-inconsistency' literature, which demonstrates that if monetary 
policy is entrusted in discretionary fashion to policy makers, they have an incentive to 
renege on their precommitment since they favour short-run output gains. The public 
forms expectations about the credibility of a pre-announced strategy of the policy 
maker. It is argued that an independent monetary authority, which is committed to 
price stability, would be an accountable player in the monetary policy game, 
removing the need for the wage bargainers to protect themselves against inflationary 
surprises.
M any studies have been dedicated to approach the 'case for central bank 
independence' from the empirical side. Various indices of central bank independence 
have been developed, based on an uniform assessment procedure which allows a 
comparison of alternative monetary arrangem ents according to their degree of 
independence.
An inverse relationship between the rate of inflation and central bank independence is 
generally advocated. The empirical findings, however, suggest a less clear-cut 
relationship than that claimed by the theoretical literature.
To allow a well-founded statement about how central bank independence affects the 
conduct and outcome of monetary policy, one needs to look at different monetary 
regimes. The Bank of England, politically dependent on the government, and the 
independent German Bundesbank have been chosen as test cases. The inflationary
performance of Germany has been on average better and more stable when compared 
to the United Kingdom's record. The respective monetary arrangement determined 
and had at times decisive influence on policy decisions. The discretionary regime in 
the United Kingdom allowed the authorities recourse to expansionary monetary 
policies, whereas this was im possible for the German governm ent, since the 
Bundesbank conducts its policy independent from government directives and adheres 
to its pre-eminent task of safeguarding the currency.
It is concluded that an independent central bank which is committed to price stability 
generates a better inflationary outcome than that achieved with a discretionary 
conduct of monetary policy. Furtherm ore, autonomy and the com mitment to 
protecting the internal value of the currency are important devices for building an 
anti-inflationary reputation.
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“I cannot help but conclude that 
ultimately the only way central 
banks can achieve their goals is if 
their integrity is without question 
and people have confidence in the 
policies they pursue. At the end of 
the day, it is public confidence that 
is a central bank's most precious 
commodity in an economy”.
McDonough (1994, p. 6)
CHAPTER I
The Case for Central Bank Independence
The Case for Central Bank Independence
1.1 Introduction
In the past years, there has been a growing acceptance of the view that the primary 
purpose of monetary policy should be to maintain stable prices. This reflects the 
realisation that the statistical relationship captured by the Phillips-curve does only 
exist in the short-run, provided inflation is unanticipated k The negative effects of 
attempts to exploit the suggested trade-off between inflation and employment became 
dramatically apparent in the 1970s, leaving economies in a state of stagflation2.
Inflation is a monetary phenomenon, a tax on financial wealth and can 
severely damage the real economy or even lead to its total collapse. Disinflation 
always proves difficult and painful and can involve substantial costs in form of lost 
output and employment. The costs of inflation depend on its so u rc e sw h e th e r  it was 
anticipated, and on the institutional structure of the economy. Unanticipated inflation 
is particular damaging since the time path of prices, in this case, is uncertain. The cure 
of unanticipated inflation is the more costly one, whereas a fully anticipated inflation'^ 
could be regarded as less socially disruptive in its continuation. It does, therefore, not 
seem surprising that living with inflation is sometimes seen as an acceptable option.
Although there arc only imprecise information, with little empirical regularity, about the length of the i
so called short-run period, an average length of three to five years is assumed until monetary expansion 
has passed entirely on to prices.
2 Findings by B ano  (1995, p. 166) show that the median inflation rate was 3.3% p.a. in the 1960s, for a 
sample of 117 countries, 10.1% in the 1970s (122 countries), and 8.9% in the 1980s (119 countries).
^ Results o f a study by Banaian/Laney/W illett (1983) on the significance of pressures for monetary 
accommodation in twelve industrial countries show that the monetary authorities were more responsive 
to domestic pressures (fiscal deficit and wage increases) than to pressures o f foreign origin, which 
suggests that the sources of inflation may be found more often at home than abroad even in an open 
economy.
"^The rate of change of the overall price index is correctly foreseen over the relevant period and this 
foresight is acted upon. (Laidler, 1990, p. 52)
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rather than trying to reduce it. Nevertheless, the costs of anticipated inflation should 
not be underestimated, which are more than just costs associated with attempts to 
economise on non-interest bearing money balances (so-called 'shoe-leather costs'). 
The continuous price changes, the spreading and collecting of information about them 
(so-called menu costs), and the operation of a less than perfectly indexed tax system 
consume a considerable am ount of real resources. Furtherm ore, even if fully 
anticipated inflation is assumed, there is no automatism which ensures that all prices 
are changed at the same time. Relative prices can fluctuate while changes of the 
overall price index follow a predictable pattern.
The costs which arise when inflation cannot be anticipated fall into three categories, 
(i) costs arising from the misallocation of resources, (ii) costs reflecting distributional 
effects of unanticipated changes in inflation, and (iii) costs related to anticipating 
inflation and offsetting its unwanted effects. Prices have a crucial role in an economy 
since they convey all the information needed to guide resources to their optimal 
allocation, essential to secure the functioning of a market economy. Inflation, 
however, undermines this role as it makes the information about relative prices less 
reliable and more difficult to interpret. It becomes harder to distinguish between 
changes in relative prices and changes in the average price level. Furthermore, 
inflation can have a significant impact on the distribution of income and wealth, in 
particular between creditors and debtors. Unexpected inflation reduces the real burden 
for the debtor and does damage to the creditor's interest. "Like theft, InfLation is just 
the redistribution o f  income by stealth"^. In a world of variable inflation, the 
possibility increases that econom ic agents favour the investment in short-term 
projects to reduce the risk of return. Inflation will tend to reduce the rate of 
investm ent by companies. Savers and lenders may try to reduce their risk by 
demanding a risk premium, which directly affects the willingness of private agents to 
borrow.
Governor in ihc inaugural LSE Bank of England lecture (1992, p. 445)
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Monetary policy has often been and is used as a policy instrument to influence the 
public's behaviour, due to the possible short-run effect of a monetary expansion on 
real variables. Instability of policy can lead to a dramatic loss of public confidence in 
governm ental institutions and in their conduct of actual and future policy. 
Considering the damage inflation does to the economy it is desirable to follow a 
credible anti-inflationary path in monetary management. Nevertheless, the actual 
conduct of monetary policy in many countries lacks stability and predictability, and 
produces frequently excess money growth. Many studies and papers have been 
dedicated to analyse this problem and to point out possible solutions and devices 
which would create stability. The intellectual controversy dealing with the question of 
the optimal monetary arrangement is referred to in the literature as the 'rules versus 
discretion debate'.
Game-theoretical studies, in particular the pioneering work by Kydland and Prescott 
(1977), provided valuable insights into the incentive structure of policy makers and 
identified the existence of the phenomenon of 'time-inconsistency of policy', the 
temptation of policy makers to behave in a short-sighted manner. Governments face a 
multiplicity of objectives w hich they try to achieve with a given set of policy 
instruments. Such objectives are rarely complementary and often stand in conflict 
with one another. An elected policy maker has both inflation and output preferences 
as well as the incentive to get re-elected^. Priorities in the policy maker's objective 
function can change over time, according to changes in the public's preferences, in the 
political environment, etc., and, therefore, directly affect the conduct of policy. Policy 
makers value surprise inflation as a means to improve their re-election prospects, 
since it generates short-run output gains and may help to manipulate the public's 
behaviour^. This leads to a lack of credibility, whenever monetary policy is entrusted.
^ Cukierman/M eltzer (1986, p. 11)
^  “ Inflation is about the honesty of government policy". (Governor, 1992, p.447).
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in discretionary fashion, to the policy maker. Expectations concerning the behaviour 
of the other 'player' (policy makers versus the public), to determine the choice of the 
best possible strategy under given conditions, are of crucial importance in this policy 
game. Consistency of monetary policy is the key to credibility, being commonly 
defined as the expectation that the monetary authority does not renege on a pre­
announced strategy^. Uncertainty about the outcomes should be replaced by an 
accountable and credible monetary policy. Stability and an anti-inflationary outcome 
seem, therefore, better ensured if one either imposes rules on the conduct of monetary 
policy or if an independent central bank is entrusted with the monetary management.
The latter two options have been put forward in the literature as alternatives to a 
discretionary monetary regime.
Since the economy is frequently subject to disturbances which are only incompletely 
predictable in their frequency of occurrence and in their amplitude, a certain degree of |
flexibility on the part of monetary policy is needed to be able to offset shocks and to j
achieve a socially acceptable outcome. The central problem is, therefore, to find the i
optimal trade-off between flexibility required to perform the stabilisation role and the I
constraints needed to prevent inflation. This chapter reviews and discusses the merits |
of different game-theoretical approaches put forward in this context, which try to find !
the best possible solutions to the problem of time-inconsistency of monetary policy.
At the end of the review, an argument in favour of the alternative to establish an
independent central bank is put forward, since this kind of institutional arrangement
appears to be superior in comparison to a discretionary as well as to a rule-based i
conduct of monetary policy.
^ Credibility according to Drazen/M asson (1993, p. 2) is more complex than that and is described as 
"the desire to carry out a policy and the ability to deliver on a promise in unfavourable 
circumstances" . The findings suggest that the policy-maker will renege on his commitment if 
circumstances are bad enough. Credibility, therefore, does not only reflect “the intention of the policy­
maker, but also the state o f the economy, where stochastic shocks will be important (p. 25).
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1.2 Time-inconsistency of Policy
Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue in their widely acknowledged article 'rules rather 
than discretion’ that, although policy makers possess information about the timing 
and magnitude of their actions, the decisions taken do not result in the social objective 
function being maximised. Kydland and Prescott identify as reason for this paradox 
the existence of a time-inconsistency problem faced by policy makers, which is 
anticipated by rational economic agents. They conclude that optimal control theory 
cannot be applied to processes of economic planning when expectations are rational. 
This argument is based on the conviction that rules, imposed on the conduct of policy, 
would help to improve the economic performance relative to a discretionary regime.
The optimal control theory can be defined as "an appropriate planning device fo r  
situations in which current outcomes and the movement o f  the system's state depend 
only upon current and past policy decisions and upon the current state” This seems 
rather unlikely to be the case in dynamic economic systems where economic agents 
try to take future policy actions into account while forming their expectations. 
Therefore, already the slightest departure from the assumption of the invariance of 
expectations to future policy actions results in a rejection of the optimal control 
theory for the case of economic planning. Priorities in a policy maker's set of 
objectives can change over time as a result of changing economic conditions which 
will lead to changes in the policy maker's decisions. Lucas argued in this context 
that policy changes induce changes in the structure, which require a re-estimation of, 
and future changes in, policy. In fact, policy makers fail to take into account the effect 
of changes in their policy rules upon the decisions of economic agents.
^ Kydland/Prescotl (1977, p. 474) 
Lucas (1976)
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Kydland and Prescott define consistent policy as follows; a policy Jt (while
jt'f} is a sequence of policies for period 1 to T) is consistent if, for each time period 
t (t= l,..., T), jtt maximises the social objective function S ( x j , x j ,  J t j , jït), taking 
as given previous decisions, x ; , x n ,  and that future policy decisions (jtg for s>t) 
are similarly selected^ k Consistent policy, however, produces a sub-optimal outcome, 
as dem onstrated by Kydland and Prescott, using a two-period exam ple. The 
underlying assumption of the analysis is that the decisions of the economic agents 
depend upon all policy decisions and their past decisions expressed as follows:
Xi=Xi(Xi, ..., Xi_i,Dti, ..., JTt ) t= l,...,T  (1)
An optimal policy decision is that which maximises S under the constraint given by 
(1). For a plan to fulfil the consistency criteria, the policy has to be selected so as to 
maximise the social objective function S. In a two-period scenario (T=2), JC2 has, 
therefore, to maximise (2), given the past decisions jt], x% and the constraint (3).
S(Xj, X2,Jti,Jt2) (2)
subject to
Xi=X i( j t i ,J t2 )
and
X2=X2(Xi,3Ti,Jt2). (3)
The first-order condition for the optimal decision rule is zero. A consistent policy 
would only be optimal if the effect of 7t2 upon xi is zero. Kydland and Prescott 
conclude that consistent policy is sub-optimal, since it ignores the effect of future 
policy K2 upon the present decisions x i of the economic agents. "Suhoptimality arises 
because there is no mechanism  to induce fu tu re  policy makers to take into 
consideration the effect o f  their policy, via the expectations mechanism, upon current 
decisions o f  agents” Furthermore, this analysis has direct implications for the 
policy maker's way of conducting policy. The results suggest that policy makers
 ^  ^ Kydland/Prescoll ( 1977, p. 475) 
^2 Kydland/Prescotl ( 1977, p. 481)
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should follow rules rather than have discretionary power, since discretion implies 
selecting the decision which is best for the current situation, which either results in a 
consistent but sub-optimal policy or in economic instability
1.3 Barro and Gordon and the Reputation-Building Approach
Barro and Gordon (1983) employed in their study the time-inconsistency model of 
Kydland and Prescott and analysed the problem as a repeated monetary policy game. 
They showed that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules, which is brought 
about through the existence of public sector expectations. The analysis suggests that a 
low inflation rate can be sustained in the absence of institutional or legislative 
constraints through a system of rewards and punishments which leads to a gradual 
reputation-building. The policy maker faces a social loss function over output and 
inflation and is asked to minimise the welfare loss by resolving this optimisation 
problem in the best possible way. The cost function for each period for the policy 
maker's objective is given by
Zt=(a/2)(jtt)2-bi(jtt-jït‘^ ) w itha, Bt>0 (1)
(jt - inflation).
The first term expresses the costs of inflation while the second stands for the benefits 
generated from surprise inflation. The quadratic form in term one means that the 
inflationary costs rise at an increasing rate with the rate of inflation. The policy maker 
is asked to minimise the expected present value of these costs. When he has 
discretionary power over the conduct of monetary policy, the policy maker controls 
the set of monetary instruments which enable him to choose the rate of inflation n  in 
each period. It is assumed that some short-run benefits can be obtained, when the 
actual inflation rate exceeds the expected inflation rate in period t (generating of
Kydland/PrescoU ( 1977, p. 487)
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surprise inflation). These short-run benefits are derived from the Phillips-curve, where 
an unanticipated monetary expansion leads to a stimulation of real economic activity 
until expectations catch up and offset such benefits. Furtherm ore, the natural 
unemployment rate is subject to disturbances (supply shocks) and is therefore 
volatile. Because of the existence of disturbances, governments value stimulative 
policy actions which lower the unemployment rate. The economic agents know the 
policy maker’s incentive to renege on the promise to keep inflation low ( ‘cheating’) 
and behave rationally by taking the policy maker's nature into account, while 
negotiating the wage contracts. Wage demands are, therefore, marked-up by adding 
an inflationary compensation p e rc e n ta g e T h e  aim is to equalise with the anticipated 
inflation rate the size of the intended output stimulation by the policy maker via the 
printing of high-powered money. The result is a discretionary equilibrium with the 
output remaining at its natural level and an inflation rate which is different from zero.
Barro and Gordon investigate three different scenarios; (i) monetary policy under 
discretion, (ii) under a rule, and (iii) under 'cheating' and examine the respective costs 
which these policies impose on the economy. In the first scenario, the current 
inflation rate Jti is chosen by the policy maker in such a way which minimises the 
expected costs for the current period, Ezi, while treating the current, and future
inflationary expectations, JtVi? given. Future costs and expectations are considered 
independent of the policy maker's present actions (equation D[1J). Assuming rational 
expectations, the economic agents try to predict as well as possible the value of Jti 
(D[21). Since inflation shocks are zero in equilibrium, the inflation costs Zt depend 
only on Jtt (D[3]).
TCt = b/a D (l)
Jt t^ = % = 5/a D(2)
^ = (l/2X5)2/a D(3)
Blake/W estaway (1992, p. 4)
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In the second scenario, policy under a rule, the policy maker commits himself at the 
outset to a rule for determining inflation. At the moment where the policy maker tries 
to set the rule, he has only limited information available at date t. Therefore, the 
policy maker can condition the inflation rate, jtt, only on parameters which are also 
known to the economic agents. He chooses jq and together, subject to the 
condition that The latter term, which involves the inflation shock, drops out of
the cost function in equation (1). The remaining term in (I) suggests that the best rule 
to follow prescribes zero inflation. The costs of this option are calculated under a rule 
from equation (1) as
z* t= 0  R(l)
The third scenario describes the situation where the policy maker reneges on his pre­
commitment, since he expects benefits from cheating the public. Assuming that the 
public's inflationary expectations are =0, formed at the beginning of period t. If 
the policy makers treats these expectations as given, he chooses the same jtt as under 
discretion (D [l]). The costs involved in this policy choice are
E^t = -(l/2)(b)2/a. C(l)
The results suggest that the outcome of monetary policy under cheating and under a 
rule is less costly than under discretion. The cheating solution, however, involves the 
least costs ^  A The question that arises in this context is what rule should be imposed? 
A pre-commitment to zero inflation appears to be the ideal rule since it minimises the 
welfare loss. Barro and Gordon argue that a rule delivers only a second-best solution 
to the problem compared to cheating, when people do not anticipate the rule, which 
brings about better results. That is because surprise inflation eliminates part of the
Barro/Gordon (1983, p. 108)
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existing distortions in the economy. The precondition for this outcome is, as Barro 
and Gordon argue, that the inflationary expectations remain at a low level.
By taking the repeating character of the game into account, it is possible to use the 
potential loss of reputation and credibility as an enforcement mechanism for a rule. 
The enforcement power of the rule must at least balance the temptation to create 
surprise inflation. Cheating in the current period generates an increase in inflationary 
expectations for the next period. Private agents form their expectations as follows
if Jtt-i then (2)
if jtt-i then (3)
Assuming that a rule has been announced which specifies the inflation rate for period 
t-1 and the inflation rate in the previous period accorded with the expected inflation 
rate, the private agents trust the government to perform according to the announced 
rule in the next period, Ï» the case where the government reneges on the rule,
leading to a departure from the actual inflation rate from the expected one, the 
government will lose credibility. The costs of the higher inflation take effect in the 
next period when people, expecting discretion, build into their wage demands an 
inflationary mark-up, Barro and Gordon argue that this pattern of behaviour is
rational and refer to it as a ‘reward and punishment strategy’l l
The policy maker will follow the rule if the enforcement is at least as great as the 
temptation to cheat. Since the costs for period t+1 are discounted by the factor 
qt = 1(1+ri), the enforceability restriction is
Brociner (1991, p. 5)
Cukierman raises objections against the application of the term ‘punishment’ strategy, which is 
borrowed from the industrial organisation literature, to the monetary policy context. He argues that the 
public goes through a learning process, which imposes constraints on the behaviour o f the monetary 
authority. (See Walsh, 1993, pp. 291-92)
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teniptation=E(z’'\ - Zt) < enforcement = E[qi (zt+i - (4)
This restriction implies that costs, caused by following the rule, must not exceed the 
expected benefits of cheating. Barro and Gordon show that the ideal rule of jr*i=0 
does not meet the enforceability restriction and is by a given
temptation (l/2)(b)2/a 
and
enforcement q«(l/2)(b)2/a
(5)
(6)
not enforceable since the discount factor q<l generates a positive gain to cheating, the 
temptation would always be greater than the enforcement in this case. Therefore, 
Barro and Gordon try to find the best enforceable rulei^, which satisfies the 
enforceability restriction and yields the least costs. Figure 1.120 shows the enforceable 
range of rules.
e n f o r c e a b le  ra n g e  o f
d i s c r e t i o n
FIGURE 1.1
Barro/Gordon (1983, p. 110)
Barro and Gordon (p. 113) define the best enforceable rule as “a weighted average o f  Ike ideal ride 
and discrelion, wilh the weights depending on the mean discount factor, q. "
14 Barro/Gordon (1983, p. 112)
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The result of the analysis is a range of enforceable inflation rates depending on the 
policy maker's discount rate and other factors.
There are certain problems and questions arising from Barro and Gordon's analysis 
which are worth considering^^ One main problem with this model is the existence of 
multiple equilibria, as shown in figure 1.1. Furthermore, the results prove problematic 
if one assumes a finite time horizon. The public agents would expect the outcome in 
the last period to be inflationary due to observations by the public, which revealed the 
true behavioural patterns of policy makers. By unravelling backwards, they would 
expect high inflation in every period. Therefore, the only sustainable equilibrium in a 
finite scenario would be the non-cooperative one. A third problem concerns the length 
of the ‘punishment’ interval of discretion (in the model assumed to be not longer than
one period),which can vary over time for various reasons, such as the ‘gravity of the i
crime’. The latter criticism is linked to another problem arising from the existence of 1
reputational constraints which should prevent the occurrence of longer lasting !
episodes of high inflation. However, observations of real economic outcomes defeat I
these implications. In summary it may be said that the model by Barro and Gordon i
tends to oversimplify, which results in a too stable solution to the problem. However, II
the findings-show the advantage of a rule based monetary policy relative to a I
discretionary solution and therefore support the case for tying the government's hands I
in monetary affairs.
1.4 Reputational Approach under Uncertainty
One of the criticisms addressed to Barro and Gordon's analysis concerned the 
reputation-building mechanism and the underlying assumption that a punishment 
interval of one period is sufficient to establish or restore a reputation. Backus and
21 Brociner (1991); Canzoneri (1985)
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Driffill (1985) took up this reputational issue in the work of Barro and Gordon and 
carried out analysis concerning a process by which a policy maker earns a reputation 
over time, resulting in a reputational equilibrium. Their paper on inflation and 
reputation extends the work of Barro and Gordon to the scenario, where the public is 
uncertain whether the policy maker cares about output or inflation.
The underlying behavioural pattern is the policy maker's intention to maintain his 
reputation as long as possible and to reveal his real nature only in the last period. 
Backus and Driffill distinguish between two types of policy makers; ‘hard-nosed’ 
governments, who always fight inflation to preserve zero-inflation, and ‘w et’ 
governments, who maximise their utility function and renege on announced policy. 
The public's lack of information about the type of government it faces is the critical 
element in this analysis, which enables the wet government to disguise its real nature 
and to manipulate the public's expectations. Each player has a different payoff - 
fimction22. in order to determine his actions, a policy maker evaluates his payoffs by 
using a recursive structure. A wet government weighs the costs and benefits of 
defaulting on the announced policy.
Backus and Driffill derived a reputation curve (figure 1.2)23 which describes the game 
in relation to the curve. The reputations of the players are described by p and q. At the 
beginning of the play, the initial reputations, po and qo, can either lie on or off the 
curve, but are assumed to be non-zero. An initial randomisation moves the play onto 
the reputation-curve, as demonstrated in the figure. The play is starting at point A, 
after the policy maker has randomised to raise its reputation to qo the play continues 
from point B. Once on the curve, the game proceeds by repeating randomisation until 
one of the players surrenders. In the case where one side concedes, the reputation of 
this player jumps immediately to zero.
22 Backus/Driflill (1985a, p. 532)
23 Backus, D./DrilTill, J. (1985b, p. 217)
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FIGURE 1.2
The government's ability to manipulate its reputation forms the core of the set-up. 
Supposing the government enters period t with a reputation pt, equal to the public's 
estimation of the probability (gained through observations) that the government is 
hard-nosed. If one assumes that the value of pi is known to both players, both then 
choose their best strategies by taking the strategy of the other player and the impact of 
current behaviour on future reputation into account. Since the public lacks 
inform ation about the real nature of the policy maker, it tries to gain it via 
observations. The public forms its inflation expectations by maximising its payoffs in 
period t, depending upon the probability that the government is hard-nosed. The 
longer a wet government succeeds in not inflating, the more the public agents revise 
the probability upwards that the government is hard-nosed, according to a Bayes' 
rule24 If the public observes inflation, the policy maker's type is automatically 
revealed with certainty, since a hard-nosed government would never inflate the
24 Backus/Di-iffill (1985a, p. 533); Brociner (1991, p. 10)
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economy. This observation leads to changes in the expected value of inflation by the 
public. The policy maker's reputation goes down to zero. Backus and Driffill argue 
that in this game probability proves to be a “sufficient statistic fo r  past play and  
contains all the relevant information needed by the players to make optimal 
decisions " 25
The analysis results in a model which is dynamically consistent. Backus and Driffill 
conclude from their analysis that in a “game with a sufficiently long time horizon,.., 
fo r  any nonzero initial reputation (pi>0) there will be an initial period (which tends 1
to infinity as the horizon tends to infinity) in which zero inflation is the equilibrium  j
outcome”^ ^. This result stands in contrast to Barro and Gordon's findings in their iirepeated static model which conclude that a zero-inflation rate is not enforceable in a j
game with infinite time horizon. The reason for this major difference in the obtained 
results lies in the Backus-Driffill assumption that the punishment lasts until the end of |
the game. The argument is that the public is not myopic as presented by Nordhaus !
(1975), it simply does not have access to all the information but gains information i
when the game proceeds via observations (the learning process). Furthermore, Backus I
and Driffill's findings suggest that a government which seeks re-election may even i
restrain its spending to preserve its reputation, which stands in direct contrast to |
arguments put forward by the political business cycle theory. Backus and Driffill's |
analysis shows how a reputation of being hard-nosed affects the public's behaviour, -
which implicitly suggests that monetary arrangements should be designed in such a 
way that recourse to a 'wet strategy' is made impossible. Backus and Driffill also '
considered the possibility of increasing the credibility and minimising the uncertainty j
of monetary policy by appointing central bankers with an anti-inflation reputation: I
This idea forms the core of Rogoff s analysis which will be presented in the following |
section.
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1.5 Rogoff and the Optimal Degree of Commitment
In 1985, Rogoff carried out a study in which he formulated possible institutional 
responses to the time inconsistency problem , in particular by exam ining the 
alternatives of appointing a ‘conservative’ central banker to head the central bank or 
by providing the central bank with incentives to hit an intermediate monetary target^^. 
He argues that it is possible to improve the overall outcome for society by appointing 
a central banker with preferences other than those expressed in the social utility 
function, who places a relatively greater weight on low inflation than society does. 
The underlying assumption of the analysis is the existence of distortions in an 
economy which cause a sub-optimal rate of employment. Once wages are set, 
economic agents fear that the government undertakes actions to raise employment via 
monetary expansion to eliminate these distortions. This fear is made concrete in an 
inflationary mark-up which is added to the normal wage demands.
Rogoff considers three possible solutions to reduce inflationary wage bargains and 
suggests as first-best solution to the problem the removal of the distortion in the 
labour market which could raise employment and lower inflation, provided that it is 
not too costly. If the first-best solution cannot be achieved at low social costs, the 
second-best alternative would be to legally impose a complete state-contingent money 
supply rule. The design of such a rule gives rise to a number of problems, such as that 
the enforcement of a rule should be done in such a way that it is difficult to change. 
This, however, involves the danger that it could be difficult to alter the rule when it 
becomes outdated, because of changes in the qualitative nature of shocks, which 
could not be predicted at the time of its design. The enforcement of such a rule would 
prevent surprise inflation but does not leave the central bank with sufficient latitude to 
perform efficiently its stabilisation role. Therefore, a rule of the described nature can 
prove unsatisfactory. Should solution one and two turn out to be either too costly or
27 Rogoff (1985, p. 1170)
16
The Case for Central Bank Independence
unachievable, R ogoff suggests a th ird-best solution, the appointm ent of a 
conservative central banker, who places greater, but not infinitely greater, weight on 
inflation stabilisation than society does28. This provided the society can improve its 
welfare. If the central bank would place an infinite weight on inflation stabilisation, 
inflation could be brought down to its socially optimal level, but any supply shock 
would pass entirely through unem ploym ent. The third-best option assumes 
knowledge of the preferences of the central banker who is subject to appointment. 
Although complete certainty about the policy maker's preferences cannot be obtained, 
Rogoff argues that already the existence of some information on the probable 
preferences of the candidate is enough justification for the result of the analysis. 
Rogoff comes to the conclusion that “in the presence o f  a labour market distortion it 
is optimal to choose an agent to head the central bank who places a greater, but not 
infinitely greater, weight on inflation than society does. ” 29. An increase in the central 
bank's commitment to fight inflation leads to a decreasing average inflation rate but 
alters the latitude of monetary policy to respond to supply shocks. Rogoff argues in 
favour of flexible regimes in monetary policy in order to make stabilisation possible 
and also for a sufficiently stable and credible monetary framework to bring inflation 
down to a socially optimal level.
The last part of Rogoff s paper is dedicated to an examination of four different forms 
of targeting; (I) inflation rate targeting, (2) nominal GDP targeting, (3) money-supply 
targeting, and (4) nominal interest rate targeting. The optimal target choice depends 
on a multitude of factors, such as the relative size of the disturbance. Rogoff argues 
that inflation rate targeting 'works well', if there are no long-term time lags in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. However, in the case where supply shocks are 
important, society may prefer to give the central bank the incentive to pursue a
28 Blake and Weslaway (1992) demonslraled that in the case where the model displays pensistcnce to 
output shocks, it is possible to appoint a central banker who is too conservative.
29 Rogoff (1985, p. 1179)
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monetary target other than the inflation rate^^ Nominal GDP targeting might be 
better than inflation rate targeting when supply shocks are large. But this alternative 
can have an inflationary bias, if the nominal GDP target is consistent with the socially 
optimal rate of employment rather than the lower natural rate. Similar problems could 
arise from money supply targeting, if the next period's expected rate of inflation is set 
at the socially desired rate rather than at the higher time consistent rate. Concerning 
the fourth alternative, Rogoff dem onstrates that low interest rate targeting is 
counterproductive, presents a credibility problem, and actually raises the time- 
consistent inflation rate. Once wages are set, the central bank would have an incentive 
to increase the money supply to lower interest rates.
The problem solution provided by Rogoff does not incorporate any reputational 
elements, due to the employed time-frame of one period, contrary to studies by Barro 
and Gordon and Backus and Driffill. R ogoffs solution to the time-inconsistency 
problem differs from those put forward by previous models. His study made an 
important contribution to the ongoing debate about the optimal institutional and legal 
outlook of a credible monetary authority.
1.6 The Role of Private Information in a Monetary Policy Game
The model to be discussed next was developed by M. Canzoneri (1985) who sheds 
some light on the role of private information in the monetary policy game. The 
assumption that the policy maker's forecast of money demand is private information 
forms the starting point of the analysis. Policy makers have control over the money 
supply and therefore over the rate of inflation. To eliminate the inflationary bias one 
could tie the hands of the monetary authority, if there were no benefits to the society 
from retaining a certain degree of flexibility in monetary policy. The problem is to
2b Rogoff (1985, p. 1187)
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find the optimal trade-off between stabilising flexibility and the inflationary bias 
eliminating constraints on the conduct of monetary policy.
An economy is frequently subject to various kinds of disturbances which can be 
expressed as follows
g t  -  JC t =  d i .
The difference between the money growth rate g in period t and the rate of inflation Jt 
in t yield the value of the disturbances d. Disturbances consist of two elements; the 
forecasted value of the disturbance, e ,^ and the forecast error, êt .
et + êt = dt
Taking now the existence of private information into account creates the following 
scenario. The policy maker’s goal is to maximise the social utility function which is 
given by
USt = - (y t - ky)2 - s(jtt - Jt*)2 ; with k > 1,
where Jt* is the optimal rate of inflation and y stands for the equilibrium rate of 
output. Policy makers perceive, from a social point of view, the natural rate of 
employment y as too low and have, therefore, the temptation to raise output to ky via 
monetary expansion. When the public observes inflation it cannot tell whether it is the 
result of an accommodated disturbance or if the policy maker reneged on the p re­
commitment.
The monetary authority tries to forecast disturbances before setting the target growth 
rate of money in this period. If information symmetry is assumed, both the central 
bank and the wage setters observe e  ^ at the same time. In a situation of information
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asymmetry, the public agents do not have this information at the time they negotiate 
their wage contracts. The wage setters have the following utility function
UWt = - ( g i - g ‘^ i-dt)2
and try to form expectations regarding the money growth rate at the time they 
negotiate the contract on the basis of their knowledge of the monetary authority’s 
utility function and the expectation that di is zero. The public is only able to obtain 
information about the disturbances at the end of the contract period t. However, wage 
setters cannot decompose the disturbance into its elements. The policy maker’s utility 
function can be expressed as follows
U Fi- - (gt - gt^ “ - y*)2 - /(g t - Jt*)2
where UFt = U S i^ , /  = s0^ and y* = ( k - l)y&; (with y* = optimal rate of output, 
and y = equilibrium rate of output) is the difference between the players’ output 
goals^k The policy maker sets the target money growth rate to maximise the expected 
value of the social utility function, knowing the public sector’s expectations and its 
own forecast of d^ . The outcome of this scenario is a non-cooperative solution which 
can be found by unravelling backwards the decisions that the players have to make. It 
can be described as follows
gi'  ^= Jt* + et + y*//,
= Jt* + y*//, 
yt = y -0 ê t ,  jtt = Jt* + y * / / - êt,
EUFt"^  = - (1 + f)dc2 - [1 + (l/f)|y*2,
= - de2.
One arrives at a Nash solution where neither player can expect to do better, given the 
strategy of the other. In this non-cooperative solution, the public tries to set the wage 
inflation high enough to keep the monetary authority from giving in to the temptation 
to inflate and to assure that it only accommodates the forecasted money demand
21 Canzoneri (1985, p. 1060)
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disturbance. The inflationary bias of this solution is equal to y*//. The result is sub- 
optimal since it leaves the economy in a state of stagflation^^ with a rate of 
employment which is too low and a level of inflation which is too high. A better 
result (idea! solution^^) could be achieved by eliminating the inflationary bias without 
reducing the output rate
g^c =  # *  +  e t ,  =  J t* ,
y t  =  y - 0 ê t ,  Jtt =  Jt* -  ê t.
EUFt^= - (1 + /)dc2 - y*2 > EUFt«:,
EUWt^ = EUWt"^.
In this case, the monetary authority fully accommodates the predicted money demand 
disturbance, but does not try to alter the rate of output via inflation. This solution is 
cooperative and efficient since no other set of strategies can make one player better 
off without making the other worse off. Nevertheless, as pointed out in previous 
papers the existence of the phenomenon of time-inconsistency of policy jeopardises 
the ideal solution and proves as problematic. If the wage setters commit themselves to 
the cooperative strategy, the monetary authority gains room to manoeuvre towards an 
inflationary outcome. Under these circumstances the policy maker will renege on its 
announced pre-commitment and abandon the co-operative strategy in favour of a 
cheating strategy
gjCh = JT* + + y*/(l + / ) ,
g^ e.ch -  jc*,
EUFt^i = EUFi  ^+ y*2/(l + / ) ,
EUWi^h = EUWt^ - y*2/(l + /).
Comparing the welfare losses, the cheating strategy generates a welfare gain for the 
government relative to the outcome of the cooperative solution, whereas the public 
experiences a welfare loss. Since wage setters know the policy maker’s temptation to
22 Rogoff (1985)
22 Canzoneri (1985, p. 1060)
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inflate, they will almost surely play non-cooperative, unless the government can be 
credibly pre-committed to the ideal policy.
In the case of information symmetry the public knows the value of the forecasted 
money demand disturbance and can, therefore, control whether or not the policy 
maker follows the rule. If inform ation asymmetry prevails, the public lacks 
information since the policy maker does not disclose its forecast data. Canzoneri 
argues that a solution to the pre-commitment problem would be relatively easy to 
find, if information asymmetry is not taken into account. But if the monetary 
authority’s forecast of money demand is indeed private information, a solution to the 
problem seems much harder to come by, since the public cannot easily verify the 
policy maker’s intentions. “No stable resolution o f  the credibility problem can rely on 
the F ed 's own announcem ent o f  its fo reca st i f  the Fed has an incentive to 
misrepresent; the resolution must be, ..., incentive compatible”^^.
Canzoneri takes up the idea of reputation-building in the approach of Barro and 
G ordon, reform ulates it, and shows, despite the assum ption of inform ation 
asymmetry, reputation can still act as a constraint. As earlier discussed in the Barro 
and Gordon model, wage setters behave rationally and revert to a non-cooperative 
strategy of wage setting in this period, when the policy maker has reneged on his 
promise to follow an anti-inflationary policy in the last period. Canzoneri introduces 
private information in the described scenario and reformulates the model. Wage 
setters observe the money demand disturbance di at the end of the period, but are not 
able to decompose it into its elements. The lack of information, therefore, does not 
lead to a reversion of the wage setting strategy when gt > gt^ = jt* + et. It is possible to 
have a reversion triggered if gt > jr* + dt + ê, where ê is an appropriately chosen 
constant. The probability of a reversion can be expressed as follows
24 Canzoneri (1985, p. 1057)
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P (gt - gi^ - ê) = Pr [êt < gt - gt^ - ê],
where P (•) is the cumulative distribution function of the policy m aker’s forecast 
error. When the policy maker reneges and gt > gt^, it increases the probability of a 
reversion next period. Similarly, if ê is lowered, the probability of higher inflationary 
expectations increases. If ê is set small enough, it imposes a constraint on the policy 
makers' behaviour, namely not to create excess inflation. Canzoneri demonstrates that 
it is possible to combine accountability (policy rule) of monetary policy with a 
sufficient degree of flexibility, necessary to perform the stabilisation role.
Canzoneri’s analysis does not consider any learning on the part of the public sector, 
and suffers therefore from a lack of dynamics. Since information asymmetry prevails, 
wage setters are not able to decompose the observed disturbance into its elements. 
There is no mechanism by which the public gains knowledge or makes inferences 
about the policy maker’s type. Instead, Canzoneri introduces the constant ê in his 
analysis, which is chosen by the public and imposes a constraint on the policy 
maker’s behaviour which keeps him from creating excess inflation. Canzoneri argues 
that some rule or discipline must be placed on central bank's behaviour to resolve the 
credibility problem and to achieve a better outcome, while sufficient stabilising 
flexibility needs to be maintained at the same time.
1.7 A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy
Cukierman and M eltzer (1986) offer in their paper an explanation of the policy 
maker’s preference for discretionary policy, which is based upon two major elements, 
the government’s desire to maximise its re-election prospects, and the existence of an 
asymmetric information structure^^. They put forw ard a positive theory of
25 See also Canzoneri ( 1985)
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discretionary policy and investigate the welfare implications of retaining this policy. 
Cukierman and M eltzer’s analyses shall not be discussed in great detail, but the 
following paragraphs will give an overview of the major findings and implications of 
the analyses carried out.
The analysis is based on the assumption that politicians are ‘political entrepreneurs’ 
who try to maximise the likelihood of getting re-elected. This assumption is in 
accordance with a w idely-held view concerning the behavioural patterns in 
dem ocratic institutions in many W estern countries. G overnm ents use their 
instruments to satisfy the socio-economic demands of their members in a game which 
culminates in the attempt of political parties to maximise their votes in the next 
national election.
The controversy between rules and discretion suggests two fundamentally different 
ways of conducting policy. If one assumes that the policy m aker’s actions are 
exclusively focused on the maximisation of social welfare, either strategy would lead 
to a socially optimal outcome. Whereas a policy maker who is primarily interested in 
the maximisation of support on election day would produce under discretion a sub- 
optimal outcome for the society. It is im portant to note that governments with 
discretionary authority differ in their ability to interpret events and in forecasting the 
future which results in a qualitatively different outcome. A government with good 
forecasting ability is likely to produce a better social outcome.
Considering the existence of incomplete information on the part of the private sector, 
the experienced level of welfare under a particular government acts as an indicator of 
its forecasting ability and future performance. The policy m aker’s reaction to the 
vo te r’s way of tracing know ledge from  observations makes the incum bent 
government act in a way that enhances its re-election prospects, namely by increasing 
output at the end of its term of office at the expense of future welfare. The resulting
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welfare loss is “directly traceable to the existence o f  periodic elections, so we call it 
'the cost o f  democracy'. It is larger the greater the frequency o f  elections These 
costs will arise as long as information asymmetry prevails. There are two possible 
ways of eliminating these costs, as suggested by Cukierman and Meltzer, either to 
disclose unreservedly all information on the side of the government to have a fully- 
informed public, or to enforce a constitutional commitment to a socially optimal 
contingent choice of policy instruments. The latter solution would still provide a 
sufficient degree of flexibility, necessary to perform a stabilisation role in the case of 
disturbances. N evertheless, such a com m itm ent involves serious enforcem ent 
problems which shall not be discussed here.
Cukierman and Meltzer base their analyses on the following set-up. An economy is 
frequently subject to disturbances which lie beyond the control of the government. 
The random state variable Xt, which expresses the existence of these disturbances, is 
introduced into the analysis. This random state variable as well as the settings of the 
policy instruments, described as at, affect directly social welfare. A government 
comes into power as a result of democratic elections. Elections are held at the end of 
each office term. The likelihood of re-election increases for the incum bent 
government proportional to the level of welfare experienced by the public under this 
government. Welfare in the current period is a result of the employed set of policy 
instruments in the past and current period. A crucial element in the analyses is that 
past policies affect past as well as present welfare. The welfare function is expressed 
by
Lt = (at-i - xt)2 + (at - Xt)2.
The real value of the disturbance is only observable at the end of period t. The 
beginning of period t is the latest time at which policy instruments can be set, if the 
policy maker wishes to affect the public’s behaviour in the current period t. The
26 Cukierman/Mellzer (1986, p. 368)
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government chooses its set of policy instruments on the basis of obtained information 
about the future. It has to make a choice between two alternatives with different 
im plications for the conduct of policy. If the policy maker wishes to set his 
instruments before the beginning of period t, he chooses the path of pre-commitment, 
which involves a lesser degree of uncertainty. Whereas a government which opts for 
waiting, specifically until the beginning of period t, has the chance to obtain 
additional information. Cukierman and M eltzer refer to these additional information 
as ‘noisy indicators’ for the random state variables Xi and Xt+i which are obtainable 
through observations on the variables
yt^ = Xt + êt° and yt^=Xt+i + êt^
where êt® and êt  ^ are normally distributed white noise processes with zero mean, 
variance a  higher quantity of available information increases the accuracy of the 
forecast and enables the government to choose a more optimal set of policy |
instrument. The government has no incentive to disclose precise information about yt. ;
In fact, complete revelation of all available information on the side of the government !
would preclude the use of economic policy as a tool to improve re-election prospects. t
The public has gone through changes in welfare and knows the level of welfare, Lt, |
experienced in the past periods. It also knows the variance of states of nature, dfr-. But [
the public lacks information in the sense that it cannot determine the relative i
contributions of nature and governmental action to its welfare. Each government is 
characterised by a different value of noise variance, which reflects its forecasting i
ability. This variance is unknown to the public but it tries to make inferences about i
the noise variance on the basis of the level of welfare experienced during the i
incumbency period.
Cukierman and Meltzer use an apolitical benevolent government (social planner) as a i
standard in their model, in order to observe how re-election prospects maximising I
governments behave. The analysis shows that the loss of welfare for the society !
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diminishes, when the social planner delays its decision to the latest possible time, 
which is the start of period t. This outcome contrasts with the result obtained for the 
case where a politically motivated government, facing a partially informed public, is 
entrusted with the well-being of the public. It turns out that the instruments are set 
optimally in the first period, t-1.
The model by Cukierman and Meltzer shows that eveiy government which maximises 
its re-election prospects and possesses private information will choose not to 
maximise social welfare. The costs of democracy will already emerge whenever a 
substantial part of the public lacks information. Consequently, the combination of a 
government with discretionary power with uninformed voters will lead to a sub- 
optimal outcome, due to the government’s behaviour prior to an election. The public 
expects an increase in welfare before the election and makes the decision whom to 
vote for on that basis. This leads to a temporary increase in welfare before the 
election, at the cost of dim inished w elfare afterwards. The implementation of 
constitutional rules, as guidelines for the conduct of policy, is regarded by Cukierman 
and Meltzer as a possibility to eliminate the costs of democracy. The social outcome 
under discretion, proves unsatisfactory since it is sub-optimal, unless an apolitical 
social planner is in charge of generating welfare for the society. Therefore, the 
enforcement of a rule appears to be more agreeable as a possible solution. Various 
problems arise by implementing such a rule: One major problem being the authority 
which enforces the constitutional rule must have the same information as the 
government in order to be able to perform its function properly. The required full 
transfer of information is, first of all, far from easy and secondly, it may not be 
desirable in all cases to disclose all available information. As a consequence “the 
implementation o f  a constitutional rule rests ultimately with the ability o f  the public 
and the incentives on the governm ent to release all available information 
Nevertheless, even if a constitutional rule is enacted, it does not guarantee non­
27 Cukierman/Mellzer (1986, p. 379)
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violation of the rule. The government will still be tempted to violate the rule 
whenever the costs of this violation will occur at a later date to the government than 
the costs of discretion to the public. This temptation is again directly due to the 
existence of information asymmetry.
Cukierman and Meltzer conclude from their study that the demonstrated principles 
“apply to any area in which current governmental decisions affect welfare beyond the 
current period  and in which there is asym metric inform ation."  Furthermore, 
“divergence o f  views within society, differences in information and the electoral 
advantage to the government from  withholding information appear to be sufficiently 
common to explain why most government policy remains discretionary."^^
1.8 Concluding Remarks
The rules versus discretion debate in monetary policy has preoccupied economists 
and non-economists for at least 150 years. The arguments put forward by Kydland 
and Prescott in 1977 convincingly demonstrated for the first time that rules generate a 
better social outcome in comparison to discretion. The identification of the time- 
inconsistency problem of policy, used as the central argument in favour of rules, goes 
back to Nordhaus (1975) and his theory of political business cycles. Nordhaus arrived 
at the conclusion that “a perfect democracy with retrospective evaluation o f  parties 
will make decisions biased against future generations"^^. In other words, politicians 
have the incentive to improve the economic situation prior to elections, regardless of 
the implications of such a policy for the future. Nordhaus demonstrated, on the basis 
of the process of social investment, the general validity of his findings whenever
28 Cukierman/Mellzer (1986, p. 387)
29 Nordhaus (1975, p. 187)
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decisions have to be made in democratic systems which involve inter-temporal 
choice^®.
The occurrence of stagflation and the ‘rational expectations revolution’ called into 
question the established belief of an exploitable Phillips-curve and showed 'that 
rational voters would not be easily fooled by well-timed pre-electoral expansion, 
which had direct implications for the rules versus discretion debate^h This rational 
criticism was incorporated in various analyses and models, such as by Cukierman and 
M eltzer and by Canzoneri who introduced the issue of information asymmetry into 
the general debate. The findings showed that the implications of Nordhaus' analysis 
are still valid, although later studies demonstrated convincingly that voters are not 
myopic and naive, as earlier assumed. These analyses particularly stress and 
demonstrate the difficulties and problems arising from the enforcement of rules as a 
device to achieve credibility and accountability of monetary policy, under assumed 
information asymmetry. Although the findings by Cukierman and M eltzer, and 
Canzoneri do not explicitly suggest the establishment of an independent central bank 
as a solution to the time-inconsistency problem in such a way as Neumann42 does, the 
conclusions drawn, however, point indirectly at central bank independence (CBl) as a 
possible alternative to eliminate the shortcomings of discretion and rules. The anti- 
inflationary record of monetary policy in Germany, which is subject to close 
examination in chapter four, demonstrates the advantages of having an independent 
central bank. The results of a study by Banaian et al. suggest that independent central 
banks have been less accommodative to outside pressures than their less autonomous 
counterparts, leading consequently to substantially lower inflation rates43.
40 Nordhaus (1975, p. 188)
41 Alesina (1989)
42 Neumann (1991, pp. 95-112)
42 Banaian/Laney/WilleU (1983, p. 13)
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The central argument for CBÏ is that the establishment of an independent central 
bank, which is committed to price stability, solves the time-inconsistency problem, by 
replacing discretion with an accountable monetary arrangement, which creates 
credibility of monetary policy and generates a better social outcome. It is argued that 
“once an inflation-conscious credibility has been established by a central hank, its 
occasional departure from  nonlnflationary monetary policy may be overlooked as a 
factor in the form ation o f inflationary expectations"'^. With the setting up of an 
independent monetary authority the inflationary bias can be removed and price 
stability can be achieved in the long-run, with minimum real economic costs. 
Furthermore, an independent central bank which is committed to price stability 
combines the necessary flexibility, needed to react to unanticipated disturbances, with 
credibility, needed to provide a sufficient level of stability for the economy. An 
independent monetary authority seems to provide a better solution to the ‘credibility 
problem’ compared to the fully binding and rather rigid ‘rules-solution’ and the other 
alternative of complete discretion.
The past few years have witnessed a growing interest in the establishment of greater 
legal independence of central banks, which brought about considerable changes in 
central bank legislation. One of the most striking examples provides the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, whose legal status was fundamentally reformed by a new 
central bank statute, enacted in 1989. The Bank was transformed from a legally very 
strongly dependent central bank into one of the most independent. Many countries in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America are studying proposals with similar purpose. 
Furtherm ore, proposals have recently been made by an independent panel of 
economists to give the Bank of England a new mandate as an independent and 
accountable central bank. Another example is the statute of the European Central 
Bank, as embodied in Protocol No. 3 to the Maastricht Treaty, which is strongly
4^  Banaian el. al. (1983, p. 13); Epstein (1992, p. 2) argues that “central bank control over financial 
conditions depends more and more on their ability to affect market expectations, and less on their 
ability to affect the money supply. ’’
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based upon the existing Bundesbank legislation and goes even beyond it. Moreover, 
the experiences with the European Monetary System show that a hard currency peg 
can provide a useful anchor for inflation expectations in countries which rely on 
discretion in the conduct of monetary policy, even if such an arrangement involves a 
significant change in the policy r e g i m e 4 5 .  The low propensity to inflate and the 
international appreciation of the Deutschemark due to the anti-inflationary policy of 
the Bundesbank, enabled Germany to set the monetary standard for many years in 
Europe.
However, there are various counter arguments and general problems arising with the 
establishment of an independent central bank which shall be only mentioned briefly at 
this point. The argument that an independent central bank contradicts and challenges 
established and generally accepted democratic principles of liberal societies is very 
often put forward in this context^). Moreover, fundamental doubts have been raised 
regarding the value of an independent central bank. This is expressed in the concern 
that an independent monetary authority can have its own internal objectives and 
m otivations which can conflict with its general tasks, namely to pursue anti- 
inflationary p o l i c y 47. A lesina (1989) argues that the existence of an independent 
central bank may create co-ordination problems between monetary and fiscal policy. 
Another point which proves problematic is the difficulty to eliminate completely 
indirect or informal political pressure over Central bankers, despite legally guaranteed 
independence.
Nevertheless, the arguments put forward in favour of an independent central bank as 
the ‘monetary custodian’ are very strong and convincing. As Cukierman argues “the
45 Driffill/M llier (1993)
46 Alesina (1989); Castello-Branco/ Swinburne (1992); Epstein (1992, p. 2) stales in this con lex I lhal 
“the expanded rote o f  nondemocratic central banks seems certain to damage the liberal democratic 
structure o f  European and US. capitalism. "
47 A study on the bureaucratic behaviour o f the Bundesbank by Vaubel shows that the members of the 
Central Bank Council mainly favour income, power, and prestige, (in; Dunkcl/JUnemann, 1995)
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intellectual case o f  central hank independence rests on two pillars. One is theoretical 
and the other empirical. The theoretical argument is based on the view that policy­
makers are subject to an inflationary bias.” Whereas the empirical case “rests on the 
observation that there is, cross-sectionally, a negative correlation between various 
proxies fo r  CBI and in fla tion ”^ .  The latter em pirical case for central bank 
independence is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
48 Cukiemian (1994, pp. 1437-38)
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Measures of Central Bank Independence
Measures of Central Bank Independence 
An Empirical Comparison
2.1 Introduction
The first chapter provided a comprehensive overview about the game-theoretical 
content of the ongoing ‘rules versus discretion’ debate. This chapter now examines 
the empirical side of the argument, which Cukierman  ^ calls ‘the second pillar of the 
intellectual case of central bank independence’, by reviewing and assessing different 
measures and indices of central bank independence.
Unlike the vast and well-developed literature on the theoretical foundations of the 
case of central bank independence, there are only a few studies which compare 
existing monetary policy regimes between a large number of countries in order to find 
empirical evidence which corroborates the theoretical case. Only recently has a 
considerable effort been made to prove the validity of the theoretical argument using 
sound empirical evidence. Although the empirical results suggest an inverse relation 
between the rate of inflation and legal independence in industrialised countries, the 
conclusions drawn from such material are less clear-cut than the theoretical literature 
suggests. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund2 questions the reliability 
of conclusions drawn on the basis of empirical evidence. In many of these studies 
correlations are made between the indices of central bank independence and 
macroeconomic variables (inflation, growth), leaving aside external constraints such 
as exchange rate systems which can affect this relationship to some extent. Another
 ^ Cukierman (1994, p. 1437)
2 Castello-Branco/Swinburne (1991)
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aspect which should be taken into account concerns the expressiveness of the 
numerical values of the indices. These values are dependent on (i) criteria applied to 
determine the status of the central bank in relation to the government, (ii) the 
interpretation of the relevant statute in terms of the criteria applied; whether the 
statute meets the criterion; (iii) the method of aggregation of the collected data and 
the com position of the index^. The resulting index incorporates arbitrary and 
subjective features since there is no non-arbitrary way of choosing the criteria and 
there are unavoidable subjective elements in constructing indices of central bank 
independence. Another issue to be considered, as shown by Cukierman (1992), 
although of lesser significance for central banks in developed countries, is the 
possibility that the actual way of conducting monetary policy may deviate from the 
legal arrangem ents. M ost of the em pirical literature focuses exclusively on 
institutional features, disregarding behavioural, political, structural, and historical 
factors as well as the role of personalities, informal arrangements, etc. which shape 
significantly the legal form of the monetary arrangements as well as the actual 
conduct of monetary policy. Grilli et al. (1991) refer to these factors as behavioural 
indicators which are an important dimension of a monetary regime as they help to 
identify the actual monetary regime and its degree of independence from government 
directives. In 1992 Cukierman published a very comprehensive study in which he 
examined 72 industrialised and developing countries on grounds of their monetary 
arrangements and macroeconomic performance. In his paper Cukierman developed 
four measures of central bank independence which allow institutional as well as 
behavioural factors, reflecting the actual practices, to be taken into account. Three 
fundamental types of proxies of central bank independence have appeared so far in 
the literature (i) legal indices, derived from central bank constitutions, (ii) the actual 
turnover of central bank governors, and (iii) answers given by monetary policy 
makers of different countries in the form of a questionnaire on central bank practice.
Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 50)
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Before going into detailed description of the various indices found, it seems helpful in 
this context to briefly introduce deviations in the definition of the notion of central 
bank independence (CBI). In an essay, first published in 1962, Milton Friedman 
distinguishes between a trivial and a more basic meaning of the word ‘independence’ 
in the context of central banking. The notion of independence applied in a trivial 
sense is “when within a central administrative hierarchy, the conduct o f  monetary 
policy is entrusted to a separate administrative organisation which is subordinate to 
the chief executive”, Whereas independence defined in a more basic sense is “that a 
central bank should be an independent branch o f  government, co-ordinate with the 
legislative, executive, and ju d ic ia l branches and with its actions subject to 
interpretation by the jud ic iary”"^ , Friedm an’s definition implies that the monetary 
authority has a mandate to carry out a law passed by the government and its 
operations could only be interfered with by the government if this mandate is changed 
accordingly. His doubts concerning the political acceptability, economic desirability 
and efficiency of the latter will not be discussed at this point. Another definition is 
given by Wood et al. (1993, p. 10) who describe central bank independence as a 
situation where the “government o f  the day has no form al means o f  influencing 
central bank decisions over monetary po licy”. In current monetary policy, there are 
hardly any examples where the central bank has an explicit and clearly defined 
mandate for price stability^.
In order to give a more detailed description and deeper insight into the various 
elements introduced above, this chapter discusses and compares the internal structure 
of major indices of central bank independence and applies these indices to different 
countries with special focus on the monetary arrangements in the Bank of England 
and the German Bundesbank.
4  Friedman (1968, p. 178/179)
5 The Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand has the mandate, which is legally binding, to deliver 0-2 
per cent inflation which is the m ost precise m andate for a central bank concerning price stability in 
operation today.
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2.2 Bade and Parkin’s Index of Central Bank Independence 
A First Empirical Attempt6
Bade and Park in’s empirical study (1988) investigates the relationship between 
monetary regimes and the laws or statutes which define the way in which the conduct 
of monetary policy proceeds in these regimes. The paper examines the experience of 
twelve industrial countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, the United K ingdom, the United S tates, Sweden, and 
Switzerland), for the period from 1972 to 1986 under floating exchange rates.
In order to organise the data and to qualify them for comparison, Bade and Parkin 
(BP) viewed the central bank legislation of the twelve countries in terms of three 
main aspects; (i) the relationship between the central bank and the government in the 
formulation of monetary policy, (ii) procedures for appointing the board of the central 
bank, and (iii) the financial and budgetary relations between the two institutions. On 
the basis of the first two features, Bade and Parkin classified the central banks 
according to their degrees of policy independence. The third feature was applied to 
identify the degree of financial independence from the government. Three criteria 
were used to determine the degree of policy independence:
(1) Is the central bank the final policy authority?
(2) Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the 
bank board?
(3) Are more than half of the board members not appointed by the 
government?
Criterion three requires that only ^  11/21 of the members of the central bank board 
are not to be appointed by the government. As threshold for meeting criterion three 
serves the composition of the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank^. Bade and 
Parkin themselves found that in all cases where the government is in charge of
6 An earlier study was published in 1979 by Fair, who compared the monetary arrangements in 16 
countries without constructing explicit indices, indicating the degree o f independence.
7 Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 62)
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monetary policy form ulation, it also appoints over 12 of the 14 policy board 
members. For each criterion met, the central bank obtains one asterisk. The degree of 
independence increases the more criteria the central bank meets.
According to the number of criteria, eight potential policy types can be distinguished, 
from which only the following four in reality exist.
Central Bank Laws: Policy T y p e s 8
Bank is 
final policy 
authority
No government 
official on 
bank board
Some board 
appointments 
Independent 
of government
Potential 
bank type
Central bank 
type does 
exist
Policy
type
_ (e) yes 1
- * - (0 yes 2* * - (8) yes 3* * * (h) yes 4
TABLE 2.1
Table 2.2 contains the information for each sample country which are needed to 
determine the policy type of the central bank.
Policy Types 9
Country Final
Authority
Government 
Officials on 
Board
Proportion of 
Policy Board 
Appointed by
Number
of
Members
Term
of
Members
Term of 
Governor/ 
Chairman
(see note below) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Australia 8 1 1 10 5 7
Belgium g 0 1 14-17 6 5
Canada b(1967-) 
8(1967+) __
0 ' 12/14 14 3 7
France g 0 12/13 13 6 u
Italy g 0 1 1 3 3Netherlands 8 0 1 5-7 7 7
Sweden 8 0 1 7 3 3United K ingdom g 0 1 18 4 5
Japan b 0 1 7 4 4
United States b 0 1 7 14(N) 4
Germany b 0 10/12 21 8 8
Switzerland b 0 1/5 10 4
TABLE 2.2
8 Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 53)
9 Bade/Parkin (1988, table 1)
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Notes: (a) b = bank, g = government
(b) number o f ministers (or their representatives) who sit on the bank board
(c) number represents proportion o f members appointed directly /indirectly by the government
(d) years (N = not eligible for re-election) (e) u = unlimited term
The degree of financial independence is determined by the following three features; 
(i) budgetary independence, (ii) board m em ber salaries determ ined by the 
government/bank, (iii) profit allocation determined by bank/government/statute. The 
following table shows the financial type of the central bank for each sample country.
Central Bank Laws: Financial Type 10
Country Budgetary Board Members' Profit Allocation
Independence Salaries Determined by Determined by
Japan no g g
Australia yes g gFrance yes . g gSweden yes g gUnited Stales yes g g
Belgium yes b s
Canada yes b s
Germany yes b s
Italy yes b s
Netherlands yes b s
Switzerland yes b s
United K ingdom yes b b
fb =  bank, g = government, s = statute]
TABLE 2.3
Bade and Parkin assigned the same weight to each attribute and simply added up the 
attributes possessed by the central bank to determine its degree of independence. The 
central banks are ranked from 1 (least independent) to 4  (most independent). The 
results of Bade and Parkin's analysis are shown in table 2.4, where the central banks 
are arranged according to their degree financial and policy independence.
Bade/Parkin (1988, table 2)
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Central Bank Types ^  ^
FIN A N C IA L
TY PE
1 2 3 4
PO LICY
TY PE
1 Australia
2 France
Sweden
Belgium
Canada
Italy
Netherlands
United K ingdom
3 Japan United States
4 Germany
Switzerland
TABLE 2.4
Financial Types: 1 government approves budget, determines board members' salaries and profit 
allocation
2 bank determines budget allocation (and reports to government); government 
determines board members' salaries and profit allocation
3 bank determines budget and board members' salaries; profit allocation determined 
by statute
4 bank determines budget, board members' salaries and profit allocation
Policy Types: 1 government is final policy authority, has official on bank board, and appoints all
board members
2 like 1, but no government official on bank board
3 bank is final policy authority but all board appointments made by government
4 bank is final policy authority and some board appointments made independently 
of government
Bade and Parkin continue their analysis with an investigation of the relationship 
between central bank types and monetary policy. The focus is on three aspects of 
monetary policy, (i) inflationary/deflationary stance, (ii) variability of inflation, and 
(iii) the variable to which it reacts. The key feature which characterises post-war 
history of the sample countries is fixed exchange rates. Since a fixed exchange rate 
system ties countries closely together and leaves monetary policy with the task of 
determining the balance of payments. Bade and Parkin have only a restricted amount 
of data available!^ to examine the effect of central bank laws on inflation. The 
inflationary stance is measured by the average rate of change of consumer prices.
*  ^ Bade/Parkin (1988, table 3)
^^The period o f ilexible exchange rates began in 1972.
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Concerning policy variability, the elements which are of greatest interest are the 
variability of inflation, output, and employment. Policy variability, measured in this 
way, would involve the examination of both nominal and real variability. This on the 
other hand would lead to conflicting rankings, due to cross-country differences in 
slopes of short-run trade-offs between output and inflation which would go beyond 
the scope of Bade and Parkin's paper.
Alternatively, Bade and Parkin look directly at variables under the direct influence of 
central banks, such as interest rates, by presupposing that stable interest rates could be 
identified with stable policy. This strategy fails since nominal interest rates ought to 
vary, as one of the instruments to control inflation. Since variations in equilibrium 
interest rates are caused by various factors, one would have to inactivate all these 
factors in order to ensure that only the interest rate causes variability and can 
therefore serve as a real indicator of the variability of monetary policy. Even though 
interest rates are instruments of monetary policy, they are employed to achieve certain 
growth rates of monetary aggregates and are therefore subject to manipulation. 
Interest rates can even serve as intermediate targets to achieve the predicted rate of 
inflation.
For the above reasons, interest rates do not seem appropriate measures of the 
variability of policy. Bade and Parkin take the view that “there is no inherent 
inconsistency in using the variability o f  inflation as the appropriate measure o f the 
variability o f  monetary policy”^^ . The following table ^ 4 contains the average inflation 
and its variability for each sample country, grouped according to the central bank 
policy type.
Bade/Parkin ( 1988, p. 19) 
14 Bade/Parkin ( 1988, table 5)
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Average Inflation and its Variability, Grouped According to Central Bank Type, 
for the Flexible Exchange Rate Period 1972-1986___________________________
C oun try
Inflation R ate Policy V ariability
Type Percent R ank S tan d ard
D eviation
R ank
Australia 1 9.9 (10) 3.2 (7)
Belgium 2 7.1 (6) 3.0 (5)
Canada 7.9 (7) 2.8 (3)
France 9.5 (9) 3.2 (7)
Italy 14.0 0 2 ) 4.6 (10)
Netherlands 5.8 (3) 3.0 (5)
Sweden 8.9 (8) 2.5 (2)
United Kingdom 11.2 (11) 6.0 (11)
Japan 3 6.6 (4) 6.1 (12)
United States 6.9 (5) 3.5 (9)
Germany 4 4.3 (1) 2.0 (1)Switzerland 4.4 (2) 2.8 (3)
TABLE 2.5
In the last part of their paper, Bade and Parkin examine the relationship between 
central bank independence and monetary policy. According to Bade and Parkin, there 
are no apparent differences in inflation rates between the first two categories of 
central banks, which differ only from each other as in the first category a government 
official is present on the central bank board. The third and fourth group are classified 
as independent central banks with Japan and the United States as intermediate central 
banks. The analysis shows that the two most independent central banks, those of 
Germany and Sw itzerland, have delivered a lower inflation than the intermediate 
banks of Japan and the US. However, the data in the table does not demonstrate the 
existence of an association between the policy type and the measure of policy 
variability. Bade and Parkin estimated first order autoregressions for inflation with 
the inclusion of a dummy variable for the German and the Swiss central bank type to 
give formal statistical content to the broad evidence obtained in the more general
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analysis. They conclude from the statistical data that central bank laws only seem to 
influence inflation in the case of the extremely independent central bank type 
prevailing in Germany and Sw itzerland and identify as the key distinguishing 
characteristic the fact that the appointments of board members are not entirely 
controlled by the government in these two countries. Bade and Parkin state in their 
concluding remarks that the results “do seem to confirm the perhaps only vaguely 
expressed idea that central banks are inherently more conservative and more 
disinflationary than the governments which establish them and which they serve“^  ^.
Besides the arbitrariness and subjectiveness which is inherent in this kind of analysis, 
the Bade and Parkin index of central bank independence incorporates a rather 
significant shortcoming which is the equal weighting of the attributes, since some 
institutional features of a monetary regime, such as whether or not the central bank is 
the final policy authority, are more important for the determination of the degree of 
central bank independence than others.
2.3 Alesina's Empirical Analysis of Central Bank Independence
A lesina based his em pirical analysis of central bank independence upon the 
pioneering study by Bade and Parkin. He used the BP proxy of CBI and integrated it 
into the political and business cycle theory to demonstrate that there is a link between 
economic outcomes and political and institutional stability. Alesina shows that there 
is a correlation between the index of political instability and the index of CBI. 
Furthermore, Alesina used additional information about monetary arrangements in 
another five countries (New Zealand, Spain, Denmark, Norway, and Finland), 
provided by Fair (1979) and Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988), and extends the BP
Bade/Parkin (1988, p. 26)
42
Measures of Central Bank Independence
sample to a total number of seventeen countries to be examined. Although Alesina 
employs the BP index of policy independence and the numerical values of his index 
are identical to B P’s classification, the value differs in the case of Italy. Alesina 
identifies the degree of central bank independence for Italy as 1.5 instead of 2 
(according to Bade/Parkin). Alesina gives as reason for its deviation: “Bade and  
Parkin ’s classifications disregard institutional changes in the period considered. The 
Italian Central Bank obtained more economic independence in 1982 Given this 
change we classified Italy as 1.5 rather than 2, as in Bade-Parkin^^“. Alesina 
criticises B P’s disregard for institutional changes and identifies these changes with a 
change in the degree of economic independence. The argument for the case of Italy is 
based upon the divorce of the Banca d ’ltalia from the Treasury in 1981, recognised in 
a study by Tabellini in 1988. The ‘divorzio’ freed the Italian Central Bank from the 
obligation to absorb all excess supply of short-term treasury bills which had a 
disciplinary effect on government spending since it limited the scope for financing 
government deficits via the printing press, which resulted in an increase in the 
independence of the Banca d ’ltalia. The results are summarised in table 2,6 in direct 
comparison with Bade and Parkin’s findings.
If one looks closer at the case of Italy it is striking that, although the divorce was 
taken into account by A lesina, he downgraded the Banca d ’ltalia in terms of 
independence from 2 (BP index) to 1.5. The construction of the index (numerical 
values from I to 4) follows the BP classification. The highest number of obtainable 
asterisks is three which stands for the highest degree of independence (numerical 
value of the index = 4). As Alesina assigns the numerical value of 1.5 to the Italian 
central bank, the Banca d'ltalia only qualifies for the category of the least independent 
central banks.
Alesina ( 1988, p. 42)
43
Measures of Central Bank Independence
Inflation and Central Bank Independence (1973-1986) *7
C ountry Average
Inflation
A lesina index 
o f cen tra l bank  
independence
B ade-Park  in index 
of cen tra l bank  
independence
Italy 13.7 1.5 2
UK 10.7 2 2
Australia 9.7 1 1
France 9.2 2 2
Sweden 8.7 2 2
Canada 7.8 2 2
Belgium 6.9 2 2
US 6.9 3 3
Japan 6.4 3 3
Netherlands 5.5 2 2
Switzerland 4.1 4 4
Gcnnany 4.1 4 4
TABLE 2.6
By taking the divorce of the Italian central bank from the Treasury into account, 
Alesina changed the numerical value of the index of CBI and altered the degree of 
independence of the Banca d'ltalia. It must therefore follow that Alesina introduced a 
fourth criterion, say A4, into his analysis to determine the degree of independence of 
a central bank. The criterion (A4) is whether the central bank is free from the 
obligation to absorb excess supply of short-term treasury bills? Accordingly, 
Alesina’s proxy of central bank independence consists of four separate criteria, B/P 
criteria 1-3 and A4, which yields eight potential policy types. In order to maintain the 
consistency of the index, criterion A4 has to be applied to all the central banks of the 
sample.
Table 2.7 shows, according to Alesina, five different central bank types which can be 
found among the seventeen sample countries. From the table it can easily be seen that 
Alesina did not follow Bade and Park in’s way of weighting and summing up the 
applied attributes. A closer look at the outcome of the analysis suggests that all the
Alesina (1989, p. 81); Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 57)
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central banks of the sample, except Banca dTtalia, have the obligation to finance the 
government’s deficit spending. This is certainly not the case and the result of a closer 
examination of Alesina's proxy of CBI is 'reductio ad absurdum'^^. The index is 
internally inconsistent since not all relevant criteria were applied to each central bank 
of the sample and therefore does not allow a comparison. Alesina failed to construct a 
consistent index of central bank independence.
Alesina Types and Central Bank L a w s  19
B/P policy 
type
C rite rion  A4 
m et?
po ten tia l cen tra l 
b an k  type
C en tra l bank  
type does 
exist?
Alesina
type
1 * (a) no
3 * (b) no -
4 * (c) no -
1 (cl) yes 1
2 * (e) yes 1.5
2 - (0 yes 2
3 - (g) yes 3
4
'
(h) yes 4
TABLE 2.7
2.4 Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini and the Index of Political and 
Economic Independence
Most of the empirical literature on central bank independence compares monetary 
regimes in terms of political independence. The economic dimension has been 
investigated only recently. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (GMT) determined the 
degree of political and economic independence of the central bank for eighteen 
countries. Political independence is defined as “the capacity to choose the fina l goal
Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 59) 
19 Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 58)
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o f monetary policy”, whereas economic independence can be defined in terms of “the 
capacity to choose the instruments with which to pursue these g o a ls ”^ K^ GMT 
identify the undermentioned three features which primarily determine the capacity of 
the monetary authority to choose the final goals of monetary policy.
(i) the procedure for appointing the members of the central bank 
governing bodies
(ii) the relationship between these bodies and the government
(iii) the formal responsibilities of the central bank
The index of policy independence is constructed on the basis of these features. In 
order to determine the degree of political independence, GMT introduced the 
following eight criteria21 into the analysis and investigated the monetary regimes of 
the sample countries in terms of these criteria.
(1) governor not appointed by government
(2) governor appointed for > 5 years
(3) all the board not appointed by government
(4) board appointed for > 5 years
(5) no mandatory participation of government representative in the board
(6) no government approval of monetary policy formulation is required
(7) statutory requirements that central bank pursues monetary stability 
amongst its goals
(8) legal provisions that strengthen the central bank’s position in conflicts
Table 2.8 contains the results obtained by applying the criteria of political 
independence to the eighteen sample countries. GMT classified the central banks of 
the Netherlands and Germany as the most independent ones with a numerical value of 
6, equivalent to the number of asterisks obtained. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
acquired, according to its statute, the same numerical value as the Bundesbank for 
political i n d e p e n d e n c e ^ ^  In fact, the statute of the ECB is closely drafted along the 
line of the Bundesbank statute. According to the construction of the index of political 
independence, Switzerland, the US, Italy, and Canada enjoy a high degree of
2b Grilli el lU. (1991, p. 366)
21 Grilli eta!. (1991, p. 368)
22 The empirical data for political and economic independence of the ECB are taken from a study 
carried out by Alesina and Grilli (1992).
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independence. GMT chose to weight all criteria equally and to sum up the number of 
asterisks obtained by each sample country. The central banks are ranked from 1 (least 
independent) to 6 (most independent). The GMT index is qualitatively and 
quantitatively richer compared to the Bade/Parkin, since it takes more criteria into 
account which convey more inform ation and therefore allows a more precise 
evaluation of each monetary regime.
Political Independence of Central B a n k s  23
A ppointm ents R elationship C onstitution Index of
with Political
G overnm ent Independence
C ountries fri CO (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9)
Australia * * 3
Austria $ * 3
Belgium $ 1
Canada $ * * * 4
Denmark * $ * 3
France * $ 2
Germany * * * * * $ 6
Greece * * 2
Ireland * * * 3
Italy * * $ * 4
Japan * 1
Netherlands * * * $ * * 6
New Zealand 0
Portugal * 1
Spain * * 2
Switzerland *  ^ * * * 5
UK SK 1
US * * * * * 5
ECB * * $ * * * 6
TABLE 2.8
In the second part of their analysis, GMT shed light on the aspect of the economic 
independence of m onetary policy by constructing an index of econom ic 
independence, which incorporates the following features:
23 Grilli et al. (1991, p. 368)
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(i) monetary arrangements between the public sector and the central 
bank determining the extent of the monetary financing of budget 
deficits
(ii) the nature of monetary instruments under the control of the central 
bank
The two features are subdivided into the following criteria:
(i) (1) direct credit facilities: not automatic
(2) direct credit facilities: market interest rate
(3) direct credit facilities: temporary
(4) direct credit facilities: limited amount
(5) central bank does not participate in primary market for public debt
(ii) (6) discount rate set by central bank
(7) banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank (**) or not 
entrusted to the central bank alone (*)
Table 2.9 contains the abovelisted criteria, applied to the sample countries.
Economic Independence of Central B anks24
Monetary Financing 
of Budget Deficit
Monetary
Instruments
Index of 
Economic 
Independence
Countries _ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Australia * * * * * * 6
Austria * * * * ** 6
Belgium * * * ** 6
Canada # * * * * ** 7
Denmark * * * ** 5
France * * $ ** 5
Germany  ^ $ * * * * * 7
Greece * * 2
Ireland * * * * 4
Italy * 1
Japan * * * * * 5
Netherlands * * * * 4
New Zealand * * 3
Portugal * * 2
Spain * * 3
Switzerland * * * * ** 7
UK * * * * * 5
US * * * * * * 7
(D CO (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)a (8)b (9)
ECB * * $ * * * * * 8
TABLE 2.9
^ no ix)rlfolio constraints in place since 1980 } Alesina/Grilli (1992, p. 72) used the data and
" no bank loan ceilin/>s in place since 1980 ) systematic of Grilli et al. (1991)
24 Grilli et al. (1991, p. 369)
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In terms of the first set of criteria, economic independence is greater the more of the 
criteria are met by the central bank. The same applies to the second set, the monetary 
instruments. As before, to determine the overall degree of economic independence of 
the central banks in the sample countries, the attributes are weighted equally and 
simply summed up. The monetary regimes in Canada, the US, Switzerland, and 
Germany enjoy the highest degree of independence, followed suit by Belgium, 
Austria, and Australia. The ECB, however, has the highest degree of economic 
independence overall (8 asterisks) and displays once again striking similarities with 
the Bundesbank. The ECB is not allowed to grant credit lines to Community or 
national public institutions, not even on a temporary basis. The result of the analysis 
carried out shows that political and economic independence is not always positively 
correlated. The Nederlandsche Bank is a good example to demonstrate this negative 
correlation, with a numerical value of 6 for the index of policy independence and a 
score of 4  in terms o f economic independence. The results of the analysis are 
illustrated in figure 2.1.
According to GMT, four groups of countries are identifiable. The set of countries in 
the upper-right section have the most independent central banks, both in political and 
in economic terms. Those countries in the lower-left part of the diagram, Greece, New 
Z e a l a n d 25, Portugal, and Spain, have highly dependent central banks. The group of 
countries in the lower-right part of the diagram enjoys a comparably high degree of 
economic independence which nevertheless can be combined with unsustainable debt
paths26.
25 The reccnl reforms in Ihe Federal Reserve of New Zealand changed its status drastically and 
increased the degree of independence. It now belongs to the group of the most independent central 
banks.
2^ Belgium: index of economic independence = 6, but public debt in GNP of more than 140% (The 
European, 1-7 Ju ly1994)
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Political i n d e p e n d e n c e  
9
* NE * WG
S W * * U S
" IT *CA
* IR * D * A
-A U
*G * S *F
‘ P UK * • J * B
*NZ
3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A = Australia  
AU = Austria  
B = B e lg iu m  
CA =  Canada  
D = Denm ark  
F = France
Econom ic  in d ep en d e n c e
WG = W e st  G erm a n y
G = G r eece
IR = Ireland
IT = Italy
J = Ja p a n
NE = N e th er lan d s
NZ = N e w  Z ealand  
P = Portugal  
S = Sp ain  
S W  = Switzer land  
UK = United K in gd om  
U S = United S ta te s
FIGURE 2.1: Political and Economic Independence of C entral Banks
GMT conclude their analysis with an investigation of whether there is a relation 
between CBI and inflationary performance. The results of the regressions confirm the 
findings by Alesina (1989) and Bade/Parkin (1982), that a more independent central 
bank is on average associated w ith low er inflation w ithout w orsening the 
macroeconomic outcome. GMT state, therefore, that “having an independeni central 
hank is almost like having a ft-ee lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in 
terms o f macroeconomic performance "27
27 Grilli etal. (199l,p . 375)
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The monetary arrangem ents of the Bundesbank and the Bank of England are 
discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs on basis of the GMT criteria. 
The appointment procedure for membership in the central bank governing bodies is 
the first subject of closer examination. By legal definition, embodied in article 5 o f  
the Bundesbank Law (Bundesbankgesetz [BBkGJ), the Bank consists of three bodies, 
“the Central Bank Council (Zentralbankrat), the Directorate (Direktorium), and the 
Boards o f  the nine Land Central Banks (Landeszentralbanken)". The Central Bank 
Council (CBC) is the supreme body of the Bundesbank (article 6 BBkG) and consists 
of the President, the Deputy President, up to six members of the Directorate, and the 
nine Presidents of the Land Central Banks. The President, the Deputy President, and 
the members of the Directorate are appointed by the Bundesprasident (speaker of the 
Bundestag) on the Federal Government’s recommendation. The Directorate consists 
of the President and the Deputy President of the Bundesbank and up to six members. 
All members are nominated by the Federal Government and appointed by the 
Bundesprasident. Appointees must have “specialprofessional qualifications” (article 
7, par. 2 BBkG) which is a rather vague requirement. One characteristic feature of the 
Bundesbank is its relatively low personnel turnover which can be attributed to the 
appointment of the President, the Deputy President, and the other Directorate 
members for a tenure of 8 years, embodied in article 7, par. 3 BBkG.
The constitutional arrangements, regarding the Bank's pursuit of price stability among 
its policy goals, and the legal provisions, which strengthen the Bank's position in the 
case of conflict with the government, will now be investigated. The relationship to the 
government is regulated in the articles 12 and 13 of the Bundesbank Law. Article 13 
gives the Federal Government the right to attend sessions of the Central Bank 
Council. On a motion by the Federal Government, the passing of a resolution of the 
CBC can be delayed up to two weeks. The Federal Government does not have a vote, 
but it has the right as well as the obligation to consult with and advise the central bank
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on matters of considerable importance for the economy as a whole and the monetary 
policy of the Bundesbank, The Bundesbank has the obligation “to support the general 
economic policy o f  the Federal Government” under maintenance of its tasks (article 
12, BBkG). On the other hand, article 12 guarantees the Bundesbank’s independence 
from governmental directives which eliminates the possibility of political pressure 
being exerted on monetary decisions. The primary task of the Bundesbank is the 
safeguarding of the stability of the currency, embodied in article 3 BBkG. The 
Bundesbank obtained only one asterisks in the set o f criteria concerning the 
appointment procedure, but met all the other criteria concerning its relationship to the 
government and the constitution. In the political as well as in the economic dimension 
of CBI, the Bundesbank scored the highest overall number of asterisks.
In contrast to the Bundesbank, Great B ritain’s monetary custodian, the Bank of 
England, performs poorly in terms of political independence obtaining only one 
asterisk for criterion five, no mandatory participation of a government representative 
in the board. The supreme authority of the Bank of England is the Court of Directors, 
made up of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and sixteen Directors. The directors 
represent various sectors of society. Four of the directors are appointed full-time 
executive directors, whereas the other twelve are part-time external directors, who 
represent the banking sector, industry, etc.. All members of the Court of Directors are 
appointed by Her Majesty (article 2, par. 2 Bank o f  England Act 1946) on the Prime 
Minister's recommendation. The term of office for the Governor and the Deputy 
Governor is five years, whereas the Directors are appointed for a tenure of four years. 
Monetary policy in the United K ingdom is regarded as a component of economic 
policy and is therefore determined by the government, with the Bank of England as its 
monetary advisor. The Treasury is entitled to give directions to the Bank of England, 
article 4, Bank o f  England Act. It is stated in a memorandum in 1980 by the Bank that 
“economic policy is the responsibility o f  the Government and is determined by
52
28 Memorandum by the Bank of England, 1980, pp. 177-80 (in particular paragraph 14)
29 W eber (1991, p. 382) and article 27 BBkG
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Ministers. Policy decisions are, however, the end product o f  the assimilation and  I
discussion o f  studies, forecasts, advice and proposals available to Ministers from  a 
wide range o f  sources, in which proce.sses the Bank o f  England has a role to play 
which can be distinguished from  that o f  Government departm ents”'^ .^ Since the 
government determines monetary policy, the fact that there is no government official 
in the Court of Directors looses its meaning. The Bank of England has practically no 
policy independence.
The GMT index of economic independence will now be examined for the same two 
cases. The Bundesbank acquired the highest obtainable number of asterisks in this 
category and stands, therefore, again for the greatest degree of independence. The 
constitution of the Bundesbank does not allow a monetising of budget deficits, 
(article 3 BBkG). Although article 12 BBkG  obliges the Bundesbank to support the 
general economic policy of the government, it only ought to do so if this does not 
jeopard ise its primary task of maintaining price stability. Article 20 regulates the 
transactions between the Bundesbank and the public administration and stipulates the 
limit for short-term loans from the Bundesbank to public bodies. However, the 
Bundesbank’s substantial annual profits accrue to the Treasury. This source of income 
is already anticipated by the Treasury in the annual budget planning which puts 
pressure on the Bundesbank to distribute its profits, although this might conflict with 
its prim e objective of price stab ility .29 For the monetary m anagem ent, the 
Bundesbank has the discount rate and Lombard rate policy, the open-market policy, 
and the minimum-reserve policy at its disposal. The Bundesbank sets the interest and 
discount rates, (article 15 BBkG). The supervision of the banking sector is fully 
entrusted to an independent authority, the Federal Credit Regulatory Agency 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fiir das Kreditwesen). The Federal Credit Regulatory Agency 
(FCRA) is an autonomous body w ithin the Ministry of Economics which exercises
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responsibility for the whole German banking sector. The FCRA is obliged to co ­
operate with the Bundesbank {article 7, par. I Credit Law j, especially in cases of 
serious banking mism anagem ent which have significant consequences for the 
economic sphere.
According to the GMT index of economic independence, the Bank of England, with 
an overall score of 5 asterisks, ranks among the most economically independent 
central banks. The Banking Act of 1979 formulated the responsibilities of the Bank of 
England. Its major task is the supervision of the banking system, (article 1 Banlcing 
Act 1979). Although the Bank of England does not provide credit facilities to the 
government, it does participate in the primary market as a buyer of government 
securities. The relation between the index of economic independence and the index of 
policy independence in the case of the Bank of England provides a striking example 
of a negative correlation between these two categories of independence, and stresses 
the importance of such a division in providing a more truthful picture of the degree of 
overall legal independence of a central bank. Nevertheless, it seems problematic to 
assign an equal weight to the attributes because it can give rise to misleading 
conclusions. The highest overall num ber of asterisks obtained for policy 
independence is six, although the highest degree of independence, according to the 
structure of the policy index, is eight. Attributes six, no government approval of 
monetary policy formulation is required, and seven, statutory requirement that central 
bank pursues monetary stability among its goals, seem crucial for the determination 
of the degree of independence of a central bank. If the appointment procedure of the 
central bank board, in particular of the governor, is made independent from the 
government this is certainly of relevance in determining the degree of independence, 
but loses some of its significance as an attribute if the government's approval of 
monetary policy formulation is required.
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If one compares the GMT index with the BP index it becomes apparent that the GMT 
criteria 5 and 6 are identical to Bade and Park in’s criteria 2 and 1, whereas GMT's 
criterion 3 differs from BP's criterion 3. The aggregation procedures in both analyses 
are identical and differences in the numerical values are caused by differences in the 
interpretation of the central bank statutes (interpretation effect) and a difference in the 
formulation of attribute 3 (criterion effect). However, only the criterion effect will be 
of concern at this point. Table 2.10 contrasts the results obtained by GMT and BP 
concerning the criteria 3 ,5 , and 6.
Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini versus B ad e-P ark in 39
Country GMT 
Policy Type
BP
Policy Type
Interpretation
Effect
Criterion
Effect
Difference
Australia 1 1
Belgium 1 2 -1 -I
Canada 1 2 -1 -1
France 1 2 -1 -1
Germany 3 4 -1 -1
Italy 3 2 +1 +1
Japcin 1 3 -2 -2
Netherlands 3 2 +1 4-1
Switzerland 3 4 -1 -1
UK 2 2
US 3 3
Sweden - 2
TABLE 2.10
Criterion three, in both indices, concerns the appointment of members of the central 
bank board. The difference between BP's and GMT's formulation of attribute 3 is that 
BP require a simple majority'^^ of board members not to be appointed by the 
government, while GMT require all board members not to be appointed by the 
government. GMT's formulation of criterion 3 is stricter, which leads to a change in 
the ranking of the Bundesbank, the Schweizerische National bank, and the Banca 
d'ltalia. The latter is upgraded (+1), whereas the Bundesbank and the Schweizerische
3" EijlTlngcr/Schaling (1993, p. 63)
31 Eleven out oC twenty board members not to be appointed by the government, as the threshold serves 
the composition of the Central Bank Council o f the Bundesbank. Eijffinger/Sclialing (1993, p. 63)
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Nationalbank are downgraded (-1), Because these two banks do not meet the strict 
version of GMT's criterion 3, they become intermediate banks (index = 3), which 
classifies both central banks as equal to the Federal Reserve in terms of political 
independence. Considering that the Bundesbank has the legal obligation to maintain 
price stability, contrary to the Federal Reserve, it does not seem justified that both 
banks represent the same category. The Banca d'ltalia is the only central bank to meet 
GMT's criterion 3 and acquires with the additional asterisk obtained by GMT 
standards the same status as the Bundesbank. By introducing a very strict requirement 
concerning the appointment of the central bank board, GMT's classification creates 
bias to the ranking of the central banks of Italy, Germany, and Switzerland.
The next index to be discussed is the Eijffinger-Schaling index which avoids parts of 
earlier criticism by weighting the criteria differently.
2.5 The Eijfïïnger/Schaliiig Index of Policy Independence
In 1993 Eijffinger and Schaling published a comparative analysis of some influential 
empirical studies on central bank independence and concluded their investigations 
with the composition of a new index of policy independence. Eijffinger and Schaling 
(ES) follow the GMT definition of policy independence as the 'capacity o f  the central 
hank to choose the fina l goal o f  monetary policy'. They identify the following features 
as the major determinants of this capacity:
(i) the procedures for appointing the board of the central bank,
(ii) the relationship between central banks and government in the 
formulation of monetary policy,
(iii) formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect 
to monetary policy.
These features are used to construct the Eijffinger/Schaling index of policy 
independence. The degree is determined using three criteria:
56
Measures of Central Bank Independence
(1) Does the central bank have the final policy authority (b); does it 
share this authority with the government (b/g), or is monetary policy 
completely entrusted to the government (g)?
(2) Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the 
bank board?
(3) Are more than half of the board appointments made independent of the
govemment?32
From the twelve resulting policy types only five in reality exist which are shown in 
table 2.11.
Eijffinger/Schaling Policy T y p e s 3 3
Bank is final 
policy 
authority
No government 
official on 
bank board
Some board 
appointments 
independent of 
government
Potential 
central bank 
type
Policy type
-(g) (h) I
-(g) * - (i) 2
*(b/g) * - 0 ) 3**(b) - (k) 4
**(b) * * (I) 5
TABLE 2.11
The first four central bank types resemble the BP types (a)-(d). Contrary to BP and 
GMT, Eijffinger and Schaling weigh the attributes differently. A country acquires two 
asterisks if policy making is exclusively entrusted to its central bank. If it shares 
monetary responsibility with the government, the central bank obtains only one 
asterisks and it receives no asterisks if the government is the sole final policy 
authority. The resulting index is asymmetrical because the attributes are not weighted 
equally. The GMT and the ES index of policy independence is composed of three 
major aspects
(i) the relationship between the central bank and the government,
(ii) appointment procedure of the board members, and
(iii) the formal responsibilities of the central bank.
32 Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 64)
33 Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 65)
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GMT weight these features symmetrically and assess them separately. By doing so, 
they allow a trade-off between feature (i) and (iii), the capacity to pursue a monetary 
policy goal and the content of such a goal. Eijffinger and Schaling demonstrate this 
trade-off by using the example of the Bank of Australia, which has the provision of 
pursuing monetary stability among its goals but is at the same time subservient in 
status to the government. The GMT procedure implies that a central bank which is 
subservient yet has the provisions for monetary stability is as autonomous as an 
independent central bank without these provisions'^. Eijffinger and Schaling avoid 
the trade-off by assessing feature (i), who is the final policy authority, in conjunction 
with feature (iii), the goals of monetary policy.
Eijffinger and Schaling's findings are shown in table 2.12 with the five existing 
central bank types ranked from 1 (least independent) to 5 (most independent).
Eijffinger-Schaling Index of Policy Independence Versus Bade-Parkin
C ountry ES policy type BP policy type In te rp re ta tio n
effect
C riterion
effect
Australia 1 I 0 0
Belgium 3 2 +1 0
Canada 1 2 -1 0
France 2 2 0 0
Germany 5 4 0 +1
Italy 2 2 0 0
Japan 3 3 -1 +1
Netherlands 4 2 +2 0
Switzerland 5 4 0 +1
UK 2 2 0 0
US 3 3 -1 +1
Sweden 2 2 0 0
TABLE 2.12
The differences in the numerical values between the ES and the BP policy index are 
interpretation and criterion effects. The interpretation effects are caused by different
34 Eijffinger/Schaling (1993, p. 66)
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interpretations of the central bank statutes. The criterion effect occurs because of ES's 
asymmetrical weighting of the attributes and the trade-off in BP's index between the 
criteria. Nevertheless, the ranking of the Bundesbank and the Bank of England does 
not change. The Bundesbank is classified by both indices as most independent, 
whereas the Bank of England ranks among the least independent central banks.
Eijffinger and Schaling made a valuable contribution to the empirical literature on 
central bank independence by constructing a new index of policy independence, based 
on an asymmetrical weighting of the attributes, and also by delivering a critical 
assessment of the existing indices of CBI.
2.6 A Broader Empirical Approach to CBI: Indices of Legal and 
Actual Independence
A recent and very comprehensive study on central bank independence, comprising 72 
industrialised and developing countries, was produced by Cukierman in 1992. He 
employs four types of indices of CBI and investigates their relation to the inflationary 
outcomes in the sample countries. The novelty in Cukierman’s analysis is the attempt 
to introduce indicators of actual independence in the empirical literature in order to 
give a deeper and more comprehensive insight into existing monetary regimes. The 
basic difficulty of measuring central bank independence lies in the multitude of 
factors involved for example, legal factors, most important in industrial countries, and 
cultural and personal factors, which determine the degree of independence, and are in 
their nature hard to quantify in numerical terms.
The four indices applied in Cukierman's study are one measure of legal CBI, derived 
from the central bank charters, and three indices of actual independence; (i) the rate of 
turnover of central bank governors, (ii) an index based on a questionnaire answered
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by central bankers in 23 countries, and (iii) an aggregation of the legal index to the 
rate of turnover. The last measure is defined as “the fraction o f  political transitions 
that are followed within six months by a replacement o f  the central hank governor”. 
The first three indices on the other hand “reflect, in the firs t place, the level o f  
independence that legislators meant to confer on the central hank”^^. Cukierman's 
caution concerning an analysis of central bank independence solely based upon legal 
aspects is twofold. “First, the laws are incomplete in that they cannot specify 
explicitly the limits o f  authority between the central hank and the political authorities 
under the contingencies ... and second, even when the law is quite explicit, actual 
practice may deviate from  i t”^^.
2.6.1 Measures of Legal Central Bank Independence
Cukierman's analysis of legal central bank independence follows two principles, the 
application of only a few and narrowly defined legal characteristics and the use of 
only written information from the central bank constitutions, to determine the degree 
of independence. The legal characteristics are grouped into four clusters:
(1) appointment/dismissal procedure and the term of office of the 
chief executive officer (CEO)
(2) relationship between government and central bank concerning
policy formulation, the resolution of conflicts, and the role of the 
central bank in the budgetary process
(3) objectives of the central bank
(4) limitations on lending to the public sector.
Each cluster consists of different legal variables which are coded on a scale from 1 
(most independent) to 0 (least independent). The result is an overall number of 
sixteen legal variables (Appendix I). The legal variables are weighted differently to 
indicate which ones are expected to lead to a greater autonomy for the central bank, 
Cukierman assigned the greatest significance for central bank independence to the
35 Cukierman (1994, p. 1439)
3^ Cukierman el al. ( 1992, p. 355)
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first variable, the appointment procedure (weight of 0.20). This stands in contrast to 
Eijffinger and Schaling's view who assigned the greatest significance to the policy 
formulation, i.e. is the central bank the sole policy authority? The time frame used 
covers the four decades from 1950 to 1989, divided into four sub-periods: 1950-59, 
1960-71, 1972-79, and 1980-89. Furthermore, Cukierman considered changes in 
central bank legislation over the period examined. W henever a change occurred 
within a decade, it was only considered when the changed legislation was in effect 
during at least half of that decade. In order to obtain a hierarchy of indices, 
Cukierman aggregated the individual components of legal independence. The basic 
sixteen legal variables were aggregated into eight variables. The variables describing 
the appointment procedure and the term of office of the governor were incorporated 
in a single variable, called CEO. The variables under policy formulation were also 
aggregated into a single variable. The objective variable was treated separately as 
well as the four first variables for limits on lending. The last four variables in this 
category were averaged with equal weight into a single variable. The final step in the 
aggregation procedure produced a single index for each country and decade, by 
aggregating again the eight variables obtained from the first round. The resulting 
index of legal central bank independence is similar to an index aggregated with 
equally weighted variables. Table 2.13 ranks the industrial countries according to 
their index of legal CBI for the period 1980-8937.
The central banks of Germany and Sw itzerland display the highest degree of 
independence and the lowest average rate of inflation. However, the results in the 
table do not demonstrate the existence of a clear-cut association between the average 
rate of inflation and the degree of central bank independence. Japan's central bank for 
example ranks at the bottom of the table, which indicates a high degree of dependence
37 Cukierman cl a!. (1992, p. 362)
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Legal Central Bank Independence and Average Annual Inflation, 1980-89
In d u stria l Econom y
Economy Legal cen tra l ban k  independence 
(index)
A verage annua l ra te  of 
in tlation  
(percent)
Germany, Fed. Rep. of 0.69 3
Switzerland 0.64 3
Austria 0.61 4
Denmark 0.50 7
United States 0.48 5
Canada 0.45 6
Ireland 0.44 9
Netherlands 0.42 3
Australia 0.36 8
Iceland 0.34 32
Luxembourg 033 5
Sweden 0.29 8
Finland 0.28 7
United K ingdom 0.27 7
Italy 0.25 11
New Zealand 0.24 12
France 0.24 7
Spain 0.23 10
Japan 0.18 3
Norway 0.17 8
Belgium 0.17 5
TABLE 2.13
on the government. Nevertheless, Japan performs very well in terms of inflation, with 
the same average inflation as the two countries with the most independent central 
banks. The same applies to Belgium with a legal index of CBI of 0.17 (least 
independent) but an average annual rate of inflation of 5 percent. Cukierman's 
findings seem to confirm Bade and Parkin’s conclusion, that central bank laws only 
influence the inflationary performance in the case of an extremely independent central 
bank. The Cukierman index of legal CBI classifies again the Bundesbank as the most 
independent central bank. Although the Bank of England ranks in the bottom half of 
the table it performs, according to Cukierman's index, better than the Banque de 
France and the Banca d'ltalia. This contrasts with the findings by Eijffinger and 
Schaling, Bade and Parkin, and GMT who classified in their analyses the two latter
6 2
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banks as more independent than the Bank of England. Since Cukierman assigned 
asymmetrical weights to the legal variables, with the most weight on the appointment 
procedure, it could be instructive to carry out sensitivity analysis with small changes 
in the weighting of the variables to investigate how this would affect the ranking of 
the central banks. Even if one would change the weights assigned to the variables, the 
ranking of the Bundesbank vis-à-vis the Bank of England would remain the same. 
The Bundesbank's overall performance in terms of independence is for all variables, 
apart from two, at least equal or better than the Bank of England's score. The only two 
variables, which are rather insignificant, where the Bank of England outperforms the 
Bundesbank are Id; May CEO hold other offices in government?, and 4d, potential 
borrowers from the bank^^.
2.6.2 Indicatoi’s of Actual Independence
The actual degree of central bank independence is determined, as already mentioned, 
by a whole catalogue of factors which are difficult to quantify. The central bank 
charter is only one of several elements in this catalogue of factors. Although 
Cukierman's analyses show that the legal status of a central bank is the most 
significant factor for the determination of its degree of independence for industrial 
countries, one should consider other less striking factors as well which have shaped 
the current constitution in the past and influence the conduct of monetary policy 
today. Cukierman remarks on this point, “many central hank laws are highly  
incomplete and leave a lot o f  room fo r  interpretation. As a result, factors such as 
tradition or the personality o f  the governor and other high officials o f  the hank at 
least partially shape the actual level o f  central hank independence”'^ ''^ .
38 See Appendix 2.1
3^ Cukierman cl al. (1992, p. 361)
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It proves difficult to find systematic indicators of actual independence in cases of 
divergence from legal independence. Cukierman tried to approach the dimension of 
actual CBI by developing two indicators of actual independence from the actual 
frequency of change of the governor and from responses to a questionnaire sent to 
central bankers of various countries. These two indicators shall not be discussed in 
great detail within the realms of this paper, since Cukierman's findings suggest an 
insignificance of the two indicators for the determination of the degree of CBI in 
industrialised countries. Nevertheless, the find ings are highly interesting and 
especially relevant for the determination of CBI for the set of developing countries. i
i
The results show that politically vulnerable and unstable countries, such as the i
majority of the developing countries, have a high actual turnover of central bank i
governors which deviates significantly from the legal term of office, as embodied in i
1the respective central bank constitutions. The indicator is based on the presumption i
that a large turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower degree of I
independence. One of the most striking examples is Argentina, in which the legal i
term of office is four years but the actual term of office is less than one year (0.93)^^, !
which is due to an informal tradition that the central bank governor is supposed to i
offer his resignation whenever there is a change of government or finance minister. i
The actual degree of independence of the Argentinean central bank is, therefore, j
substantially lower than suggested by the legal index. A low governor turnover does |
not necessarily imply a high degree of independence since a subservient governor 1
may stay in office for a long time. This might be true for countries with an j
exceptionally low central bank governors’ turnover rate, such as Iceland, the i
Netherlands, and Denmark. Table 2.14 shows the governors’ turnover rates for the i
group of industrialised countries. Cukierman argues that the threshold turnover, above 
which CBI declines seriously, is somewhere between 0.2 and 0.25 changes per year, i
since most countries have an electoral cycle of at least four years. The average
Cukierman ( 1991, p. 384)
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turnover rates for all industrialised countries are not higher than 0.20, from which it 
can be concluded that the central bank governors’ turnover rate does not contribute 
much to explaining variations in independence within that group. On the contrary, in 
the group of developing countries the turnover rates vary widely and seem, therefore, 
more likely to reveal variations in the independence of the governors.
Central Bank Governors’ Turnover Rates 1950-89 (average number o f changes per
annum)41
C oun try T u rn o v e r R ate
Icehuid 0.03
Netherlands 0.05
Denmark 0.05
Luxembourg 0.08
Nonvay 0.08
Italy 0.08
United K ingdom 0.10
Canada 0.10
W est Germany 0.10
United States 0.13
Finland 0.13
Belgium 0.13
Switzerland 0.13
Sweden 0.15
Ireland 0.15
France 0.15
New Zealand 0.15
Japan 0.20
Spain 0.20
TABLE 2.14
The second indicator is based on subjective answers by qualified individuals to a 
questionnaire which contained various aspects of CBI. The questionnaire was divided 
into five groups of issues:
(1) legal aspects of central bank independence,
(2) actual practice when it differs from the stipulation of the law,
(3) monetary policy instruments and the agencies controlling them,
(4) intermediate targets and indicators,
(5) final objectives of monetary policy and their relative i m p o r t a n c e ' ^ ^
Cukierman (1991, p. 383) 
Cukierman ( 1991, p. 386)
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Several questions in the questionnaire resemble some of the issues which form the 
basis of the legal variable, but they focus on the actual practice rather than on the law. 
Although the judgements given in the questionnaire are subjective, they help to 
identify d ifferences between actual practice in monetary policy and its legal 
definition. The questionnaire is composed of seven variables which are weighted 
asymmetrically, as shown in table 2.15.
Questionnaire Variables and Weights^^
V ariab le N um bei V ariab le D escription W eight
1 Tenure of central bank CEO overlap with 
political authorities
0.10
2 Limitations on lending in practice 0.20
3 Resolution of conflict O.IO
4 Financial independence 0.10
5 Intermediate policy targets 0.15
6 Actual priority given to price stability 0.15
7 Function as a development bank, granting credit 
at subsidy rates?
0.20
TABLE 2.15
Each variable is subdivided into different aspects and a numerical code is assigned to 
each of these aspects. The questionnaire based index of CBI probably contains more 
information than the legal index, since it questions the actual way in which monetary 
policy is conducted, which can d iffer widely from the monetary arrangements 
embodied in the central bank constitutions. Nevertheless, the main limit of this 
indicator is the fact that it is only based on responses from a small number of 
countries. The results indicate clearly that the actual degree of central bank 
independence in developing countries is significantly lower than suggested by the 
findings for legal independence. This contrasts with the results obtained for legal 
independence, where the two groups of countries perform rather similar. Cukierman
Cukierman cl al. (1992, p. 366)
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received responses from tw enty-four countries which are integrated in the 
questionnaire based index of CBI, shown in table 2.16.
Questionnaire-Based Index of Central Bank Independence^
C ountry Q uestionnaire-based index of cen tra l ban k  independence
Germany, Fed. Rep. 1.00
Costa Rica 0.81
Finland 0.78
Auslralia 0.76
Ilaly 0.73
Denmark 0.73
Bahamas, The 0.71
Luxembourg 0.66
France 0.65
Uniled K ingdom 0.64
South Africa 0.64
Zaire 0.61
Lebanon 0.59
Ireland 0.57
Barbados 0.54
Uganda 0.53
Uruguay 0.49
Belgium 0.47
Turkey 0.44
Tanzania 0 3 8
Peru 022
Yugoslavia 0.17
Ethiopia 0.13
TABLE 2.16
Subsequently, Cukierman turns in his analysis to the relationship between inflation 
and central bank independence. The general hypothesis is that inflation is negatively 
related to CBI which is based on presumptions put forward by the theoretical 
literature on ‘rules versus discretion'. However, legal independence of a central bank 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for low inflation, as the findings by 
Cukierman and other authors have shown.
^  Cukierman cl al. (1992, p. 388)
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In order to investigate the relationship between CBI and inflation, Cukierman 
regressed inflation on various indices of CBM^, related the index of legal CBI and the 
turnover rate of central bank governors to a transformed inflation rate (D), which 
represents the annual real depreciation of a given amount of money, with D = jc / (1 + 
3t), where jc is the inflation rate. The transformed inflation rate takes a value from 0 to 
1.0. The results of the regression of D on disaggregated indices of legal CBI are 
statistically insignificant. Cukierman, therefore, carried out another regression with 
the aggregate index of legal independence. This time, the aggregate legal variable is 
statistically significant for the group of industrial countries, which indicates that laws 
do make a difference. The contrary is observed for the set of developing countries, for 
which the statistical evidence does not reveal that the central bank constitution 
contributes to explaining the variations of inflation rates across periods and between 
countries. The turnover rate for the subsample of industrial countries is insignificant, 
whereas it is highly significant for the developing countries. Figure 2.2^^^ illustrates 
the relation between the results obtained for the two subsamples, industrial and 
developing countries.
Inflation (D)
A Inflation (D)
developing
industrial
Legal Independence
developing
industrial
Turnover Rate
FIGURE 2.2
The left graph shows the partial relation between the aggregate index of legal CBI and 
the transform ed inflation rate (D). The significance of legal central bank
details about the regression procedure can be found in Cukierman et. al. ( 1992) 
Cukierman ct al. (1992)
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independence for the inflationary record in industrial countries is indicated by a 
downward-sloping line. The horizontal line, which displays the results obtained for 
the developing countries, shows that legal independence does not affect average 
inflation in this subsample of countries. The right graph reveals the partial 
relationship between the turnover rate of central bank governors and the transformed 
inflation rate (D). The upward-sloping line indicates that the an increasing turnover 
rate induces increasing inflation in developing countries. The low and short horizontal 
line shows that the rate of inflation and the turnover rate are generally lower in the 
industrial countries.
Previous studies, in particular by Alesina and Grilli et al. focused exclusively on the 
legal data and found a strong negative relation between the rate of inflation and CBI. 
Cukierman's indices of independence differ from those constructed in previous papers 
and it might be instructive and informative to re-examine the earlier results by 
applying Cukierman's index in order to make the outcomes comparable and to put 
them into perspective. In summary, Cukierman's results show an inverse relation 
between legal independence and inflation in industrialised countries, but not in 
developing countries. In the latter group, the actual turnover rate of central bank 
governors turns out to be a better proxy to describe the actual independence of the 
central bank. There is a significant divergence between legal independence and actual 
independence in developing countries which is due to factors, such as sudden regime 
shifts and political instability.
2.7 The Alesina-Summers Index of CBI
Alesina and Summers investigate in their paper whether there is a correlation between 
CBI and the level and variability of real economic variables. The index of central
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bank independence used in this investigation is a synthetic index, product of an 
averaging procedure between the index of CBI by Bade and Parkin and a conversion 
from the GMT index of CBI to BP. The conversion is based on the following rule:
GMT index (i) conversion
i>  11 4
7 < i < l l 3
4 < i < 7 2
i < 4 1
The central banks are ranked from 4 (most independent) to 1 (least independent). The 
resulting Alesina-Summers index of independence is shown in column four of the 
following table.
Index of Central Bank Independence^^
C ountry BP GM T Conversion from Average
G M T to BP ^ G M T, B P -
( 1) (2 ) (3) 14)
Australia 1 9 3 2
Belgium 2 7 2 2
Canada 2 11 3 2.5
Denmark 2 8 3 2.5
France 2 7 2 2
Gennany 4 13 4 4
Ilaly 1.5 5 2 1.75
Japan 3 6 2 2.5
Netherlands 2 10 3 2.5
Nojway 2 NA NA 2
New Zealand 1 3 1 1
Spain 1 5 2 1.5
Sweden 2 NA NA 2
Switzerland 4 12 4 4
DK 2 6 2 2
US 3 12 4 3.5
TABLE 2.17
1 rule of conversion is descrilxid above 2 average of column ( I ) and (3)
Alesina/Summcrs (1993, p. 154)
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The resulting index is em ployed to investigate w hether CBI affects the 
macroeconomic outcome or not. Alesina and Summers plot various macroeconomic 
variables, covering the period from 1955-88, against measures of CBI. The outcome 
of the relation between average inflation and CBI is a nearly perfect negative 
correlation (figure 2.3), which contradicts the findings by Bade and Parkin, and 
Cukierman, who could not find a clear-cut association between the two variables. The 
explanation for the different results may be found in the way the Alesina-Summers 
index of central bank independence is constructed.
■ AUS ■
«  l'RA /N O II«W I:
liuk'xurCciiifiil hiiiik IriilupviiJi-i
FIGURE 2.3
Alesina and Summers constructed other charts which show the relationship between 
CBI and the level and variability of econom ic growth, between CBI and 
unemployment, and CBI and interest ra tes^ . The conclusion drawn from the 
empirical evidence is that, although expansionary monetary policy influences real 
rates in the short run, “it does not appear that systematically expansionary monetary 
policy operates to reduce average real rates over a long perlod” '^^ . Furthermore, the 
results suggest that CBI does have neither large benefits nor large costs in terms of 
real macroeconomic performance, but it is associated with monetary disciplinerai 
Nevertheless, A lesina and Summers remark that “the degree o f  central hank 
Independence Is only one o f  severa l Institu tional fac tors, exchange rate
Alesina/Summers (1993, p. 155 following)
49 AlesIna/Suminers (1993, p. 158)
This confirms Grilli's et al. (1991) view who stated that 'CBI offers a free lunch'.
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arrangements, and exogenous shocks that influence economic perform ance In 
different c o u n tr ie s " .
2.8 Masciaiidaro and Spinelli - A Review and Summary of 
Determinants of Central Bank Independence
Masciandaro and Spinelli (MS) provide in their paper, published in 1994, a detailed 
listing and grouping of the factors determining CBI which have been considered so 
far in the empirical literature. MS determine the degree of independence for all central 
banks of the OECD countries by ranking them according to the constraints they face. 
Masciandaro and Spinelli conclude their analysis with an inquiry into the relevance of 
institutional constraints as determinants of independence by sending questionnaires to 
central bankers of ten major central banks. Table 2.18 contains the institutional 
determinants which have so far appeared in previously constructed indices.
Institutional Determinants of Central Bank Independence^^
D eterm inants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Governor appointed * * *
Governor term * * * *
Central bank board appointed * * * * * * $
Central bank board tenu * * * *
Government participation in the board * * * * * *
Policy responsibility in monetary policy * * * * * * * *
Legal provisions in case of conQicts * * * *
Government-Central bank
Central bank statutory goals * * * *
Monetary financing of the budget deficit * * *
Discount rate setting * *
Policy responsibility on banking supervision *
Financial and budgetary relations $ *
Government-Central bank (salaries, profit
allocation,,..)
TABLE 2.18
Alcsina/Summcrs (1993, p. 159) 
Masciandaro/SpinelU (1994, p. 436)
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Note; 1 = Parkin (1978) 5 = Burdekin/W illet (1990)
2 =  Bade/Parkin (1982)* 6 = Grilli/Masciandaro/Spinelli (1991)*
3 = Parkin (1986) 7 = Cukierman (1992)*
4 =  Masciandaro/Tabellini (1988) 8 = Eijffinger/Schaling (1992)*
* (these papers have been discussed in the previous sections)^^
The institutional determinants are grouped into two sets, those describing political 
independence and those determining functional independence. Political independence 
is defined as “the possibility fo r  a bank to pursue a strategy o f  monetary policy  
consistent with price stability”, whereas functional independence relates to “tactics o f  
monetary policy, i.e. to the possibility top'eely choose the instruments and techniques 
o f monetary control which ultimately lead to price stability”^ .  Given the groupings 
of the institutional determinants of independence, the tables 2.19 and 2 .2 0  show the 
OECD countries ranked according to their degree of political and functional 
independence, under consideration of those constraints, which have been considered 
so far by the empirical literature.
Political Independence of OECD Central Banks^^
C ountry
Institu tional D eterm inan ts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
O verall Index 
o f Independence 
9
Australia * * * 3
Austria * * * 3
Belgium % 1
Canada * * $ * 4
Denmark * * * 3
Finland * * * * * * * 7
France « * 2
G ennany * * * * * 6
Greece * * 2
Ireland * % 3
Italy * * * * 4
Japan $ 1
Netherlands * •k * $ $ * 6
New Zealand 0
The Alesina/Summers index of CBI is somewhat difficult to break down into separate determinants 
since it is the product of a conversion from GMT to BP.
^  Masciandaro/SpineUi (1994, p. 436)
Masciandaro/Spinclli (1994, p. 437)
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(continued)
Country
Institutional Determinants 
1 2 3 4 5
Overall Index 
of Independence 
9
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US
Note:
TABLE 2.19
1 = governor not appointed by government
2 = governor appointed for more than 5 years
3 = all the board not appointed by the government
4  = board appointed for more than 5 years
5 = no participation of government representative in the board
6 = no government approval o f monetary policy fonnulation is required
7 = statutory requirements that central bank pursues the goal o f price stability
8 = legal provisions that strengthened the central bank's position in case of conflicts with the
government
9 = sum of each row
Functional Independence of OECD Central Banks
Country
Institutional Determinants 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Overall Index 
of Independence 
8
Australia * * * * * * 6
Austria * * * * 6
Belgium * * « * 6
Canada * * * $ * iC* 7
Denmark * * * ** 5
Finland ** 2
France * * 5
Germany * * $ * * * * 7
Greece * $ 2
Ireland * * $ * 4
Italy * 1
Japan * * * * * 5
Netherlands * $ * * 4
New Zealand * * * 3
Norway * * * * 7
Portugal $ * 2
Spain * * * 3
Sweden * * 2
Switzerland * * * * * ** 7
UK * * * * * 5
US * * * * * $ * 7
TABLE 2.20
Masciandaro/Spinelli (1994, p. 438)
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Note: 1 = direct credit facility: not automatic
2 = direct credit facility: market interest rate
3 = direct credit facility: temporary
4 = direct credit facility; limited amount
5 = central bank does not participate in primary market for public debt
6 = discount rate set by central bank
7 = banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank (**) or not entrusted to the central
bank alone (*)
8 = sum of each row
The resulting indices are highly complete and instructive since they incorporate all 
the institutional determinants applied in previous indices. Nevertheless, one should 
note that there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating the determinants to a composite 
index. M asciandaro and Spinelli allow trade-offs between the criteria due to 
symmetrical weighting. The results show a somewhat different ranking of various 
central banks in comparison to previously constructed indices. This is to a great 
extent due to the grouping procedure. Finland meets the highest number of 
institutional attributes of political independence and qualifies with a overall score of 7  
as the politically most independent central bank in the OECD countries. Finland is 
followed suit by Germany with a numerical value of 6  for political independence. The 
UK performs poorly by obtaining only one asterisk for attribute five, no participation 
of government representative in the central bank board. The outcome reverses for 
some countries in the category of functional independence. Germany ranks again at 
the top of the list with the highest degree of functional independence (index = 7). The 
central banks of Norway, Canada, and Sweden enjoy the same degree of functional 
independence as the Bundesbank. Finland on the other hand is highly dependent on 
the government as an index of two indicates. The Bank of England performs rather 
well and can be classified as intermediate bank in terms of functional independence. 
The results show that there is not always a correlation between functional and 
political independence, which complicates a systematic ranking of the central banks. 
Because of this lack of correlation, Masciandaro and Spinelli constructed a table
75
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which standardises the rankings of central banks' independence which have come out 
of the previous empirical literature. The results of this regression classify once again 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United S tates as the countries with the most 
independent central banks (overall independence). MS, therefore, conclude that the 
rankings obtained by considering all institutional determ inants are generally 
consistent with those of the previous literature.
In the last part of their analysis, Masciandaro and Spinelli investigate the relevance of 
institutional constraints as determinants of CBI in the view of central bankers. The 
central bankers were asked (i) to state if something relevant was missing from the list 
of institutional determinants, and (ii) to assign a weight (in the 0 -1  range) to each 
determ inant of independence accord ing to its perceived relative im portance. 
According to the responses, central bankers considered the list of institutional 
determinants as exhaustive. The following two diagrams^^ show which importance 
the central bankers attached to the individual determinants.
0 . 7 -0 . 6 -0 . 5 -0 .4 -0 . 3 -0 . 2 -
FIGURE 2.4
Note: 1 = governor not ap]X)intcd by government is required
2 = governor appointed for more than 5 years 6 = statutory requirement that central bank
3 = Ward not appointed by government pursues monetary stability
4 = no government's representative on the botud 7 -  legal provision about conHiet between
5 = no government approval of monetary jxilicy central bank and government
Masciandaro/Spinclli (1994, p. 441)
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0.9-,
0 . 7 -0 . 6 -0 . 5 -0 , 4 -0 . 3 -0 . 2 -
Note: 1 = credit to the government: not automatic
2 = credit to the government; at market interest rate
3 = credit to the government: temporary
4 = credit to the government: of limited amount
5 = central bank does not participate in ,>rimary
market for public debt
6 = discount rate set by central bank
7 = banking su]3crvision not entrusted to
Uie central bank alone
In terms of political independence, the central bankers attached great importance to 
the statutory mandate of the central bank to pursue the goal of price stability (column 
7, figure 2.4) and to the independence of the central bank in the formulation of 
monetary policy (column 6 , figure 2.4). The full control over the discount rate 
(column 6 , figure 2.5) and the control of credit to the government (column 1 and 4, 
figure 2.5) were regarded as most relevant determinants of functional independence.
The information obtained from the questionnaire show that the indicators and 
determinants considered and established by the empirical literature are meaningful 
and appropriate for the determination of the degree of central bank independence. 
Masciandaro and Spinelli conclude from their findings that one should always pay 
considerable attention to the institutional constraints which central bankers face if one 
wants to describe, analyse, and compare monetary regimes. Furtherm ore, ''the 
indicators o f political and functional independence demonstrate how one could bring 
monetary stability to inflation-prone EU countries
Masciandaro/SpinelU (1994, p. 442)
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2.9 Concluding Remarks
For many years economists have analysed the optimal conduct of monetary policy 
purely within a theoretical framework, lacking empirical evidence to confirm the 
drawn conclusions. With the pioneering work by Bade and Parkin, the empirical 
dimension was finally approached in a first attempt to compare central bank laws and 
monetary policy of twelve industrial countries and to construct an index indicating the 
degree of central bank independence. Studies by Alesina (1988), Grilli et al. (1991), 
Cukierman (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), and 
others followed, providing more empirical evidence for the intellectual case for CBI 
by taking more countries and institutional constraints into consideration. The resulting 
indices differ from each other in the number of institutional constraints incorporated, 
in the number of countries considered, in the weights assigned to the individual 
attributes, and in the aggregation procedure. Nevertheless, the overall outcome is the 
same, with minor variations in the ranking of some central banks as a result of 
interpretation and criterion effects^^. However, before draw ing conclusions from 
these legal indices, one should be aware of the fact that there are various problems 
associated with such indices which are not to be neglected. As various studies^^^ show, 
there is a possibility that actual monetary practice deviates from the central bank law 
which calls for an index reflecting actual independence. Cukierman investigated in his 
study this dimension by sending a questionnaire to central bankers of various 
countries to consider the spirit of the law and its application in practice and 
constructed an index of actual CBI. The findings suggest that the index of actual 
independence is a better ind icator to describe the monetary arrangem ents in 
developing countries rather than the index of legal independence. In the group of 
industrialised countries, deviations in the legal implementation from the central bank
See for explanation p. 56 following 
Cukierman (1992) and E ijffinger/Schaling (1994)
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laws are less common. One can therefore conclude that the legal index of 
independence is indeed an appropriate indicator to describe monetary reality in the 
latter group of countries. M oreover, according to a Pearson correlation test for 
positive correlation between empirical and legal CBI, carried out by Eijffinger et al. 
in 1994^^, the ES index is the only index which shows a significantly positive relation 
with actual independence on a level of one percent. Therefore, the ES index seems to 
be the best proxy to capture both sides, the law and the actual implementation of the 
law and is for that reason slightly more difficult to construct and likely to change 
more frequently, whenever changes in the actual practice occur.
Another problem of purely legal based indices is that laws are incomplete in terms of 
an explicit specification of the division of authority between the central bank and the 
government which leaves often room for interpretation. There are other than legal 
factors, such as tradition, personalities, historical as well as political factors which 
partly shaped the existing monetary arrangements and affect the application of the law 
in practice^^. These factors are hard to quantify and to define, which makes it difficult 
to find a systematic indicator. In the various indices, the interpretation of the law 
always incorporates unavoidable subjective elements leading to different numerical 
values for the indices of some central banks. Another problem lies in the impossibility 
to aggregate the criteria applied to the sample countries in a non-arbitrary way. As 
mentioned earlier, the weighting procedure varies between the indices, a symmetrical 
weighting of the criteria could lead to trade-offs between the different attributes, 
whereas the problem of an asymmetrical weighting is the differing views concerning 
the importance attached to the individual criteria.
A lthough it is generally accepted that central bank independence is a useful 
institutional device, which exerts a restraining effect on money growth, the empirical
Eijffinger/van Rooij/Schaling (1994, p. 23)
Banaian ct al. (1983)
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findings, however, do not demonstrate such a clear-cut inverse relation between legal 
independence of central banks in industrialised countries and the average rate of 
inflation, as claimed by the theoretical literature. The general claim is that CBI is 
negatively related to the level and variance of inflation and not related to the average 
economic growth rate. Cukierman's findings invalidate this proposition for the group 
of developing countries, where the statistical results do not provide evidence that 
central bank laws contribute to explaining different rates of inflation across periods 
and between countries. On the other hand, the proposition is valid for the group of 
industrial countries as the findings by various authors show. Eijffinger and Schaling 
(1993) tested these propositions by regressing the average rate of inflation, the 
variance of inflation, and the average economic growth rate on the Bade-Parkin index, 
the Alesina index, the GMT political index, and their own index of central bank 
independence. They find that the empirical results confirm the theoretical relation 
between CBI and the average rates of inflation and economic growth, while no 
positive significant relation between CBI and the variability of inflation could be 
found^3. The latter result stands in contrast to findings by De Haan and Sturm*^  ^who 
found a negative significant relationship between CBI and inflation variability for the 
period 1961-1987.
Despite the shortcomings and the criticism, the empirical literature succeeds in 
demonstrating that institutional constraints on central banks' behaviour matter a lot in 
theory as well as in practice. Indices of central bank independence provide a valuable 
insight into the design of monetary regimes and the ground on which diverging 
outcomes of monetary policy can be analysed and explained. As the results of the 
empirical analyses have shown, the central banks of Germany and Great Britain differ 
fundamentally in their respective legal arrangements and mandates. The Bundesbank
The results of the study by Eijffinger el al. ( 1994) confirm these findings.
^  De Haan/Sturm (1992, pp. 310-12); Alesina (1988) found also that CBI reduces inflation variability. 
Bade and Parkin (1988), however, did not find evidence for reduced inflation variability.
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is one of the most independent central banks, whereas the Bank of England is highly 
dependent on the government. The actual conduct and outcome of monetary policy in 
these two monetary regimes are subject to a detailed analysis in the second part of this 
paper, to corroborate the 'intellectual case for CBI' on the basis of these two concrete 
examples of alternative monetary arrangements.
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Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom
The Conduct of Monetary Policy in the 
United Kingdom: An Assessment
3.1 Introduction
The occurrence of stagflation in the 1970s in many industrial countries, which 
painfully demonstrated the invalidity of the assumed trade-off between inflation and 
employment ^  as the study by W. Phillips in 1958 had suggested, also had an impact 
on the conduct of m onetary policy in the United K ingdom. M oreover, the 
comparative success of the W est German and Swiss economies encouraged the 
authorities to direct their attention towards the achievement of "a proper consistency 
and coherence o f  fiscal and monetary decision-making ...to  provide a convincing and 
persuasive public presentation o f  such decisions"'^. The setting of monetary targets 
seemed to provide such a framework and the emphasis of monetary policy in the 
United K ingdom shifted towards targets and monetary rules. The first target was 
published for the broad monetary aggregate M 3 in autumn 19763, which was adopted 
to serve as a constraint upon other policy objectives, which then were still conducted 
along Keynesian lines, until the change of government in 1979.
British monetary history of the past two decades is marked by a persistent search for a 
framework of monetary policy, which would provide the basis for monetary stability 
and low inflation. The conduct of m onetary policy in the UK experienced 
considerable changes in its main objectives, in the means to achieve them, and in the 
place of this policy itself in the management of the economy. Landmarks in British
1 See Friedman's 1976 Nobel lecture 
-  BEQB (June 1983, p. 201)
3 M3 comprises the UK banking system's total sterling deposit liabilities to the domestic private sector.
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monetary policy of the past two decades were the introduction of monetary targets in 
1976, the launch of the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in 1980 by the 
Conservative government under Mrs. Thatcher, EMS membership, and the launch of 
a new strategy of monetary policy in the UK in 1993, centred around the introduction 
of published annual inflation targets. The main purpose of such devices was to serve 
as a constraint on the conduct of monetary policy, increasing the accountability and 
transparency of policy decisions.
The institutional arrangement in which British monetary policy is embedded is of 
crucial importance to understanding and explaining these policy changes and the 
different policy outcomes. The Bank of England is dependent on the Treasury and the 
final authority over monetary policy, therefore, rests with the government. In 
situations where the Bank of England and the Treasury advocate diverging views 
concerning the most appropriate policy action at a certain time, the view of the 
government usually determines the final policy choice.
As outlined in chapter one, monetary policy, if entrusted in discretionary fashion to 
policy makers, does not infrequently lead to an inflationary outcdme. Furthermore, it 
was argued that discretionary monetary policy lacks consistency and credibility, since 
there is no institutional device, preventing policy makers from using this policy as an 
instrum ent to improve their re-election prospects. The UK's inflation record, 
especially of the 1970s, seems to confirm this assumption. Although the authorities 
succeeded in bringing inflation down in the 1980s, the monetary targets were 
frequently missed^ and the repeated changes of devices employed to make the anti- 
inflationary commitment of the government more credible, induced instability into the 
economy.
^  Between 1980 and 1986, the annual EMg targets were achieved only twice, in both cases al'ter an 
upwards revision of the original target ranges.
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This chapter provides a detailed insight into British macroeconomic performance of 
the past two decades, with a shorter recourse to the policies of the 1960's and early 
1970's and attempts to show how the monetary arrangement in the United Kingdom 
affected the policy decisions and outcomes.
3.2 British Macroeconomic Performance and Monetary Policy in 
the 1960s and 1970s
3.2.1 The 1960s
During the 1960s, the major objectives of macroeconomic policy in the United 
Kingdom have been the acceleration of the sustainable rate of growth of the economy 
and the rectification of the balance of payments, without sacrificing the goal of a high 
level of employment. These objectives were primarily pursued by means of fiscal 
policy (taxes, government spending) and interest rates. The policy of full employment 
led to a steady increase in the public sector's activity in the economy and the 
borrowing requirement of the central government grew rapidly, from a position of 
about balance in 1958/59 to £1,335 million in 1967/68^. The dominating constraint on 
the government's demand management was the maintenance of the dollar/sterling 
exchange rate within the framework of the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton 
Woods. Monetary policy played a permissive role primarily in this regime and 
“monetary measures were largely taken as supporting elements in general 'packages ' 
o f  measures"^. The policy on interest and exchange rates was solely in the hands of 
the Prime Minister and the Chancellor at the time^. The major concern of monetary
^ BEQB (December 1969, p. 449/450); The RadcliiTe Committee (1959, paragraph 528) pointed out in 
its report on the working of the monetary system that they could not find an “automatic rule fo r  
restricting a Government that is determined to spend” .
^ BEQB (December 1969, p. 449)
^  “At no time from  October 1964 onwards was either the Bank or the Treasury asked fo r  a position 
paper on the exchange rate; they were obliged to wait on events while devising what expedients they 
could to defend the parity. ” Cairncross (1988, p. 58)
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policy was the management of interest rates, adjusted according to the state of the 
balance of payments, and the control of bank lending to the private sector.
From 1953 until 1967, the inflation rate never exceeded five percent and the 
unemployment rate remained under three percent, apart from one episode in the first 
quarter in 1963, where the unemployment rate rose above this level. Nevertheless, as 
Laidler^ remarks, the unemployment target set for this period was too low and the 
country experienced an inflation rate which was higher than the average rate of 
inflation in the rest of the world, leading consequently to a secular deterioration of the 
balance of payments. The fixed exchange rate system and a low world inflation lay at 
the root of the apparent success of Keynesian policies in the United Kingdom until 
1967. At that time, the path of inflation was primarily determined by the inflationary 
behaviour of the United States as the world's largest economy. At the close of the 
decade, the Bretton W oods system becam e increasingly under pressure, the 
competitive position of the United States deteriorated gradually, aggravated by the 
economic consequences resulting from the Vietnam War and rising inflation whilst 
the US payments deficit widened considerably^.
In the second half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, studies on the 
demand-for-money function had been carried out^^\ suggesting a relatively stable 
function and a adequately reliable relationship between M 3 and nominal incomes. 
Further econometric research in the nature of M 3 encouraged the authorities to attach 
a greater importance to the money supply than before. This was due to two separate 
reasons as pointed out by J S Fforde i f
“first, because ... nom inal interest rates, in conditions o f
persistent and volatile inflationary expectations, were a poor
8 L a id lc r( l9 7 8 ,p . 55)
^ In the first quarter of 1971, the US payments deficit ran at an annual rate of $20 billion, (source: 
Palgrave's Financial Dictionary)
Laidlcr/Parkin (1970) and Goodharl/Crockett (1970)
11 Fforde in BEQB (June 1983, p. 202)
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guide to real interest rates and hence to the 'thrust' o f  monetary 
policy. Money supply growth, relative to GDP, was a better 
guide; ... Second, because the supposed responsiveness o f  this 
better guide to acceptable movements in nominal interest rates 
suggested that the needs o f  monetary policy could be met 
without persistent recourse to direct controls over bank lending 
to the private sector" .
A comparison of the empirical evidence for different countries reinforced the case for 
using the money supply as an indicator or target of monetary policy. In the late 1960s, 
the authorities became increasingly concerned with monetary aggregates and their 
properties. The money demand relationship provided the ground for the use of a new 
method of monetary control.
3.2.2 The Experience of the 1970s
During the 'reign' of Bretton Woods, excess demand pressure in the UK appeared in 
the form of a balance of payments deficit rather than in a higher rate of inflation. At 
the turn of the decade, the rate of inflation was slowly creeping up and unemployment 
tended to rise. The performance of economic growth in the 1960s had been perceived 
as rather unsatisfactory, with an average growth rate of GDP of under three per cent, 
and led in 1971 to the launch of an expansionary budget by the Conservative 
government to initiate a 'go for growth' and growth did indeed experience an upswing. 
In May 1971, the Bank of England published a discussion document entitled 
'Competition and Credit Control' (CCC) which introduced new measures to enhance 
competition. The introduction of such measures was mainly a response to repeated 
criticism by the National Board for Prices and Incomes (PIB) and the Monopolies 
Commission concerning the clearing banks' interest rate cartel since 1955. The PIB 
demanded the abolition of the cartel and the extension of balance-sheet controls to all 
banks and near banks. In recognition of the views expressed by both authorities, CCC 
was finally implemented. The core of the new approach “was a system under which
86
Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom
the allocation o f  credit is primarily determined by its cost "'^ '^ , with each bank setting 
its own lending rate on the basis of an individually determined base rate, reflecting 
commercial as well as market considerations 3^.
In 1972 the money supply started to expand, which was beside other factors largely 
due to the Competition and Credit Control reforms and the large public sector 
borrowing requirement (about four per cent of GDP), coupled with the commitment 
to low interest rates in 1972 sterling was floated to ease external constraints, 
subsequently followed by the final collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973, which was 
regarded by the leading countries as a liberation from unpopular constraints. In 
October 1972, a major change of policy in official money market operations occurred, 
the bank rate (the Bank of England’s' traditional rediscount rate) was replaced by a 
market-determined minimum lending rate (MLR), which equals the average discount 
rate for Treasury bills at the tender plus 0.5 per cent, rounded up to the nearest 0.25 
per cent. In the past, the bank rate had often moved out of line with the rates on other 
securities. The decision was taken on account of the fact that administered changes in 
the bank rate were too 'political'.
The first two years after the CCC reform witnessed a rapid expansion of the monetary 
aggregates, M 3 grew with an average annual rate of 26% in the two years to 
September 1973^A Consequently, the bank rate was raised from 7.5 per cent in July to 
13 per cent in November and drastic cuts in government spending were announced in 
an emergency budget on the 17 December 1973. The authorities felt obliged to
13 Hall (1983, p. 8)
13 In the first Mais lecture on the 9 February 1978, the governor pointed out that the CCC was first “a 
move away from  reliance on direct restrictive controls in the monetary sp h ere .... More positively, it
was a move towards a system in which market forces could play a predominant role importance
was now attached to the monetary aggregates; their rate o f  growth was to be controlled by the market 
instrument o f  interest ra te s" . BEQB (March 1978, p. 32)
14 Cairncross (1988, p. 58) argues that the introduction of CCC should have been buttressed by a 
greater readiness to let interest rates fluctuate to exercise sufficient control over credit.
1^ Between 1971-73, clearing banks had expanded their lending by 112 per cent, and 'other' banks had 
probably more than trebled theirs, which led to an explosion in property values. (Cairncross, 1988, 
p. 59)
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exercise discretion and re-imposed direct credit controls on the banking sector, in the 
form of a new instrument, the Supplementary Special Deposit scheme or 'corset'. 
Banks had to pay a penalty in the form of non-interest bearing deposits on accounts in 
the Bank of England, whenever the growth of 'interest-bearing eligible deposits' 
exceeded a certain allowable base. The situation was aggravated by the world-w ide 
explosion of primary product prices which gave additional boost to the rate of 
inflation, already rising due to the expansionary monetary policies in the UK during 
the first years of the 1970s.
The first oil price shock in 1973-4 marked the end of the post-war boom and 
produced in many industrial countries a combination of high inflation and rising 
unemployment. The Labour government of 1974 tried to conduct its policies along 
Keynesian lines in the face of acute inflation output fell in 1974 and 1975, and 
unemployment doubled. The authorities faced an increasing loss of credibility which 
impeded debt sales and weakened the external confidence in sterling. Subsequently, 
in the wake of an exchange rate crisis, the UK authorities had to agree to an IMF 
financial programme in 1976, which in return led to the imposition of ceilings on the 
UK's Domestic Credit Expansion for the following two years, coupled w ith a 
tightening of fiscal policy. A second major shock to the world economy occurred in 
1979, as oil prices more than doubled and prices of precious metals experienced a 
dramatic upsurge. This coincided w ith an apparent weakness of the American 
presidency which induced growing scepticism regarding the longer-term prospects of 
US inflation and was reflected by a strongly weakened US dollar in 1978. The second 
oil price shock, however, resulted in a more determined and broader commitment in 
the major industrial countries to pursue an anti-inflationary monetary policy.
The rate of inflation in the United K ingdom peaked a t of 29.9 per cent in August 1975.
88
Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom
In the course of the 1970s, the 'corset' was re-imposed three times and although it 
proved nominally effective and the growth of the monetary aggregates slowed 
d o w n t h e  market increasingly innovated 'ways around' the 'corset controls'. 
Throughout the 1970s, the markets, in response to the various controls imposed upon 
them, developed a whole new range of financial instruments, so-called financial 
innovations, which gained considerable importance in the banking sector as well as in 
the money markets. Foreign exchange markets experienced a major expansion, banks 
engaged themselves increasingly in liability management (banks obtain the deposits 
required to match their lending in the wholesale market), improved terms and interest 
rates on large deposits as well as medium term variable rate loans became available in 
the company sector, building societies provided improved terms and rates of deposits, 
and the gilt-edged market offered new varieties and issue techniques'^ the second 
half of the 1970s, Keynesian demand management came increasingly under criticism 
reflecting the experience o f high inflation in the mid-1970s and the apparent 
difficulties of incomes policy s o l u t i o n s A  new stimulus towards the finding of 
market-based solutions to the control of the money supply was given and the political 
economy of 'monetarism' became increasingly influential towards the end of the 
decade - the conduct of monetary policy shifted away from 'discretion' towards 'rules'.
The monetary policy choices made in the 1970s by the British authorities and the 
inflationary record of the United K ingdom give rise to the assumption that the 
outcome would have been somewhat different with an independent Bank of England, 
after the policy constraint imposed by the Bretton Woods system had disintegrated.
Artis/Lewis (1991, p. 16) stale that “the repeated use o f  the weapon invited a problem  o f  
'instrument instability'" which led on the side of the banks to an inflation of their liabilities base prior 
to the corset's application.
Artis/Lewis (1991, p. 16)
Llewellyn et al. (1982, p. 23) note in this context that “in a regime o f  active liability management, 
hanks can force the Bank o f  England into conflict situations between exchange rate, interest rate and  
monetary targets. These conflicts are particularly acute in the UK because o f  the apparently low 
sensitivity o f  the demand fo r  bank credit with respect to interest rates and the effect interest rate 
movements have on the exchange rate. "
20 Cobhani(1988, p. 248)
21 Eniminger (1984)
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Although policy tools directed at a high level of employment had been used by all 
major industrial countries in this period, the comparative success and the inflationary 
record of the German economy at the time seem to suggest that the respective 
monetary arrangement played a role in limiting the scope of application of such 
measures by the German authorities 22. Laidler23 argues that
“the basic error committed has been to neglect to control the 
m oney supply w hile pursu in g  an unrea listica lly  low  
unemployment target, prim arily by fisca l means. M onetary 
expansion, largely a by-product o f  'full employment' fisca l 
policies, has been responsible fo r  the high British inflation rate 
o f the early 1970s”.
An independent central bank would have imposed some disciplinary effect on British 
macroeconomic policy and is likely to have led to less expansionary policy choices in 
the early 1970s.
3.3 Monetary Targeting in the United Kingdom
3.3.1 Monetary Aggregates as Intermediate Targets
Generally, one can distinguish between two groups of intermediate target variables; 
indicator variables with predictive value and those without real predictive content. 
The latter serve as intermediate indicators from which useful information about a 
variable of interest can be obtained (i.e. monetary aggregates), whereas the former 
reflect to some extent the thrust of policy (i.e. exchange rate). The choice of the target 
variable depends critically on the source of the shocks which occur in the economy. 
The results of studies on the robustness of the variables under different circumstances 
generally 24 suggest that exchange rate or interest rate targets are to be preferred when
22 A t the time, when the first oil crisis hit the world economy, the comparative economic strength of 
Germany did, however, significantly affect its capacity to cope with a shock of that magnitude. 
2 3 u iid le r(1 9 7 8 ,p . 52)
24 There are cases where the results are rather uncertain
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F igure 3.1 Relationships among monetary aggregates and their components, 
(source: Artis/Lewis, 1991, p. 137)
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the cause of instability lies in the demand-for-money function. Monetary aggregates, 
on the other hand, are recommended when the shocks come from domestic spending 
or overseas prices25 Furthermore, there are other factors which exercise a significant 
influence on the choice of the target variable, such as the distribution of the shock and 
the content of the authorities' objective function. These factors, however, can change 
over time which in return might affect the choice of the target variable.
In 1976, the authorities in the United K ingdom started to publish target ranges for 
monetary aggregates. Monetary aggregates are divided into two groups; Aggregates 
of narrow and broad money (Figure 3.1). The importance attached to the target 
aggregates has varied considerably over time. With the introduction of the Medium 
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in 1980, monetary targets became the primary focus 
of monetary policy, chosen to assist in the politically declared fight against inflation. 
Growing unpredictability in the behaviour of the target aggregates and increasing 
doubts about their central importance led to the abandonment of targets for broad 
money in 1986. In the search for a new means of credibility in monetary policy, broad 
monetary aggregates were rediscovered by the British authorities in 1993.
3.3.2 The Introduction of Monetary Targets
Since the early 1970s, the authorities studied the empirical behaviour of M3 and the 
results of this observation had been somewhat encouraging. The growth path of M 3 
seemed to display some similarity with the growth of inflation^^ at the time, with a 
time-lag of two years. Nevertheless, the authorities showed concern about the 
reliability of the evidence since M3 had undergone a considerable structural change
25 Arlis/Levvis (1991, pp. 127/128)
26 The growth of' fM g reached its peak in the fourth quarter of 1973 with 27.4% and the rate of 
inflation peaked in August 1975 at 29.9%.
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2^ the development o f  the broader monetary aggregates came increasingly to depend on interest- 
rate relativities - between wholesale money rates, Treasury bills and local authority rates on one hand  
and bank lending rates on the other - rather than on the average level o f  rates’’ BEQB (March 1978,
28 BEQB (June 1983, p. 203)
29 BEQB (June 1983, p. 203)
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and expanded rapidly following the CGC reform in 197127, Furthermore, econometric 
studies on M 3 from the 1960s proved useless after the reform had taken effect. Some 
optimism that this was to prove a temporary phenomenon remained, however.
Subsequent to 1973, the political and market opinion remained very sensitive to
!
developments in the money supply with implications for the exchange rate as well as j
for the financial markets. The authorities took the position that |
I“it now seemed that the growth o f  M b within reasonable limits I
could be directly influenced, occasionally to a high degree, by :
a combination o f  direct controls and an active policy o f  debt !
management. So although there was at firs t no form al or
published money supply target, the course o f M3 was a fa irly  \
strong policy constraint after 1973 ” 28, J
1I
In 1974-75, the growth of M 3 slowed down, yet it proves rather difficult to estimate i
how much of the relative decline can be attributed to a shift in the authorities'
emphasis and how much was due to the sudden fall in the velocity of circulation of
M3 in 1972-73, which slowly started to return to its former trend level. Between 1974
and 1976, the Bank of England used internal money supply targets as an informal
policy guide29. In autumn of 1976, the short step to the publication of the first official
annual target for M 3 was taken to restore financial confidence. The introduction of
published monetary targets in the United Kingdom followed a general trend in other
major industrial countries which adopted in growing numbers published monetary
targets, starting with Germany in 1974.
The merits of published monetary targets were perceived as threefold; firstly they 
provide a basis for stability in and consistency of monetary and fiscal decision-
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making. Secondly, they might affect positively future inflationary expectations and 
therefore decrease the costs of reducing i n f l a t i o n ^ ^ .  Thirdly, such targets reduce 
uncertainty about the future conduct of monetary policy on the side of the private 
sector and therefore make the authorities' policies more credible and accountable. 
Despite the introduction of monetary targets, the attitude of the British authorities to 
the balance between monetary targets and Keynesian income policies was rather 
unclear during this period, as the following statement by the governor in 1978 
indicates.
“The main purpose o f  having publicly announced monetary 
targets is, therefore, to provide a basis fo r  stability. Stability 
does not, however, imply rigidity. There can be occasions when 
policy needs to be adjusted because circumstances have 
changed. There is a case fo r  adjusting monetary policy, as well 
as fiscal policy, to offset cyclical swings in the economy” .
Table 3.2 shows the targets set for the monetary aggregate M3 and their outcome 
between 1976 and 1979.
T arge ts fo r  M 3, 1976 - 197932
Year Target Outcome
1976/77 12 10
1977/78 9-13 16
1978/79 8-12 11
TABLE 3.1
The first two years after the adoption of monetary targeting were marked by a 
significant divergence from the target. The first target was undershot and the second 
target was exceeded by a considerable margin. In the second year of monetary targets 
in the UK, the authorities' did not demonstrate a serious commitment to the target, 
since the policy decisions were determ ined by the concern to m aintain the 
competitive advantage for the British manufacturing industry of the prevailing low
Cobham (unpublished)
BEQB (March 1978, p. 34)
22 D ow /Sav ille(i988)
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exchange rate. Heavy interventions in the foreign exchange market were made, 
accompanied by a progressive reduction in short-term interest rates. The next target, 
from April 1978 to April 1979, was met. The experience with the first two targets led 
the authorities to introduce ' rolling' targets (assessment of the target before the 
previous target period has been fully com pleted to consider newly obtained 
information on the economy) in October 197823. The first rolling target was overshot 
by a relatively small margin.
One of the last acts of the Labour government was to set up a Committee of Inquiry 
which examined the roles of the Treasury and the Bank of England in the conduct of 
monetary policy. In its final report, the Committee concluded that there is no 
necessary relation between an effective conduct of monetary policy and an 
assignment of more independence, coupled with specific statutory objectives to the 
Bank of England. Furthermore, the report outlined the various changes which had 
occurred over the past two decades and had broadened the Bank's responsibilities and 
influence. These developments had helped to increase, in the Committee's view, the 
accountability of the Bank to the Parliament.
The victory of the Conservative party in the election of May 1979 marked the turning 
point in the conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom and was manifested 
by a “radical change in m acroeconom ic strategy. Colloquially, monetarily  
constrained 'Keynesianism' was replaced by 'monetarism'
22 The governor argued in his Mais lecture in favour of 'rolling' targets by stating that the “drawback 
o f  the present annual targets has been the implied requirement to hit a particular number on a 
particular date. The various time-lags in the system make it difficult, and certainly highly undesirable, 
to try to offset undesired monetary movements very rapidly. "(BEQB, March 1978, p. 37)
24 BEQB (.lime 1983, p. 203/204)
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3.3.3 The Medium Term Financial Strategy, 1980-86
3.3.3.1 1979-82
After its victory in the elections in May 1979, the Conservative party took office and 
made monetary policy to the centrepiece of its economic strategy. In his first budget, 
the Chancellor reconfirmed the government’s commitment to focus monetary policy 
primarily on the control of the growth of the monetary aggregates. The government 
had no explicit inflation target, its primary policy objective, however, was a sustained 
reduction in inflation in order to provide the economy with favourable conditions for 
a sustainable growth in output and employments^. Monetary targets were perceived as 
the means of defeating inflation. Shortly after the new government had assumed 
office, public-sector wages were raised substantially, following a pre-election 
commitment. The VAT rate was raised from 8  per cent to 15 per cent in order to fill 
the financial gap left by a cut in direct taxes. The target set for M3 for the financial 
year 1979/80 was met. The experience of the secondary banking crisis and other 
factors gave an impetus to strengthen the legal basis of the Bank of England's 
regulatory powers which led to the enforcement of the Banking Act in 1979.
The new government strongly believed in free markets and the efficiency of market 
forces in the allocation process. Since monetary targets were the declared primary 
means to defeat inflation, the exchange rate was left to adjust freely in response to 
m arket forces. Between June and October 1979, exchange rate controls were 
abolished, which exposed the domestic banking industry to international competition 
and restored the power of arbitrage to equalise onshore and offshore sterling interest 
rates. At that time, direct controls on bank lending were still in force, but this new 
freedom triggered an increase in disintermediation, partly involving offshore banks as 
well, which consequently led to the abolition of the 'corset' in 1980. In the face of this
25 The new government decisively rejected the idea of a positive trade-off between monetary growth 
(inflation) and o u tp u t.
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situation, the Chancellor announced in the 1980 budget the adoption of a Medium 
Term Financial Strategy. Monetary policy became fully integrated into the general 
economic strategy of the government which reduced the potential for an independent 
monetary policy by the Bank of England. The fiscal policy decision on the size of the 
budget deficit was subordinated to the authorities' commitment to control the growth 
of the monetary aggregates at acceptable levels of interest rates. In the framework of 
the MTFS, M 3 was retained as the single target aggregate although “it was recognised 
that experience hitherto in achieving fa irly  close control o f  this aggregate was not 
entirely reassuring. But it was fe lt that the answer to this might lie in changing the 
methods o f  control rather than the target aggregate i t s e l f The new targets were 
set for a medium term period, alongside targets for the budget deficit in the form of 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement in relation to gross domestic product 
(GDP), which were made subordinate to the new monetary standard27. The core of the 
MTFS was the deceleration of monetary growth over the medium term, manifested in 
lower target rates for the growth of broad money for each of the subsequent years. 
The original MTFS targets, published in the 1980 budget, are shown in table 3.3,
Original MTFS targets28
year PSBR/GDP ratio growth of £M 3
1980/81 3.75 7-11
1981/82 3.00 6-10
1982/83 2.25 5-9
1983/84 1.5 4-8
TABLE 3.2
It was hoped that projecting the declared policy goals over a longer period of time 
would influence people's expectations of future inflation and output, reducing
26 BEQB (June 1983, p. 204)
27 £M3 is linked to PSBR since the increase in £Mg equals the increase in lending to the private and 
public sector and net external Hows, the increase in lending to the public sector again equals the part o f 
PSBR which is not financed by sales o f government securities to the private sector
28 source: Brown (1990, p. 104)
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uncertainty and would lead to more political credibility. The apparent disadvantage of 
such a medium term strategy is that it reduces the degree of flexibility of policy to 
offset unexpected disturbances, which are difficult to forecast at the time when the 
targets are set. Successive versions of the MTFS in subsequent budgets were marked 
by various modifications to the original.
The experience with the 'growth policies’ of the 1970s, shifted the emphasis towards 
private 'entrepreneurship' as the source of growth, which implied a major shift in the 
thrust of economic policy. A reduction in size of the public sector, an abolition of the 
various controls imposed upon the private sector, as well as restraining the power of 
the trade unions were seen as necessary preconditions for such a shift^^
The key features of the MTFS can be summarised as follows;
a) The defeat of inflation became the primary macroeconomic 
policy objective.
b) Monetary targets were the means to achieve this objective 
on the assumption that there is a stable demand for money 
function.
c) The achievement of the objective was embedded in a 
medium term strategy which was perceived as essential to 
reduce uncertainty in the economy and to strengthen the 
confidence in the government's policies; the targets were 
set at a declining profile.
d) Interest rates were the instrument to control the growth of 
the monetary aggregates and would, therefore, be raised to 
whatever level was needed to assure that monetary growth 
was within target range.
e) Targets were set for the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) in relation to GDP to prevent 
additional pressure upon interest rates from the side of the 
public sector. Fiscal policy in terms of the budget deficit 
was subordinated to monetary policy.
f) The MTFS had an insular nature^o (there was hardly any 
reference made to external factors, such as the exchange 
rate).
The choice of fMg as the central target variable met with doubts whether the 
relationship between monetary growth and nominal incomes was indeed reliable in 
the face of an already apparent instability in the British demand-for-money function.
29 Brown (1990, p. 102/103)
40 Brown (1990. p. 104)
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However, the government believed that future inflation expectations could be altered 
via monetary targets and swept all doubts a s i d e ^ f
In the first year of the MTFS, the targets set for M3 and PSBR were overshot and the
same was true for the year 1981/82. In 1982/83 both targets were met but only after
an upwards revision. After exchange rate controls and the 'corset' had been abolished,
the growth of M3 was dramatically inflated by the process of r e i n t e r m e d i a t i o n ^ ^ .
Other factors, such as financial innovations, full adaptation of liability management,
and the growth of building societies contributed to the acceleration in the growth of
broad money. After the abolition of direct controls, the authorities were left with two
instrum ents to control the money supply, short-term  interest rates and debt
managements^. Short-term interest rates proved rather ineffective as an immediate
control instrument on bank lending since the desired effect on M3 only became
apparent after a time-lag of six months, as available evidence had shown. The demand
for bank loans was the crucial factor which needed to be influenced in the course of
M3 control. Fforde argued that
“...with these uncertainties and time lags surrounding the 
course o f  bank lending, monetary control in the shorter term 
came to depend critically upon debt management;... , there 
were rather close limits to what could be achieved by this 
means. For one thing, the short-run predictability o f  the 
government's own borrowing needs was at that time very
p o o r  "44.
In fact, sales of gilt-edged stocks, conducted by the Bank of England on behalf of the 
Treasury, made up the majority of the debt sales.
At the beginning of the second quarter of 1980, the British economy moved steeply 
into a recession, which led to sharp reductions in profit margins, a rapidly rising
41 Fforde in (BEQB, June 1983)
42 “Credit rationing and high inflation were m ajor influences on household behaviour through the 
1970s. It is likely that the direct monetary controls that were then applied impinged most heavily on 
bank lending to households.” the Governor's Loughborough lecture (BEQB, December 1986, p. 502)
43 Coleby in (BEQB, June 1983)
44 Fforde in (BEQB, June 1983, p. 204)
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unemployment rate, and consequently to a boost in social security spending, leading 
to the overshoots of PSBR target in the first years of the MTFS. The initially low rate 
of inflation started to accelerate again in 1979 and inflation peaked in May 1980 at a 
rate of 21.9 per cent. In the autumn of 1980, the growth of prices and nominal 
incomes slowed down again. Between 1979 and 1980, the exchange rate rose |
considerably due to high interest rates, a credible anti-inflation commitment by the |
Thatcher administration, and a strong surplus in the balance of payments, after the j
British oil fields in the North Sea had been fully developed. The Bank of England j
issued a paper on 12  March 1981 which introduced a number of changes to enhance !
the existing framework of monetary control. Greater emphasis was placed on open- i
market operations and to a lesser extent on discount window lending. The Bank was j
determined to allow market factors to have a greater effect than before on bill rates, i
the reserve asset ratio was to be abolished as soon as consultations with the banking !
sector about adequate holdings of liquid assets had been c o m p l e t e d ^ ^ .  Despite the 
recession, the balance of payments remained in surplus and the conduct of fiscal 
policy stayed tight. After its peak in 1980, the rate of inflation fell gradually to under '
five per cent. By 1982, inflation was in a sustained downward trend but M3 was still 
overshooting (Figure 3.246).
Monetary indicators, other than M 347, suggest that the conduct of monetary policy 
was tight during the first years of the MTFS and that an even tighter policy would 
have only led to an exacerbation of the already severe recession. In the face of the 
large overshoot of M 3 in the first year of the MTFS and the comparably better 
performance of narrow aggregates as indicators of the actual stance of monetary 
policy, commentators started to question once again the appropriateness of M 3 as 
monetary target aggregate, which encouraged further academic study of this issue in 
order to find other less distorted monetary aggregates. In 1980, monetary base control
45 BEQB (March 1981)
46 Arüs/Lewis (1991, p. 74)
47 The growth of the narrow aggregates M 1 and Mq was much slower than the growth of M3 .
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was intensively discussed and considered as an alternative to targets for broad money 
on the grounds that base money showed a close statistical relationship with inflation. 
The arguments in favour of such a control mechanism, however, did not prevail in the 
end. The authorities took the view that the situation necessitated a continuous 
interpretation of the performance of M 3 in the light of other factors, such as the 
exchange rate, since the behaviour of the target aggregate alone did not seem to be 
giving a reliable signaH^.
22-
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FIGURE 3.2
Since the authorities had attached such great importance to the MTFS as expression 
of their devotion to the defeat of inflation, the monetary overshoots were taken very 
seriously. Since 1980, the velocity of broad money (GDP/broad money) had fallen by 
an average of 4 per cent a year, with M 3 falling at an accelerating rate, whereas the 
velocity of Mq rose strongly. If a target is set for the growth of broad money and the 
velocity of circulation of this aggregate falls, it imposes a tighter squeeze on the 
economy. The statistical relationships between money and nominal incomes had 
already shown considerable fragility in the early 1970s in the face of strong supply
J S Fforde (BEQB, June 1983) and Coleby (BEQB, June 1983)
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shocks, most apparent in Anglo-Saxon countries49 After the second oil price shock in 
1979, the pronounced changes in monetary policy in the United Kingdom made the 
fragility of this relationship even more apparent. The most significant breakdown of 
the previously established relationship occurred in those monetary aggregates which 
had been chosen as monetary targets^^^ Goodhart^^ argues "‘that any observed 
statistical reguiarity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it fo r  control 
pufposes”. Various explanations have been put forward to explain the instability of 
the relationship between the money stock and nominal income since 1980, which 
shall not be discussed here, since such a discussion would go beyond the scope of this 
paper. Despite the present instability, several authors^2 have argued, on grounds of 
em pirical evidence, that the long-run dem and-for-m oney function d isplays 
remarkable stability, with few outliers which require special explanation. The 
authorities themselves put forward various reasons to explain this fall in velocity, 
such as reintermediation after the abolition of the 'corset'. In fact, the process of 
disintermediation was quite substantial, with financial flows being re-routed away 
from the banks balance sheets, companies issuing bills and other companies or 
financial institutions were holding these bills instead of certificates of deposit. 
Another factor which was invoked by the authorities was the entry of the clearing 
banks into the mortgage market, which increased the competition between banks and 
building societies on assets and liability sides
49 Fair (1987, p. 475/476) compared the money demand functions of 27 countries and found 
considerable similarities across the OECD countries. With exception of Germany, instability in money 
demand was found in 13 of the 17 tested countries.
50 Goodhart (1989, p. 99/100)
51 Goodharl's Law: Goodhart (1984, p. 96)
52 Artis/Lcwis (1984) and Taylor (1987); Taylor estimated a stable demand function for EM3 for the 
UK (1964-1985) on quarterly basis and included an own rate of return on money in the equation in 
order to capture some effects of financial innovation. The results show no sign of a structural break in 
the function following the introduction of the CGC. In another equation, Taylor excludes the factor 
which describes the inlluence of financial innovation, whereby the estimated coefficient shifted by 
over three standard errors.
53 Cobham (1988) and Cobham (unpublished)
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Llewellyn et al.54 argue that two sets of constraints dominated British monetary 
policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s; On the external side, the relationship 
between international capital movements, the exchange rate, and the domestic money 
supply. On the domestic side, the complex relationship between fiscal policy 
(measured by the budget deficit), the growth rate of the money supply, and the level 
and structure of interest rates.
3.3.3.2 1982-86
After inflation had fallen to a low figure, the government was increasingly urged to 
indicate the thrust of monetary policy, in the face of continued overshooting of the 
monetary targets and w ith other factors than the growth of monetary aggregates 
appearing to have some influences on monetary policy decisions. The overshoots in 
the early 1980s coupled with the authorities inability to explain the fall in velocity of 
broad money led to significant modifications in subsequent versions of the MTFS. 
Extensive studies were undertaken by the Bank of England and the Treasury to find 
less distorted and more reliable monetary indicators. Since the velocity of narrow 
money had proved more reliable during this period, its role was upgraded in the 
framework of the MTFS. Quoting Goodhart (1989, p. 306):
“This erosion o f  confidence in their ability to interpret the 
signals given by their prior chosen main target and indicator,
£Ms, led the authorities to extend the range o f  monetary and  
other variables, including notably the exchange rate, that they 
would consult in assessing the stance o f  policy, and hence in 
deciding on how to vary interest rates ".
In March 1982, the authorities amended the policy laid down in the original version 
of the MTFS in 1980. The monetary targets set for £Ms in the MTFS relating to 
1982/83 and succeeding years were revised upwards, in the 1982/83 and 1983/84 
MTFS common target ranges were set for a period of three years for JEM .^ The
54 Llewellyn el al. ( 1982, p. 23)
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authorities introduced two additional measures, PSL2 (Private Sector Liquidity, 
second definition, an even broader aggregate than £Mg), and M i, for which the same 
target range was set as for £Ms. Although the authorities believed that £Mg was 
sending misleading signals regarding the monetary conditions, it was politically 
impossible to abandon £Ms as target aggregate. Nevertheless, the status of the 
monetary target for £M3 was downgraded in response to increasing doubts about its 
central significance. From 1982 onwards, the emphasis was on the 'illustrative' nature 
of the target aggregates which was accompanied by a growing emphasis on the 
exchange rate as indicator. C o l e b y 5 5  states in this context that, although the 
authorities' objective to counter inflation had remained unchanged, “there has been a 
wide-ranging debate over almost every aspect o f  its aims and operations and there 
have been changes in the weights given to particular fac tors considered in 
formulating policy”.
After the re-election of the Conservative government in June 1983, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer initiated a review of the MTFS. The discussion centred once again on 
the choice of the target aggregates. The authorities, in the light of their previous 
experience with targets for broad money, started to consider narrow aggregates for 
targeting purposes. In the 1984/85 MTFS, separate target ranges56 were set for Mo 
and £ M 3 and additional attention was paid to PSL2 and M 2 . The velocity of M q  had 
been on a steady upward trend since 1955, suggesting a stable relationship between 
Mo and nominal expenditures57. Although £M 3 was still considered important, the 
authorities took the view that it was more useful as a guide for 'funding policy' rather 
than as an indicator for the setting of short-term interest rates (Temperton, 1991). The 
authorities attached equal weight to both target aggregates in the assessment of the 
stance of monetary policy. In the 1985 budget, the role of the exchange rate was
55 BEQB (June 1983, p. 215)
56 Mo's range was two percentage points lower than that for fM g, reilecting historical differences in 
the trends in velocity of these two aggregates.
57 Mq was regarded by the authorities 'as a useful indicator of monetary conditions'. BEQB (August 
1992. p. 305)
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significantly upgraded and exchange rate fluctuations became the indicator on which 
monetary conditions were judged. Furtherm ore, the authorities announced the 
publication of government's forecasts for nominal GDP alongside targets for the 
monetary aggregates58, In the 1985/86 MTFS, separate targets were set for Mo and 
£Ms, but the target range for £Ms was suspended in October 1985. In the 1986 
budget, a target for £Mg was reinstated but only for 1986/87 and with a relatively high 
target range. By the end of 1986, the authorities were preparing to abandon monetary 
targets59 and in the 1987 budget, £M3 was finally dropped^o as target aggregate, 
which left M q as the only aggregate targeted by the authorities. Cobham (1988) 
argues in his paper on the influence of financial innovations on monetary targeting, 
that the major wake of distortions and structural changes induced by financial 
innovations on the growth of monetary aggregates has passed. Although the financial 
markets will continue to produce new instruments, there is no reason to expect a 
further substantial increase in competition as a cause of financial innovations^!. 
Therefore, “as fa r  as the UK is concerned, financial innovation implies a need not 
to abandon but to modify the practice o f  monetary targeting"^'^. A rather opposing 
opinion is held by Dow and Saville (1988), who stated that it has become evident that 
monetary targetry is no longer tenable. Table 3.3 shows the monetary targets set in 
the UK between 1976 and 1987 and the results achieved.
The corporate sector was still in a state of recovery from the severe recession in 
1980/81 and the demand for mortgage finance in the personal sector grew rapidly^s, 
reflected by a persistently high demand for bank loans. In the early 1980s, demand
58 Fforde (1982, p. 207) noted in this context that ‘'Indicating an acceptable medium-term path fo r  
nominal GDP enables a greater einphasis to be placed on the favourable development o f  demand and 
output that could be accommodated within it. ”
59 the Governor's Loughborough lecture (BEQB, December 1986)
6b The authorities stated in the 1987 budget report that no new target for broad money was set because 
it remains too difficult to interpret the behaviour of TMg.
61 The official rationale for the abandonment of monetary targets in the UK has always stressed the 
problems caused by financial innovations.
62 Cobham (1988, p. 263)
63 Personal sector bon owing for house purchase grew at an average annual rate of 19.5% during the 
1980s. BEQB (February 1995)
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for bank loans appeared to be highly interest inelastic^^. In the first half of the 1980s, 
the policy of overfunding (Figure 3.3), which is the sale of government debt to the 
non-bank public exceeding that required to fund the PSBR, was a prominent feature 
of gilt-edged market managements^.
Monetary Targets, 1976 -198766
P eriod M easu re T arg e t Set O utcom e
1976/77* £M3 9-13 8.0
1977/78* £M3 9-13 15.1
1978/79* 8-12 11.4 [a new target was set after six months
Oct. 1978/Oct. 1979 £M3 8-12 13.7
10.9 to October 1978]
[a new target was set after eight months
June 1979/Oct. 1980 £M3 7-11 17.2
12.4 to June 1979]
[Original target was to April 1980. Target
1980/81** £M3 7-11 19.4
was extended in Oct. 1979 for one year. A 
new tiuget was set after eight months.
9.9 to Feb. 1980 and 10.4 to April 1980]
1981/82** £M3 6-10 128
1982/83** Ml 8-12 12.4
1983/84**
£M3
PSL2
Ml
8-12
8-12
7-11
11.2
11.6
14.0
1984/85**
£M3
PSL2
Mo
7-11
7-11
4-8
9.5
12.6
5.4
1985/86
£M3
Mo
6-10
3-7
11.9
3.4
£M3 5-9 16.7 [the target was suspended in Oct. 1985]
1986/87 Mo 2-6 4.4
£M3 11-15 19.0 [the target was suspended in Oct. 1986]
TABLE 3.3
* financial year
** from February of one year until April of the next
The pursuit of deliberate overfunding of the PSBR was the authorities' response to 
their previous experience with interest rates which had proved insufficient to control 
the broad money supply. The sales of more public debt than all of the PSBR had a 
contractionary impact on M 3 . However, such a policy was fraught with technical 
problems. The large payment flows from the banking sector to the government caused
64 Goodhart (1989, p. 306)/ reasons are given in: Artis/Lewis (1991, p. 160/161)
65 Arlis/Levvis (1991, p. 185)
66 source: Temperton (1991, p. 7)
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persistent cash shortages in the discount market, especially the sale of long-dated 
securities, which forced the authorities to counteract by engaging themselves 
consistently in the purchase of commercial bills in open-market operations to provide 
the banking sector with sufficient liquidity. This policy soon resulted in an excess 
holding of bills ('bill mountain')^T The policy of overfunding was contrary to the 
authorities' declared intention to give greater freedom to market forces in the 
determination of short-term interest rates, and was abandoned in October 1985^^. The 
determination of interest rates became increasingly pragmatic and the authorities' 
attention shifted more towards exchange rate fluctuations. The sterling exchange rate 
fluctuated considerably during this period (Figure 3.4) and on many occasions interest 
rates were raised in the face of a sterling weakness in the foreign exchange market.
16-, —  Debt sales 
^  PSBR
H
- 1 2 - H
- 1 6
Y ear
FIG URE 3.3: Funding the PSBR
(source; Arlis/Ixwis, 1991, p. 186)
By 1985 the Bank of England was holding commercial bills in excess o f£ 1 5  million. 
G ilbody(1988. p. 279)
In fad , the growth of EMg was more controlled by the mean of overfunding than by interest rate 
changes during 1982-85.
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Sterling Index and rate against EMS 
(1975 =  100)
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FIGURE 3-4: Sterling Exchange Rates
(source: Driffiil, 1987, p. 27)
In the 1984 budget, the government spelled out as its primary policy objective the 
achievement of stable prices with lower interest rates. The post-1983 UK inflation 
record, however, suggests that the government was not particularly determined to 
bring inflation further down, after it had reached an average rate of 5 per cent. In the 
light of a declining level of world-inflation and a more stable macroeconomic 
environment, the conduct of monetary policy seems to have been rather lax after 
1983. Nevertheless, whenever the RPl (retail price index) tended to rise above 5 per 
cent, due to inflationary pressures, the authorities counteracted by raising short-term 
interest rates. The authorities' behaviour indicates a switch in monetary policy to 
supporting economic recovery rather than stable prices, after inflation had been 
brought down to 5 per cent^’^ .
The process of disinflation in Britain followed a world-wide trend, which can, 
according to an OECD study on the disinflation in the 1980s^(\ be mainly attributed 
to the restrictive monetary policies adopted in OECD countries. The Conservative
Brown (1990, p. 108/9)
(Coe ct al., 1988, p. 113) cited in A rtis/Lewis ( 1991, p. 52)
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government under Thatcher leadership uncompromisingly pursued the articulated 
policy of monetary tightening to curb inflation in the first half of the 1980s. The 
findings of an analysis on the credibility of the Thatcher regime carried out by 
Brociner (1990), show that the change of government in 1979, the re definition of the 
role and emphasis of British monetary policy, and the subsequent monetary tightening 
reduced inflationary expectations and was, therefore, credible. The broad international 
consensus about the necessity to pursue counter-inflationary monetary policies at the 
end of the 1970s made the adoption of such policies by the Thatcher government 
som ewhat easier. A lthough the governm ent succeeded in reducing inflation, 
according to its precommitment, the observations by Brown (1990, p. 108/9) seem to 
suggest that an even lower inflation rate would have been feasible at the time. The 
disinflation in the early 1980s in the UK and the findings by Brociner demonstrate 
that an anti-inflationary commitment can be credible even in a discretionary monetary 
regime, provided the policy makers do not renege on the precommitment. The 
experience, however, shows that such commitments are mostly short-lived and are 
often sacrificed in the moment, when economic conditions become less favourable.
3.4 British Monetary Policy post-1986
3.4.1 Searching for a New 'Anchor'
In the second half of the 1980s, the PSBR moved into surplus which was partly due to 
the flow of payments to the government as a result of the privatisation of public sector 
corporations. In the second half of the 1980s occurred a shift in attention, especially 
in medium-sized countries, away from monetary aggregates whose past performance 
had cast doubts on their predictability, towards stabilising the exchange rate since 
past misalignments in the foreign exchange market had led to increasing concern by
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the authorities'll. Furthermore, in the case of the United Kingdom, the exchange rate 
attracted growing attention in the light of a possible entry into the ERM, after broad 
money targets had been abolished. High interest rates in the United States and a 
strong appreciation of the dollar increasingly biased interests rates in the UK by 
forcing the authorities to maintain them at a higher level than they would have done 
otherwise. In September 1985 in the Plaza Agreement, the G5 resumed an active co­
ordination effort to reduce the pressure by driving down the dollar. Soon after, the 
dollar started to depreciate strongly and concern grew about the consequences of a 
massive depreciation. In February 1987, the G7 agreed in the Louvre Accord to 
stabilise the dollar by installing a loose system of 'reference ranges' within which the 
currencies were to be maintained. The specific guidelines set out in the Accord for the 
monetary policy of the participants, however, did not require changes in existing UK 
policy. At the end of 1987, interest rates were cut in response to the collapse of the 
world stock markets in October. In March 1987, an informal arrangement was made 
to constrain sterling within a narrow trading range with respect to the Deutschemark, 
which was just below 3 DM/£. Whenever the pound tended to rise above this range, 
the authorities intervened in the foreign exchange market or reduced interest rates. 
This coincided with a period of upward pressure on sterling and excessive domestic 
demand, which in the face of growing inflationary pressures, made it increasingly 
difficult to retain the low level of interest rates necessary to maintain the 'peg' to the 
DM. Consequently, this policy was abandoned in March 1988. British monetary 
policy between 1985-87 can be described as having been significantly influenced by 
an effort to narrow the range of sterling fluctuations against the DM in anticipation of 
a possible UK membership in the EMS *‘a n d h r  in an ejfort to control Inflationary 
expectations by drawing on investor confidence in the
The strong appreciation o f sterling was viewed by the authorities as a major factor behind the depth 
o f the UK recession.
'72 Poole (1992, pp. 76/77)
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During the 1985-87 period, the growth of M3 was extremely high and 1989 
experienced a resurgence of inflation. In the budgets from 1987/88 to 1992/93, no 
target ranges for broad money aggregates were set and the ranges set for Mo had 
merely an 'illustrative' character^^. However, in the 1988 budget report, the authorities 
stated that Mq had proved a reliable indicator of monetary conditions'^^. Furthermore, 
although no broad monetary target had been set, the authorities continued to take 
broad money developments into account for the assessment of the stance of monetary 
policy. Goodhart^S argued that, although the authorities maintained Mo as a target 
aggregate, there has been no case where the development of this indicator was 
primarily responsible for a policy instrument shift, apart from a few occasions where 
M q was considered before policy measures were taken. In 1990, the British economy 
went into a recession initially caused by a sharp fall in domestic demand^6. The RPl 
peaked at over 10 per cent in 1990 and than declined gradually, reaching under four 
per cent in the first quarter of 1992.
On the 6  October 1990, the United Kingdom entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
ERM membership was viewed by the authorities as device to create credibility for 
British monetary policy. The Governor stated in November 1992 that
“it certainly offered a very visible sign o f  our commitment to 
price stability - a sign that could be understood, and which 
would thus influence favourably expectations in the private 
sector
The precondition for sterling membership had always been stressed by the authorities 
as being twofold; The convergence of the UK inflation rate to an average EMS
Mq is in the short-term exclusively demand-determined and has therefore no apparent short-term 
causal role. (BEQB, February 1995)
24 Goodhart (1992, p. 143) remarks that "indeed we have had some monetary targetry ever since 
1985, in the form  o/ M q, though this, I  believe, has m ainly represented a jig  lea f to disguise the actual 
fa c t o f  the abandonment o f  monetary targetry, a fig  lea f which enabled the Chancellor to say that he 
never gave up monetary targetry".
25 Goodhart (1992)
26 Domestic demand fell between the second quarters of 1990 and 1991 by 4.7%.
(BEQB, August 1992)
22 inaugural LSE Bank of England lecture (BEQB, November 1992, p. 447)
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country rate of inflation and the chance for the UK authorities to observe the working 
of the EMS after exchange controls had been removed. A satisfactory fulfilment of 
these conditions was perceived as essential in order to secure a ’smooth entry'. 
However, prior to sterling's entry, the rate o f inflation did not meet the first 
precondition. Although in the period 1987-90 exchange rate controls were still in 
force, the ERM appeared to rely to a lesser extent on the use of this instrument, which 
showed the system's ability to function successfully even without these controls.
The UK suspended its membership on the 16 September 1992, after turbulent market 
conditions had necessitated a heavy official purchase of Sterling. The Governor 
pointed out that, due to the increasing divergence between the domestic policy needs 
in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the constraints of the system forced Britain into 
unduly disinflation, which involved the risk that the UK economy would suffer 
unnecessary damage^®. Britain's exit from the ERM resulted in a loss of counter- 
inflationary credibility, although as King (1993) argued, this loss was small.
3.4.2 Alternative Proposals and a New Strategy
After the suspension of sterling's membership in the ERM, a new framework for anti- 
inflationary credibility of monetary policy was urgently needed. A new strategy was 
launched in 1993, the government's commitment to price stability was embodied in an 
explicit inflation target^^. The Chancellor announced a target range for annual 
inflation of 1-4 per cent, defined in terms of underlying inflation - RPIX (RPl 
excluding mortgage interest p a y m e n t s ) ^nd said that, by the end of this Parliament, 
the aim is to achieve an inflation rate which is in the lower part of this range. Beside
28 BEQB (1992, p. 447)
29 Inflation Report, Febniary 1993
^6 Crockett (1994) argues that over time it would be desirable to use a more sophisticated measure of 
internally generated price pressures.
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the publication of the inflation target, institutional changes had to be introduced to 
bolster the credibility of the commitment to low inflation. The Bank of England, 
therefore, was committed to provide a regular (quarterly) and objective analysis of 
inflationary trends and pressures (Inflation Report) to monitor the progress being 
made towards the Government's objective of price stability (since February 1993). 
The Governor stressed in his Mansion House speech in November 1992, the 
im portance of such steps in order to make monetary policy more open and 
accountable to both Parliament and the public^T Although in the 1993/94 MTFS, 
medium-term monitoring ranges were set for M4 and Mg, the centrepiece of monetary 
policy became the inflation target. W ithin the framework of this new strategy, 
monetary aggregates are used as information variables rather than intermediate 
targets. Moreover, the government committed itself to greater openness concerning 
the information used to assess the appropriate stance of monetary policy to meet the 
target and to explain the reasons for any changes in that stance. The Treasury was 
committed to the publication of a regular monthly assessment of the underlying 
monetary conditions (since December 1992). An additional commitment was made to 
issue detailed press notices whenever interest rates are changed (since October 1992). 
Furthermore, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on April 13, 1994 that 
minutes of the monthly meetings between the Chancellor and the Governor will be 
published in future, which shall contribute to greater transparency of monetary policy. 
The role of fiscal policy in supporting monetary policy was emphasised within the 
new monetary strategy of the government.
From the UK's exit from the ERM onwards, sterling depreciated strongly. The rate of 
inflation moved well under four percentage points but started to rise again at the end 
of 1994 (Figure 3.582).
The Governor (1992) argued that, although 'these changes may appear to be a small step lor Britain, 
they are a giant leap for the authorities'.
82 Financial Times (27/07/95)
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FIGURE 3.5
In June 1995, the government updated its inflation target and announced that it will 
continue to target RIPX inflation at a rate of 2.5 per cent or less, beyond the end of 
the present Parliament. Representatives of countries with an inflation target as the 
centrepiece of their monetary policy framework, judged, at a recent conference 
organised by the Bank of England, that past experience had encouraged the targeting 
of inflation since some of the countries had already succeeded in reducing 
substantially their domestic level of inflation. It is hoped by the authorities to reduce 
uncertainty and generate credibility with the adoption of a official target, provided 
that to hit the target implies a low rate of inflation*^
The Bank of England recommended in its quarterly report, published 2 August 1995, 
that interest rates should be revised to counteract inflationary pressures in order to 
ensure that the government's inflation target is met. Nevertheless, commentators at the 
time expected the government to respond in a rather reluctant manner to the warning 
by the Bank, despite the apparent threat to the inflation target. The Bank of England 
noted that the financial markets were not convinced that the government is serious 
about sticking to its inflation target, which was manifested by a sharp increase in 
long-term inflation expectations since May 1995 -^ .^ Already the publication of the
83 King (BEQB, February 1995)
84 Financial Times (03/08/95, p. 1)
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minutes of the meeting of June 7 between Kenneth Clark and Eddie George had 
shown that the Chancellor 'rejected the view that policy should be tightened simply 
because the financial markets expected it to be' and re-emphasised that the decisions 
on interest rates were to be solely based on the economic evidence on a month-by- 
month basis85. The Financial Times remarked in this context on 20 July 1995 that 
‘‘while the judgement on whether or not Interest rates should he raised may be finely  
balanced, the risks are no t”. As chapter one tried to demonstrate, expectations are a 
crucial factor in monetary policy and policy makers should, therefore, take these 
expectations into account, whenever policy decisions are made. This is of particular 
relevance for the conduct of British monetary policy at the moment, since the 
credibility of the UK's new policy regime is still rather fragile. Although, at the end of 
1995 the rate of inflation was within the 1-4 per cent, meeting the ambitious goal of 
bringing inflation into the lower target range by end of this Parliament, after 
excluding mortgage interest payments, will, however, require more enthusiasm on the 
side of the government and seems at the moment rather unlikely.
Recently, proposals have been put forward, in a paper by an independent panel of 
economists, to give a new mandate to the Bank of England by making it more 
independent, in the hope of generating greater credibility and accountability of 
monetary policy. It is argued that price stability should be the statutory objective of 
the Bank of England and the Bank should, therefore, be independent of government 
directives in order to secure that the primary monetary policy objective of price 
stability is met. Provisions, however, should be made to allow a temporary reversion 
of monetary policy to the government in an emergency. The government should only 
be able to overrule the Bank and to resume the control over monetary policy when it 
lays before the Parliament a statutory instrument to suspend for a period of six 
months the Bank's primary objective^^.
85 Financial Times (20/07/95)
86 Roll fed.] (1993)
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At this present moment, the government still exercises full discretion over the thrust 
of monetary policy in the United Kingdom and no actions have been undertaken to 
enhance the independence of the Bank of England so far. Nevertheless, the 
government has committed itself to a precise inflation target and the future will show 
to what extent the low inflation objective is indeed the overriding constraint on the 
conduct of monetary policy in the UK.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom has been marked by various
changes over the past decades both in its objectives and its means. The dependence of
the Bank of England on the government had, at times, decisive impact on policy
decisions, since it enabled the authorities to use monetary policy for the pursuit of
objectives other than price stability. The negative effects of Keynesian-style demand
policies of the 1970s, directed at a high level of employment, were particularly
pronounced in the United Kingdom. The various devices employed over the years to
embed the counter-inflationary commitment into some credible framework, turned
often out short-lived. Cairncross remarks to this point that
“the record suggests that when there has been disagreement 
over monetary policy, the Bank o f  England and the Treasury 
are, as likely as not, on the same side o f  the argument. This 
may be true even o f  the Chancellor and the Governor. The 
Prime Minister has the last word and Prime Ministers usually 
have strong views which they do not lightly abandon”^ '^ .
Even in the absence of an independent monetary authority, it is still possible to build 
a reputation, provided monetary policy is credibly committed to low inflation and 
consistently conducted in tlie light this objective. However, the UK's monetary history 
also shows that optimism should be expressed rather cautiously in such cases, since 
discretion has too often prevailed at the end, despite an official precommitment to
8^ Cairncross (1988, p. 71)
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price stability and the self-imposition of constraints to make such commitments more 
credible. As M. King remarked, “there is no doubt that the most effective way to 
obtain credibility is to build up a track record o f  low inflation "88, which has been 
rather poor in the UK over more than two decades®^. The new strategy of the 
authorities is directed at making the conduct of monetary policy more accountable 
and the commitment to low inflation more credible. However, for the future one 
remains sceptical; W hether the new monetary policy framework in the United 
Kingdom will be more binding for the policy makers. The issue of whether the Bank 
of England should be made independent of the government will with certainty rank 
high on the political-economic agenda in the next years. The authorities' ability to 
generate sufficient credibility for their present strategy will determ ine how 
strenuously the form er alternative will be pursued and advocated in the general 
debate.
The record of British monetary policy, especially since 1979, has been marked by a 
continuous search for credibility of the authorities' low inflation commitment. In the 
face of this evidence, one could argue that there has always been a case for an 
independent Bank of England.
“Just as the Bank o f  England provided a model when the 
Reserve Bank o f New Zealand was established in 1934, there is 
now a clear case fo r  making the Reserve Bank o f  New Zealand 
a model fo r a refoi'med Bank o f  England”
88 King (1994, p. 123)
8^ The results of a study by Batchelor/Orr (1991) suggest that factors such as, the political party in 
government, the proximity of elections, and, under fixed exchange rates, the rate o f inflation itself, 
determined significantly the policy credibility in the UK. However, the government's initiatives to 
increase credibility, through incomes policies and monetary targets, did not succeed in reducing 
uncertainty.
Wood et al.( 1993, p. 27)
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CHAPTER IV
Monetary Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany
The Conduct of Monetary Policy in the 
Federal Republic of Germany: An Assessment
4.1 Introduction
German history, at the beginning of this century, is marked by the appearance of two 
runaway inflations. In the period between the end of the First World War, through the 
first years of the Weimaer Republic, until November 1923, Germany experienced 
unprecedented inflation, accompanied by a dramatic loss of public confidence in 
governmental institutions. After a period of relative economic stability, achieved by 
the Rentenmark reform of November 1923, Germany went into depression like the 
rest of the industrialised world. The hyperinflation of 1923 with consumer prices 
rising two billion-fold and the resulting deep economic and social consequences are 
generally regarded as the main reason for the political failure of the First Republic. 
There are countless examples where discretionary conduct of monetary policy 
resulted in an undesirable and sometimes even disastrous outcome, as in the case of 
Germany, leading twice in a century to a complete loss of monetary wealth.
After the end of the Second World War, at the insistence of the British military 
authorities, the Bank Deutscher Lander (BdL) was founded to co-ordinate the actions 
of the Land Central Banks which had been created in the zone of each Ally. The 
structure and powers of the newly established institution had a close resemblance to 
today's Bundesbank. In 1950, after the Federal Republic came into existence, the BdL 
obtained its temporary status as the central bank of Germany. In the first draft of the 
legislation, Germany's political leadership favoured a rather decentralised institution 
to allow governmental representation and a certain degree of influence on monetary
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matters, and put proposals forward concerning the transfer of banking authority from 
the Allied Banking Commission to the government. The Central Bank Council of the 
BdL had strong objections against this proposal, resulting in a fierce debate whether 
the new central bank should be independent of government directives. In the years of 
its existence, the Bank D eutscher Lander set a new standard for monetary 
management by maintaining relative price stability during a period of high growth.
The German Bundesbank was established by the Bundesbank Act in 1957 as an 
independent central bank^ with a constitutional responsibility to protect the internal 
value of the Deutschemark. The inclusion of the mandate to safeguard price stability 
met with wide consensus in German society. Since then, the refusal to compromise on 
inflation has been a distinctive element of Bundesbank policy despite changing 
economic concepts of thought. Nevertheless, the Bank's room for manoeuvre to 
achieve its prime objective of price stability, has often been limited over the years, 
primarily by external constraints. Germany's membership in the fixed exchange rate 
system of Bretton W oods and later, after the Deutschemark had involuntarily 
assumed the role of an 'anchor' currency in the European M onetary System, 
challenged German monetary management. The Bundesbank faced the difficult task 
of balancing domestic interests and the requirement to maintain international stability 
after the Deutschemark had become one of the most important reserve currencies after 
the US dollar. The government’s exchange rate policy, for which it is legally in charge 
in Germany, made it more difficult for the Bundesbank to pursue successfully the 
objective of price stability on various occasions.
1 A restriction in independence lies in the appointment procedure since the Bundesbank President, the 
Deputy President, and the members o f the directorate are appointed by the Bundestag's President 
(speaker of the Bundestag) on the recommendation of the Federal Government, although the 
government is obliged to consult the Central Bank Council (CBC) before giving its recommendations 
to the Bundestag's President. The Presidents of the Land Central Banks are appointed by the 
Bundestag's President on the recommendation of the Bundesrat (Upper House of the German 
Parliament) after a prior hearing of the CBC and on account of a recommendation of the regional 
autliority.
It is important to note in this context, that in the 1960s and 1970s the “Central Bank Council 
forw arded a number o f  negative opinions on the nominees o f  the state governments (Land Central 
Banks), but never succeeded in stopping an appointm ent”. (Holtfrerich, 1988, p. 143)
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In 1974, the Bundesbank was the first central bank to adopt monetary targets by 
setting an annual target for the growth of the Central Bank Money Stock (CBMS). 
This was viewed by Bundesbank officials, in the face of apparent dangers threatening 
monetary stability, as an important step in restraining price expectations in the 
economy. The practice of monetary targeting has been retained ever since, although 
the targeted aggregate changed to M 3 in 1987. In 1990, the Bundesbank faced its 
greatest challenge so far with the German unification. Since its establishment in 1957, 
the Bundesbank has successfully pursued an anti-inflationary monetary policy, based 
on its constitutional task of maintaining price stability and its independent status, 
which earned it the reputation of an accountable and credible monetary 'custodian'.
This chapter reviews German monetary policy over the past three decades and is 
divided into four main parts; Part one provides an insight in the Bundesbank's 
monetary management under the fixed exchange rate constraint of the Bretton Woods 
system. Part two discusses the concept of monetary targeting in Germany and reviews 
the setting of monetary targets under flexible exchange rates. The third part is 
dedicated to a detailed assessment of Bundesbank policy in the 1980s under the EMS 
constraint. Part four outlines the major issues of the German currency union in 1990 
and the problems of German monetary policy in the 1990s.
4.2 German Monetary Policy under the Fixed Exchange Rate 
System of Bretton Woods
Within the framework of the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods, the 
Bundesbank was obliged to intervene in the foreign exchange market whenever the 
exchange rate reached the official intervention points to prevent the intervention 
points from being passed. Favourable international conditions had enabled the 
Bundesbank to pursue a rather expansionary monetary policy until m id-1959 to
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promote economic growth and employment and to achieve equilibrium in the balance 
of payments. In order to keep the rate of inflation under control, the Bundesbank 
tightened monetary policy in autumn 1959, leading to a massive inflow of foreign 
capital which increased the money supply dramatically. The government, who is in 
charge of the exchange rate policy, found itself with a conflict of interests between 
defending the external value of the currency to maintain the relative advantage of 
Germany's export industry due to an undervalued Deutschemark and counteracting 
increasing inflationary pressures. A fter having opposed the first revaluation in 
October 1960, the government finally decided for a modest revaluation in March 
1961, after the monetary instruments at the Bundesbank's disposal had failed to 
counteract imported inflation. Bundesbank officials^, who had been in strong accord 
with the government's original refusal to revalue, criticised publicly the government's 
decision for revaluation which brought the then Bundesbank President to remark that 
'one shouldn't operate on a healthy currency [the D-mark] in order to cure a sick one 
[the US dollarj'3. Nevertheless, after revaluation, the Central Bank Council (the 
supreme body of the Bundesbank) adopted a more supportive position concerning the 
government's decision for a new exchange rate parity^. However, the revaluation did 
not lead to the intended slowdown of the economic boom and failed to make 
monetary policy effective again. The Bundesbank was forced to pursue a policy of 
low interest rates until 1965, despite economic expansion and rising inflation. This 
episode shows the potential for disagreement about the appropriate action in the 
exchange rate policy arising from the split of monetary and exchange rate jurisdiction 
between the central bank and the government.
2 Karl Blessing, who was at the lime the Bundesbank President, fully supported the government's 
decision not to revalue in October 1960.
3 quoted in Kennedy (1991, p. 39)
4  Economics M inister Erhard staled, after the Central Bank Council meeting in which the Council had 
approved the new parity, that in the case of continuous opposition by the Bundesbank, the government 
would have exercised its power to suspend (veto) the Bundesbank's decision of reducing the minimum 
reserves that had just taken place. (Kennedy, 1991, p. 40) The government's power o f veto, however, is 
limited to a  fortnight and has never been exercised, but serves as an effective threat in a case of strong 
disagreement.
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The 1960s were marked by substantial economic growth, high employment, and 
relatively stable prices. In the face of increasing inflationary pressures, the 
Bundesbank started to tighten monetary policy in summer 1964, reinforcing it in 1965 
when budgetary relaxation contributed to overheating of the economy. 1965 was a 
year of great internal and external imbalances with the biggest current account deficit 
which had been so far recorded in the Federal Republic, a diminishing growth rate of 
the labour force, a steep rise in consumer prices, and rising public expenditures. The 
conflict between economic and monetary policy lasted until spring 1966 and was 
finally resolved in favour of monetary interests as the government agreed on a 
restrictive budget. The fixed exchange rate had prevented the effective use of 
contractionary measures at an earlier stage to counteract the increasing inflationary 
pressures. After the contractionary monetary measures displayed price-stabilising 
effects and the public authorities had cut their investment expenditures significantly, 
inflationary pressures were largely offset, but recessionary tendencies had gained 
significance and Germany went into the first post-war recession. In the mid-1960s, 
monetary policy proved more effective in restraining demand than it had been on 
other occasions in the post-war period. At the end of 1966, the authorities felt that the 
stabilisation endeavours had gone too far and decided, therefore, to ease the tight 
monetary stance to promote economic recovery. In early 1967, the government 
adopted an expansionary budget approach to stimulate recovery5. In autumn 1967, an 
economic upturn became finally apparent but the expansionary policies had led to the 
re-emergence of inflationary pressures.
In 1967, the government passed the Stability and Growth Law (SGL, Stabilitats- und 
Wachstumsgesetz) which was intended to provide additional policy instruments to 
foster economic growth. The belief in the instability of the private sector was behind 
the passing of the SGL. The main emphasis was placed on fiscal policy and political
5 two special investment programmes were launched by the government in the course of 1967, 
involving more than DM 5.5 billion
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decision-makers were bound in their economic policy to the fulfilment of the general 
macroeconomic goals of a social market economy. This law provided the government 
with a plausible justification for interventions in the business cycle. Article 1 defined 
as the four macroeconomic goals; ( 1) stability of the price level, (2 ) full employment,
(3) a steady and reasonable growth, and (4) foreign trade equilibrium - 'the magic 
square'6 . The link between the goals of the Stability and G rowth Law and the 
Bundesbank Act arises from the Bundesbank's obligation to support the general 
economic policy of the federal government (article 12, Bundesbank Act). Article 18 
of the SGL regulated the setting up of a Council of Economic Advisors, the ’Five 
Wise Men', which was established to advise the government in economic matters and 
to produce an annual report about the state of the German economy. Despite the fact 
that the annual publication of the report receives considerable attention from the 
government as well as from abroad, the Council's role is purely that of an advisor 
since it is not vested with sanctions in order to initiate and enforce necessary policy 
changes. In January 1968, the government submitted its annual economic report, 
which was revised in January 1969, to the Parliament, containing medium-term 
economic aims for the period 1968-1973. The definition of the aims was considered 
optimal and reflected directly the goals embodied in the Stability and Growth Law.
(1) Full employment (0.8 of the labour force) - implying 
an average unemployment rate of 1.0  during the 
target period.
(2) Price stability (rise in GDP deflator not exceeding 1 
per cent) - implying an average annual increase in 
the GDP deflator of 1.8  per cent.
(3) Foreign trade equilibrium - a surplus on the balance 
of goods and services on a national accounts basis of 
1.5 per cent of GDP, offset by transfer payments and 
long-term capital exports.
(4) Steady and reasonable economic growth - annual 
GDP increase of 4  per cent in v o l u m e ^ .
6 The term 'magic square' refers to the apparent conflict between these goals, since some of them can 
only be achieved at the expense of others. In the SGL, however, these goals were considered equally 
important and simultaneously achievable.
 ^OECD Economic Survey (1969, p. 35)
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After the enactment of the Stability and Growth Law, an intense discussion about the 
Bundesbank's autonomy into the 1970s dominated the political debate in Germany. 
The Social Democrats strongly favoured a change in the Bundesbank's status. 
However, these ideas failed to find a majority and ultimately did not prevail.
During the period from 1966 to 1968, the German economy experienced a major 
expansion, marked by a pronounced growth of GDP, a substantial capacity growth in 
the total economy, a declining rate of unemployment, and a surplus in balance of 
trade of more than $5 billion in 1967 and 1968. In 1969, the economic stance 
remained expansionary, real GDP grew by 8  per cent and capacity utilisation rose 
steeply*, although growth started to slow down in the course of the year. In the same 
year, Germany became the world's largest exporter of long-term capital at $5.9 
billion, which consisted alm ost entirely of private savings. A fter the situation 
deteriorated, the Bundesbank used its limited room for manoeuvre in March 1969, by 
changing the minimum reserve requirements to reduce the high liquidity balances of 
the banks caused by a massive speculative inflow of foreign capital, awaiting 
revaluation. The government enforced restrictive budgetary measures after economic 
indicators had suggested a likely excessive rise in demand. After the restrictive fiscal 
and monetary measures employed had proved largely self-defeating, attracting large 
speculative inflows from abroad, the Bundesbank pleaded for a revaluation of the 
Mark. The government, however, refused revaluation in May 1969, but was split over 
this issue, which came to affect directly the general election campaign. The 
Deutschemark was finally revalued in September at 9.3 per cent, generating an 
outflow of speculative funds. The revaluation and the Bundesbank's restrictive 
monetary policy coupled with budgetary restraints tightened the monetary stance. 
Although the applied measures dampened the growth of exports and weakened the 
boom in private investment, demand, however, remained rather high and put severe
8 A t the end of 1969,1.6 million foreign workers (mainly from Turkey) were employed in Germany.
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pressures on resources^. Despite restrictive monetary and fiscal measures, prices 
continued to rise fast, reinforced by high wage settlements. In autumn 1969, wage 
settlements became increasingly aggressive, leading to a 'wage explosion' in 1970. 
The government perceived its scope for action as rather limited in the face of the 
oncoming general elections. In early 1970, it became increasingly clear that the 
impact of the revaluation was not strong enough to offset inflationary pressures. The 
Bundesbank, therefore, took additional measures to tighten the monetary stance even 
further and introduced incremental minimum reserve requirements on banks' foreign 
liabilities. Although the restrictive measures applied showed the desired effects, 
declining international interest rates urged the Bundesbank to adapt its policy 
instruments accordingly. The Bundesbank reaction to the international requirement 
came somewhat delayed since the authorities found no justification for an immediate 
relaxation of monetary conditions on domestic grounds. The Bundesbank's monetary 
policy was, according to the OECD Economic Survey in 1971, apart from the 
revaluation in 1969, “the most effective policy variable in stemming domestic 
inflation in 1970, although its impact was severely limited by external factors”.
In May 1971, the government allowed the Deutschemark to float in order to ease 
inflationary pressures and restore the Bundesbank' s control over the monetary 
aggregates. This step was also taken in the hope that revaluation expectations would 
have a restraining influence on prices and wages. However, actual developments were 
somewhat different from the authorities' expectations. The movement of the $/DM 
was very erratic due to changing expectations in regard of a Deutschem ark 
revaluation. After the US government had eased up considerably on its credit policies 
and the international monetary situation deteriorated, the Bundesbank engaged itself 
increasingly in supporting the weakened US dollar to prevent an excessive
9 The industrial capacity utilisation averaged 93 per cent in 1970 despite an continued increase in 
foreign workere. OECD Economic Survey (1971)
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appreciation of the Deutschem ark 9^ December 1971, the Group of Ten agreed 
(Smithsonian agreement) on new bilateral parities relative to the dollar, a devaluation 
of the US dollar relative to gold, and the installation of new fluctuation margins 
around the new dollar parities of 2.25 per cent on either side^k In the course of the 
currency realignment, the Deutschemark appreciated vis-à-vis the other currencies by 
a rate of 7.5 per cent, which did not eliminate the inflationary pressures to the extent 
that was expected. The Bundesbank and the government, therefore, agreed on 
additional restrictive measures to offset the expansionary effects of speculative capital 
import on the money supply. The decision about the appropriate measure triggered a 
conflict between the two sides. The Bundesbank favoured a license system for the 
buying of German bonds by foreigners, while the government preferred an increase in 
the 'Bardepot' (percentage of foreign credit to be held interest free with the 
Bundesbank). The application of the latter instrument is at the discretion of the 
government, while the Bundesbank decides on the percentage of the Bardepot. At the 
end, the Bundesbank lost to Bonn's officials and applied the new instrument with a 
40-percent rate*2. In April 1972, the central banks of Belgium, Germany, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed an agreement in Basle (the 'snake in 
the tunnel' arrangement), designed to limit the exchange rate fluctuations among the 
currencies of the signatories by agreeing to narrower bilateral fluctuation margins of 
±1.125 per cent. In June 1972, a Sterling crisis led to a renewed massive speculative 
inflow of foreign capital and the Bundesbank succeeded, on this occasion, in 
convincing the government to apply the license system^^ This course of events 
prompted the publication of the Bundesbank's interpretation of the Bundesbank Act, 
with special regard to its relationship to the government and its autonomy.
Between January 1970 and May 1971, the Bundesbank purchased, bound by the intervention 
obligation, more than US$ 11 billion, resulting in a stock of foreign currency reseiwes of almost DM 69 
billion. (NOlling, 1993,p. 46)
 ^1 The agreement tripled the fluctuation margin vis-à-vis the dollar, which gave strong incentives to 
the creation of a lighter intra-EC mechanism in order to restrict exchange rate fluctuations. 
(Gros/Thygesen, 1992, p. 16)
^2 The instrument fell out o f use in 1974, but the government can reactivate it any time. (Holtfrerich, 
1988, p. 147)
D  Article 13, para. 1 obliges the Bundesbank to advise the government in currency matters.
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In the early 1970s, an attempt was made to extend the Bundesbank's catalogue of 
monetary instruments, reaching the stage of a parliamentary bill. The government, 
under the leadership of the Social D emocrats, proposed the introduction of a 
minimum reserve requirement on the banks’ assets in addition to those on the banks' 
obligations. The governm ent insisted that the use of this instrum ent by the 
Bundesbank would require government approval. The Christian Democrats and the 
Bundesbank strongly objected against such a 'two-key provision' , leading to the 
dropping of the bill
Starting in the fourth quarter of 1972, the industrialised world experienced a massive 
economic upswing accompanied by a sharp acceleration of the rate of inflation which 
prompted in many countries the introduction of restrictive measures to bring the 
development of prices under control. The rise in world food and raw material prices 
and the first oil crisis aggravated the situation dramatically and complicated the 
necessary stabilisation policies significantly. Germany was more successful than other 
countries in coping with the external and internal effects of the oil crisis. As the oil 
crisis hit the world economy, German domestic demand had already started to slow 
down, coupled with a deceleration of the pronounced price increases from the 
beginning of the 1970s. A relatively large export volume and a strong foreign balance 
helped to maintain high employment and industrial capacity utilisation. In March 
1973, the Deutschemark was floated jointly with the currencies of the other five 
members of the European Community against the US dollar. At the time, it was 
believed that it would be possible to return to pegged exchange rates, but the oil crisis 
and its severe econom ic consequences proved insurm ountable obstacles. The 
transition to floating exchange rates removed the strong external constraint which the 
Bretton Woods system had imposed on German monetary policy and what had, in the 
past, often severely biased the pursuit of domestic price stability 5^ q^ he end of
14 Hollfrerich ( 1988, p. 149)
The former Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger wrote; “Since the mid-1950s, German 
stabilisation policy has repeatedly been undermined by influences originating abroad. In no other
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Bretton Woods enabled the Bundesbank to largely regain control over the money 
supply and corrected the asymmetry of monetary adjustment processes, which had 
existed under fixed exchange rates ^6 Schlesinger argued that
“by releasing the Bundesbank from  its duty to intervene on the 
foreign  exchange m arkets...the Federal Government freed  
monetary policy from  the obligation to create central bank 
money involuntarily via purchases o f  foreign exchange. This
enabled the adoption o f  a policy o f  monetary targeting
4.3 The Introduction of Monetary Targets
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, which had the Bundesbank released from 
the necessity to create central bank money involuntarily via purchases of foreign 
exchange, enabled the authorities' to pay greater attention than before to the control of 
the money stock. Throughout the 1960s, the m ajor operating target of the 
Bundesbank's monetary management had been the free liquid reserves of the banks, 
reflecting their potential lending capacity. Free liquid reserves consist of liquid 
assets^* which can easily be converted into central bank balances. The Bundesbank 
controlled the banks' free liquidity stock by acting on minimum reserve requirements, 
rediscount quotas, and open market operations. The situation, however, changed in 
the early 1970s, when banks ceased to maintain a certain voluntary minimum level of 
free liquid reserves. In the past, banks had always tried to retain a certain level of free 
liquid reserves at any time, by reducing their lending volume whenever their free 
liquidity stock shrank. The new developments prompted the Bank to abandon its past
major country has imported inflation played such a major role as in the Federal Republic o f  
Germany”. (Emminger (1977), T he D-M ark in the conflict between internal and external equilibrium'. 
Essays in International Finance, no. 122, Princeton, p. 1, quoted in Kennedy (1991, p. 58)
^6 Emminger in Ciocca [ed.] (1987)
Schlesinger, H. 'Die Geldpolitik der Deutschen Bundesbank 1967-1977, K redil und Kapilal, Vol.
11, p. 11, quoted in Lssing (1992, p. 291)
^8 Liquid assets are excess reserves on deposit w ith the Bundesbank, domestic money market paper, 
money market investment abroad (excluded from the definition since 1973), unused rediscount quotas 
(included as a negative item), and short-term Bundesbank advances against collateral (Lombard credit) 
which were deducted since this type of Bundesbank credit cannot be obtained automatically and is only 
granted for a short period. (Sherman, 1990, p. 25)
128
Monetary Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany
operating target and called for a re-orientation of monetary policy, confronting the 
Bundesbank with the task of finding suitable monetary indicators and intermediate 
targets.
A fter the oil price shock, uncertainty about the thrust and doubts about the 
effectiveness of monetary policy had increased and inflationary expectations became 
to be more influenced by current price developments rather than by the Bundesbank's 
stabilisation policy. Issing^^ stated in this context that until the end of the 1960s and 
early 1970s, most countries followed strategies which set about achieving monetary 
policy objectives directly. The outcome of such policy approaches was rather 
unsatisfactory, subsequently leading to a shift in emphasis in favour of intermediate 
monetary targets. The Bank was urged to take action in view of the dangers 
threatening monetary stability and the publication of an intermediate monetary target 
by the Bundesbank was perceived as crucial for restraining price expectations and to 
signal
“that monetary policy was no longer prepared to accommodate 
the continuation o f  the inflation process from  the monetary 
angle. In this way central banks urged economic agents to 
reckon with lower inflation rates in the medium run and to 
adjust their expenditure stance accordingly "20
While searching for an appropriate intermediate target aggregate, the Bundesbank 
considered a wide range o f different monetary indicators, but decided finally in 
favour of the central bank money stock ( C B M S ) 2 k
19 lssing (1994, p. 136)
20 Schlesinger (1983, p. 6)
21 In its annual report in 1972, the Council of Economic Advisors had already proposed a  money 
stock-oriented policy approach.
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4.3.1 The Setting of Intermediate Monetary Targets
4.3.1.1 Properties and Control of the Central Bank Money Stock
A target for the central bank money stock was announced for the first time in 
December 1975. The central bank money stock is defined as the total amount of 
currency in the hands of non-banks and the required minimum reserves on banks' 
domestic liabilities. The required minimum reserves are calculated at constant reserve 
ratios from January 1974 with 16.6% for sight deposits, 12.4% for time deposits, and 
8 .1% for savings deposits. Consequently, the components of the minimum reserves 
are in a relation of about 4:3:2 to each other. Currency in circulation is given full 
weight in the definition of the CBMS. The differentiated weighting of the various 
components indicates their degrees of 'moneyness'. The CBMS differs only slightly 
from the monetary base, although the quantitative difference is highly significant, 
mainly in the way that it does not comprise the minimum reserve requirement on 
deposits of non-residents and the excess reserves of the banks. The central bank 
money stock is a measure of the monetary expansion which has already taken place 
(backward-looking indicator) rather than a measure of the creation of central bank 
money. The CBMS serves both, as intermediate target aggregate and indicator of 
monetary conditions. The advantages of the CBMS as an interm ediate target 
aggregate are its early availability (two weeks earlier than M3) and the fact that it is 
calculated from monthly a v e r a g e s ^ ^  instead of end-of-month data as for Mi and M 3 . 
The reported data for CBMS are, therefore, less subject to random influences in 
comparison to the other monetary aggregates. Nevertheless, unexpected movements 
in currency in circulation can tem porarily lead to distortions and reduce the 
informative value of the indicator, but such developments had in the past, usually, 
returned to normal after a few months. If the divergences prove more persistent, the 
Bundesbank draws special attention to the distortions and their probable reasons in its
22 CBMS is calculated from average levels o f the Bundesbank's Weekly Return and the minimum 
reserve statistic.
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monthly analysis, to prevent the general public misinterpreting the stance of monetary 
policy23. CBMS has a relatively stable relationship to nominal GDP over the long 
term, which makes it particularly valuable as an indicator from a macroeconomic 
perspective24. The results of econometric studies suggest that changes in the central 
bank money stock and in the aggregates M i and M 3 tend to run ahead of increases in 
expenditure. Schlesinger (1983, p. 7) remarked that
“by prescribing a margin fo r  the desired expansion o f  the 
central bank m oney stock  it can therefore be shown  
convincingly that m onetary po licy  can set a norm ative 
'monetary framework' fo r  the longer-term trend o f production 
and prices and fo r  nominal expenditure in the economy - a 
framework which finally makes all those concerned share the 
responsibility”.
Furthermore, CBMS is closely related to the monetary aggregate M 3 , since both 
aggregates incorporate the same financial assets, only weigh them differently, and 
expand at roughly the same pace. The importance of the central bank money stock for 
monetary control by the Bundesbank arises from the fact that
“it underlines in a special way the responsibility o f  the 
Bundesbank fo r  the overall monetary developments: without an 
expansion o f  the central bank money stock an increase in the 
money in the hands o f  nonbanks is unthinkable. Calculated at 
current reserve ratios, the central bank money .stock is in the 
fina l analysis the direct contribution o f  the central bank to 
aggregate money creation”
Another factor, which played a crucial role in the Bundesbank's choice of CBMS as 
target aggregate, was that savings deposits are included in the definition of the 
indicator. In the past, the Bundesbank had been confronted with considerable 
problems in recording and interpreting the development of M; and M 2 because of 
frequent and often unpredictable changes in the deposit structure due to interest rate 
changes. Furthermore, institutional reasons might have played a role as well in the
22 Schlesinger (1983)
24 During the period 1961-1976, the growth rate o f the CBMS deviated only in four of the years by 
more than 2 percentage points from the growth rate o f nominal income. (Duvvendag, 1976, p. 276)
25 Schlesinger (1983, p. 7)
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Bundesbank's choice of an interm ediate target aggregate^^ The Bundesbank 
influences the central bank money stock indirectly by changing short-term interest 
rates and bank liquidity yet faces considerable uncertainty about the intensity and 
time lags of this instrument. The Bundesbank lacks a fully reliable econometric model 
of the m onetary transm ission m echanism , which necessitates a continuous 
interpretation of new data and evidence in order to allow an adequate response to the 
current monetary conditions. The Bank has made it clear that the control of the 
CBMS is not totally independent of the decisions of banks and non-banks, at least not 
in the short-run^^. When deriving the annual target for the central bank money stock 
the Bundesbank takes the following variables into account^*;
(1) the expected growth in the production potential,
(2 ) the desired change in the utilisation of the 
production potential,
( 3 )  the 'unavoidable' price i n c r e a s e 2 9 ,
(4) the expected development of the 'velocity of 
circulation' of money^o.
An overall economic projection, which is discussed and co-ordinated with the 
government, precedes the formulation of the monetary target. The targeting procedure 
is based on the presupposition of initially stable prices and a normal utilisation of the 
production potential. The publication of the key data and the derivation procedure 
underlying the setting of a target for the CBMS by the Bundesbank, enhances the 
transparency of monetary policy and enables decision makers in other fields to adjust 
their actions and expectations accordingly.
26 If for example, the Bundesbank had chosen M f as intermediate target, it would have required 
drastic measures to inlluence M i with open market ojjerations, since the German market for open 
market papers lacks size, depth, and elasticity. Large open market operations would have too strong 
repercussions on interest rates in the money, credit, and capital markets, (source; Duwendag, 1976, 
p. 294)
27 Schlesinger (1976, p. 441)
28 Bundesbank (October 1982, p. 84)
29 The Bundesbank considers as an 'unavoidable* rise in prices a rate o f price increase which cannot be 
prevented even by a policy strictly committed to stability (somewhat below the forcasted rate of 
inflation). When price stability is lacking in the initial stage, inflationary expectations have already 
affected arrangements between economic agents, although the central bank is aiming at price stability. 
(Bundesbank, October 1982, p. 85)
20 This factor, the velocity o f circulation of the CBMS, is the connection to the nominal GDP.
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However, there are several problems which arise from the use of the central bank 
money stock as an intermediate target variable. Firstly, the CBMS includes a high 
proportion of currency in circulation with its full weight. Random shocks in the 
demand for cash can tem porarily increase the amount of cash in circulation, 
reflecting inadequately the degree of monetary expansion, since the increase in the 
cash holdings could be partly a result of shifts in the deposit portfolio. Since this 
statistical disadvantage can at times be quite considerable, the Bundesbank takes in its 
assessment of the monetary stance the development of other monetary indicators and 
a wide range of economic data into account. Furthermore, the similarities between the 
central bank money stock and the monetary base can easily lead to the misconception 
that the targeting of the CBMS is some sort of monetary base control concept^k 
Another point of criticism is the exclusion of minimum reserve requirements on 
banks' foreign liabilities, since they are not fundamentally different from banks' 
domestic liabilities^^.
The Bundesbank used the central bank money stock as its intermediate target 
aggregate until 1987. Over the years, the definition of the money stock has undergone 
certain changes. For the first years after the adoption of monetary targeting, the 
annual target for the CBMS was defined as a single figure, this was changed to a 
target corridor (3% margin) in 1979, above all due to the experience in 1978, which 
witnessed a substantial increase in real terms in the D-Mark's value. The policy of 
monetary targeting is generally vulnerable to external developments. Moreover, 
persisting uncertainties concerning the development of the macroeconomic variables 
as well as short-term fluctuations in the demand for money prompted the Bundesbank 
to review the announced target after six months to decide, according to the monetary
21 Von Hagen (1988, p. 105) cirgues that “the performance o f  an operating regime with the base as 
the operating target is superior to the performance o f  the regime currently adopted by the 
Bundesbank”. This result is obtained from an em pirical evaluation o f alternative operating regimes for 
money stock control based on the multiplier model.
22 Duwendag (1976, p. 286), the Council o f Economic Advisors argued similarly in its 1974 annual 
report
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conditions and trend, whether to aim at the upper or at the lower part of the target 
corridor.
4.3.1.2 Monetary Targeting under Flexible Exchange Rates
In the first years of monetary targeting in Germany, the Bundesbank set the annual 
target for the CBMS in terms of a precise figure. The Bundesbank generally does 
allow in its targeting strategy short-term deviations of the money stock growth from 
the target. Correcting measures (changing the course of interest rates and liquidity 
policy) are only taken when the departure of the actual growth rate from the target 
proves more persistent. From 1975 to 1978, the actual annual growth rate of the 
money stock always exceeded the target, primarily for external reasons. In 1975, the 
Bundesbank viewed a growth rate of the money stock of 8  per cent as consistent with 
its commitment to price stability. However, the economic upswing was more hesitant 
than expected, urging the Bundesbank to apply expansionary measures to achieve its 
objectives. Despite the expansionary monetary stance, the increase in the CBMS was 
still below the target in the middle of the year, leading, on the side of the Bundesbank, 
to the application of additional expansionary measures. In the second half of 1975, the 
economy was on the steep path of recovery and the central bank money stock 
accelerated rapidly, resulting in an overshooting of the target.
The target for 1976 was set, in contrast to the year before, in terms of a year-on-year 
average rather than a postulated expansion during the year. In the same year, the 
Bundesbank intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market to support the other 
currencies in the snake. The Bundesbank's engagement in large exchange rate 
interventions met with criticism  inside Germany. In October 1976, the 'snake' 
members finally agreed on an exchange rate adjustment which involved five 
currencies, followed by relatively frequent realignments in subsequent years. In the 
second half of 1970, the rate of inflation fell which was to a considerable extent due
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to more moderate wage settlements^^. After the collapse of Bretton Woods, a multi- 
currency standard had come into existence in which hard currencies, such as the Yen 
and the D-Mark, were in high demand as savings as well as transaction medium. This 
general constellation placed the Bundesbank once again in a policy dilemma. 
Whereas on one hand, tight domestic monetary policy and appreciation reduced the 
competitiveness of German products on the world market, if the Bundesbank on the 
other hand were to adopt a rather expansionary monetary approach, it would risk 
losing credibility. Between 1972 and the end of 1977 the weighted external value of 
the Deutschemark against the sixteen currencies which were at the time officially 
quoted in Frankfurt, increased by about 43 per cent. This development, however, 
should be seen in part as a correction of the previous undervaluation of the DM, 
which had facilitated exports and impeded im ports^t
In 1977, the snake still accommodated seven countries, with the Deutschemark 
serving as anchor. At the 1978 Bonn Economic Summit, the government agreed that 
Germany would take on the 'locomotive' role of pulling the international economy out 
of the recession. In 1977 and 1978, the Bank intervened heavily in the foreign 
exchange m arket to support the dollar. The growth of the CBMS turned out 
significantly higher than the target value in 197825. A t the end of 1978, the second oil 
crisis of the decade hit the world economy. In 1979, the Bundesbank changed course, 
after the United States had pushed the German authorities to adopt more expansionary 
fiscal measures, the Bank refused to accommodate an increase in the fiscal deficit and 
was determined not to allow any further overshooting of the target. The Bundesbank's 
decision was intended as a signal of stability to fiscal policy as well as an attack on 
the US dollar, whose weakness had led to large foreign capital inflows into Germany 
which jeopardised internal stability.
23 Spahn (1989, pp. 18/19)
34 Emminger in Ciocca led.] (1987, p. 132)
35 The Bundesbank (1985,37/1, p. 23) stated in its M onthly Report that “ the failure to meet the target 
was not only due to the control techniques used but also a deliberate monetary policy reaction to the 
undesirable external development at the time”.
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In 1979, the Bundesbank defined for the first time its annual target in terms of a target 
corridor, which increased the Bundesbank’s discretionary room for adjustment to 
unexpected distortions in the course of the year, without jeopardising the credibility 
of its targeting strategy. This step to the 'corridor concept', however, met with 
criticism, raising doubts in its opponents26 whether the Bundesbank's monetary policy 
is indeed geared to the production potential. In the course of internal negotiations 
between the US government and western central banks to support the dollar, the 
Bundesbank remained strong and objected against the demands put forward by the 
American authorities. In autumn 1979, the dollar came under severe pressure and the 
US authorities had no other alternative than changing their exchange rate policy.
4.4 The EM S Experience; G erm an M onetary Policy  
under Pegged Exchange R ates
The European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1979, as a reaction to the 
large exchange rate fluctuations of Community currencies throughout the 1970s. The 
EMS incorporates two key features, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) with 
pegged exchange rates and the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a weighed basket of 
all participating currencies. The currencies of the participating countries are allowed 
to fluctuate freely within a limited band. W henever the exchange rates approach 
either the upper or the lower edge of the margin of the band, the central banks, whose 
currencies are involved, have the obligation to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to bring the exchange rate movement back on course. The fluctuation band 
was for most currencies set at ±2.25% around the central rate, which was meant to 
provide sufficient flexibility to accom m odate different inflation trends. The 
arrangement was coupled with the stipulation of convergence of economic policies 
among the member countries, implying bilateral rapprochement rather than a joint
26 See i.e. Ribhegge (1989, p. 210)
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policy towards a low rate of inflation. The Bundesbank raised strong objections 
against this institutional feature of the ERM. With Germany's entry in the ERM, the 
potential conflict of interest between government and the Bundesbank about 
exchange rate policy re-emerged to its full extent. The institutional features of the 
arrangement considerably limited the Bundesbank's freedom of decision making in 
regard to its mandate for domestic price stability and gave once again strong 
discretionary incentives to the Ministry of Finance which is in charge of exchange 
rate policy. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that the Bank strongly opposed 
joining the system, yet the government was determined to make Germany a member 
of the EMS. Different arguments have been put forward to explain Germany's 
incentive for EMS m e m b e r s h ip s ^ ,  which shall not be discussed here. Although the 
EMS was originally designed to function as a symmetric system, it soon became an 
asymmetrical system in which the Bundesbank assumed a central role and set the 
monetary standard for EuropeSS. Norbert Kloten^^, a member of the Bundesbank 
Council, remarked on that point ''the Bundesbank never wanted a dominant rote in 
Europe's monetary policy-m aking,..she was fo rced  to accept that ro te”. W ith 
Germany's membership, asymmetry appears to have been from the very beginning 
inherent in the EMS, due to the Bundesbank's constitutional responsibility for stable 
prices. The major motivation for high-inflation countries to join the EMS is rather 
clear^. These countries gain credibility from the Bundesbank's anti-inflation 
reputation by pegging the exchange rate to the D-Mark which forces the central bank 
to follow the monetary policy of the 'anchor' currency. The credibility of membership 
in a fixed exchange rate system for these countries depends crucially on the ability of 
the authorities to convince speculators that their only objective is the maintenance of
See for a summary of altemative explanations Fralianni/von Hagen (1990, p. 90-93).
38 Fratianni and von Hagen (1990) reject on the grounds of empirical evidence the argument of 
German dominance in the EMS.; Weber's findings (1991, p. 75/76) classify the EMS as “a bipolar 
system in which the French franc offered a soft currency alternative to the hard currency option o f  the 
German m ark’’.\ Gros and Thygesen (1992) found that the EMS has been less asymmetric than often 
assumed and the degree of asymmetry seems to have changed significantly over time.
Kloten, N. (1988); "Die Europiiische Whhrungsintegration: Chancen und Risiken", Deutsche 
Bundesbank AuszUge aus Presseartikeln , 81, p. 3) quoted in Fratianni/von Hagen (1990, p. 92)
^  Giavazzi/Pagano (1988)
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the fixity of the exchange rate, whatever the unemployment and output costs. The 
disadvantages of fixed exchange rates can be generally described as being threefold"^^; 
Firstly, the differences in reputation of the participants can lead to low credibility of 
the whole system. Secondly, fixed exchange rates considerably limit the scope of 
adjustment to disturbances. Thirdly, such arrangements end up usually with one 
leader and many followers (the 'N-1 problem'), which can endanger the stability of the 
system, when the leading currency comes into difficulties and fails to sustain its role.
The year 1979 witnessed an increase in the consumer price index of 4.1 per cent^2 ^ 
current account deficit of DM 11 billion, and a dramatic rise of 11,6  per cent in 
import price index. Although, the Bundesbank achieved its annual growth target for 
the CBMS imported inflation increasingly threatened domestic price stability. The 
conflict between exchange rate objective and responsibility to protect the internal 
value of the D-Mark in the face of a permanent threat of imported inflation was to 
become the major challenge for the Bundesbank throughout the 1980s. 1980 was the 
year of the biggest German government deficit since 1950, at DM 28 billion, which 
equals 1.28% of GDP and rising unemployment. The Bundesbank showed serious 
concern about the current account deficit and its effect on exchange rate expectations 
and the Deutschemark's role as an international reserve currency^^. Although the 
money supply was heavily influenced by external factors throughout the year, the 
monetary target for the CBMS, however, was met with 5 per cent (lower end of the 
target range).
In the first two years following the establishment of the EMS, external factors forced 
the Bundesbank to maintain a tight monetary stance despite increasing domestic
See de G rauwe (1992)
The increase in the CPI in Germany in 1979 was relatively low, compared to other countries (See 
OECD Economic Outlook, July 1981, p. 140) which obseived a  two-digit rise in consumer prices.
“The willingness of foreigners to hold financial assets in a certain currency is the ...test of whether a 
central bank is fulfilling ite task o f maintaining a  stable monelaiy system. To follow a given 'monetary 
rule' in such a constellation is at best a secondary concern” . (Spahn, 1989, p. 24)
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pressures of a recession. The second oil price shock caused considerable problems for 
Germany, which was dependent on im ported oil and gas. The situation was 
exacerbated by a deterioration of the trade balance with non-OECD countries. The 
strengthening of the dollar and a declining confidence in the DM led to a capital 
outflow in 1980. The authorities intervened in the foreign exchange market to prevent 
a serious decline in the external value of the D-Mark. However, the policy of 
sterilised intervention on currency markets was not sufficient to counteract the Mark's 
downward trend. In early 1981 the $/DM exchange rate dropped to an alarmingly low 
level which forced the Bundesbank to tighten monetary policy even further. After the 
meeting of the Central Bank Council on February 19, the Bundesbank announced 
drastic m e a s u r e s s u c h  as a rise of the Lombard rate to 12 per cent and the 
suspension of the right of commercial banks to obtain overnight Lombard funds. The 
Bank's restrictive policy necessitated interventions in favour of other EMS currencies, 
while the weakened Mark still needed support.
The Bundesbank's interest policy was strongly attacked by the government, leading to 
a serious political conflict between the two parties which eventually brought the 
downfall of the government of the Social Democrats under Helmut Schmidt. The 
drastic measures applied led almost immediate reaction in the markets. By April the 
Deutschemark had regained and stabilised its place as the strongest currency in the 
EMS. A fter the external pressures had eased the Bundesbank shifted its policy 
towards other economic goals (according to its mandate embodied in Article 3 and 12 
of the Bundesbank Act). However, a meeting between Bundesbank officials and 
Chancellor Schmidt ended in a clash of opinion after the Bank had refused to reduce 
interest rates to stimulate the economy. The government had already considered an 
extension of its borrowing from the OPEC countries as alternative source of 
financing. The Bundesbank raised strong objections against this financial plan on the
^  Overnight credits to the banks through the 'special Lombard" system went up to 28% after the CBC 
meeting in February.
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grounds that this would lead to an unacceptable increase in the money supply, and 
announced not to support the government in this matter by issuing new federal bonds. 
The government found an alternative way by channelling the OPEC funds through the 
Credit Agency for Reconstruction (Kreditanstalt für W iederaufbau), which was 
outside the jurisdiction of the Bundesbank. The German government finally raised a 
loan of DM 6.3 billion together with the French governm ent.
This conflict demonstrated more clearly than ever before the importance of the 
Bundesbank's independent constitutional position. Moreover, it challenged the legal 
position and the scope of jurisdiction of both parties who vehemently defended their 
v ie w s ^ A  The Bundesbank strongly criticised in its 1980 A nnual Report the 
government's policy, accusing it indirectly of irresponsible behaviour and urging to 
change public policy to bring the budget back to 'norm al'46. The wide public 
consensus about the unsustainability of the government's deficit policy, coupled with 
the loss of faith in demand management after the second oil price shock marked the 
end of the Keynesian era in Germany. In 1982, the new government of the Christian 
Democrats announced a policy shift towards a supply-side oriented strategy and a 
medium-term budgetary consolidation.
The Bundesbank met its monetary target in 1982, with the growth of the CBMS being 
in the bottom half of the range. As in the summer of 1982, the current account had 
moved into surplus and the rate of inflation had declined, the Bundesbank switched to 
a more expansionary stance. At the beginning of 1983, prior to the EMS realignment 
in March, tension in the EMS led to a heavy inflow of foreign capital. In the first half 
of 1983, the CBMS growth was considerably above the target range which was 
mainly due to the large capital inflows and a structural shift in the deposit portfolio, 
after the decline in short-term interest rates. A fter the realignment in March, interest
45 Kennedy ( 1991, p. 51 )
46 The Council o f Economic Advisers supported in a special report the Bundesbank's position.
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rates rose and capital flows reversed which enabled the Bundesbank to meet its 
annual target by the end of the year. Until the spring of 1985 monetary policy 
decisions were made under continuous consideration of the dollar's strong 
performance in the exchange market. The D-Mark's weakness had a favourable effect 
on German exports, but threatened domestic price stability, which prompted the 
Bundesbank to intervene frequently in support of the DM/$ exchange rate. In 1985 
Germany joined in the concerted action of other central banks to prevent further 
appreciation of the dollar. The dollar devaluation had strong repercussions on the 
EMS which were temporarily resolved by the realignment in April 1986. Moreover, 
the expected disciplinary effect of the EMS was rather weak in the first half of the 
1980s since high-inflation countries frequently realigned during this period.
1986 was the year of an extraordinary economic situation with the Mark increasing in 
real terms against the dollar by 32.2 per cent, the current account showing a record 
surplus of DM 76.5 billion, and a negative inflation rate at 0.2 per cent. At the end of 
the year, increasing tension in the EMS around the intervention points obliged the 
Bundesbank to purchase foreign currencies on a large scale. The Bank was confronted 
once again with having to choose between the real revaluation of the D-Mark and the 
overshooting of the monetary target. In the course of 1987 the volume of currency in 
circulation increased substantially^^ due to factors, such as the negative rate of 
inflation which meant that non-interest bearing deposits yielded a real return. The 
Bundesbank came under increasing international pressure, especially from the US, to 
implement a more expansionary monetary policy. Strong upward pressure on the 
Mark and Germany's obligation to support the dollar, arising from its participation in 
the Louvre Accord, prom pted the monetary authorities to allow a significant 
overshooting of the CBMS target both in 1987 and 1988. Kloten48 remarked that in 
the face of these factors, the Bundesbank opted for a 'wait-and-see' attitude.
47 A l the end of 1987, currency in circulation plus sight deposits accounted for more than 70 per cent 
o f the CBMS. (OECD Economic Survey, 1987/88, p. 27-9)
48 Kloten (1993, p. 44)
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"It adhered to the monetary status quo; by thus meeting the 
demand fo r  central bank money resulting from  the development 
o f bank deposits and the volume o f  currency in circulation” but 
"it refrained from  active control o f  the expansion o f  the 
monetary aggregates”.
In both years monetary policy supported economic activity. A fter initial strong 
resistance, the Bundesbank finally cut central bank interest rates in January 1987, in 
response to a continuous flow of foreign capital into Germany. Furthermore, the 
volume of securities repurchase agreements was increased considerably. In the course 
of the year, further substantial interventions in the foreign exchange market were 
undertaken to prevent destabilisation in the EMS and to dampen the upward 
movement of the Deutschemark against the dollar. The Bundesbank's request for 
another realignment to ease the pressure was turned down by the Ministry of Finance. 
In the middle of 1988, the Bundesbank eventually started to tighten monetary policy 
after the Federal Reserve had prepared the ground, by adopting a more restrictive 
policy approach.
The monetary target for 1988 was set in terms of the broad money stock M 3 which, 
according to various studies, was considered by the Bundesbank as a 'particularly 
suitable' monetary policy indicator for Germany and as superior compared with 
narrower definitions^^ Moreover, M3 had moved broadly in line with the CBMS in 
the past two decades. The annual target values for M 3 are derived from a 
'Potentialformel' which is calculated in the following way:
M 3 target =  Pnormative +  ^ trend ~ ^  trend P ~ price
V - velocity of money
Y - output.
However, the monetary authorities emphasised that the change in the target variable 
neither affects the underlying rules of monetary targeting, nor the medium-term 
orientation. The Bundesbank's intention was to take account of the marked reaction of
49 See Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report 1988, (40/3) and 1985, (37/1)
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money in circulation to fluctuations in interest and exchange rates. Developments in 
the CBMS had in the past often exaggerated the actual monetary expansion due to the 
high proportion of currency in circulation in this aggregate. Furthermore, it had 
proved necessary on occasions in the past to extend the definition of the money stock 
for control purposes (i.e. Euro-deposits held by dom estic non-banks). The 
Bundesbank continued to derive a CBMS target for the transitional period, beside the 
target for the M 3 .
The second half of the 1980s was marked by continued relatively low economic 
growth compared with other major industrial countries, associated with a weakness of 
real investment, unprecedented surpluses in the balance of payments, and a very 
strong D-Mark. After the 1981-2 recession, unemployment rose rapidly, remaining 
persistently at over 2 million for the next five years. The trend started to reverse only 
from mid-1988 (figure 4.1 ).
2.5Unemployed
2.0
FIGURE 4.1
(source: Council of Economic Advisers 1989)
The price indicator, however, proved satisfactory^^. The tight Bundesbank policy was 
manifested in a consistently falling inflation rate from 1982 onward, reaching a 
negative rate in 1986. However, after the record low in 1986, inflation started to rise 
again, peaking in m id-1989 by over 3 per cent (figure 4.2). The targeting record in the
Spahn (1989, p. 29) notes in this context that “owners o f  monetary assets can defend themselves 
against the 'injustice' o f  inflation with a threat o f  capital fligh t to such an extent that monetary policy is 
prepared to pay the price o f  higher unemployment”.
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second half of the 1980s was rather poor with overshoots in 1986, 1987, and 1989 
(figure 4.3).
FIGURE 4.2
(source; Deutsche Bundesbank and OECD, 
in OECD Economic Survey 1994, p. 48)
FIGURE 4.3: M onetary T argets and Outcomes 
(source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report 
in OECD 1989/90, p. 11)
Findings of a study by von Hagen (1989, p. 6 8 ) indicate that
“the Bundesbank's dollar po licies and partic ipation in- 
coordinated interventions since 1985 have contributed  
significantly to the excess growth o f  German money supply, 
relative to the Bank's monetary targets in the second ha lf o f  the
This conclusion is based on the result that the Bundesbank does not completely sterilise the foreign 
exchange market interventions in the long-run. The monetary base growth was especially affected by 
these Bank's interventions, when the D-Mark's movement against the dollar and the EMS currencies 
was in the same direction.
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Compared with countries, such as the United Kingdom, the German financial system 
appears to have had lesser incentives to develop new financial i n s t r u m e n t s ^ ^  Money 
stock control in Germany was, therefore, unaffected by the distorting consequences of 
strong innovation activities.
In the second half of the 1980s disinflation in the EMS had been considerable. 
However, the disinflation record is not exceptional compared to the world-wide trend 
of declining inflation in this period, but was accompanied by higher unemployment 
which proved far more persistent in the EMS compared to non-EMS OECD countries. 
Deep recessions in many EMS countries after the second oil price shock made their 
respective governments initially abstain from  conducting restrictive monetary 
policies, leading at the beginning of the 1980s to many realignments and a low 
credibility of the EMS. Towards the end of the 1980s, the convergence of the 
inflation rates in the EMS was systematic and s u b s t a n t i a l Between 1987-92 no 
realignments occurred and the average inflation could be brought down from a peak 
in 1980 at 11.6% to 2.2% in 1987. Gros and Thygesen (1992, p. 156) stated that the 
EMS was a successful response to external and internal monetary stability^.
German monetary policy in the 1980s was strongly affected by various external 
constraints which considerably limited the latitude of monetary adjustm ent to 
undesired domestic developments. The D-Mark's international double role as second 
most important reserve currency after the dollar and as EMS 'anchor', coupled with 
the Bundesbank's responsibility for domestic price stability, often resulted in a policy 
dilemma which was resolved at the expense of either one of these responsibilities.
See Dudler (1986) and Issing (1992)
In the second half of the 1980s, the EM S seemed to have successfully imposed discipline on the 
conduct of monetary policy by its members. W eber (1992), however, argues that only the smaller EMS 
participants have gained an anti-inllation reputation during the EMS perirxl.
^  According to a study by W eber (1991), the credibility o f the exchange rate fixity was mostly 
credible under the Bretton Woods system and within the European currency snake, that was, however, 
not the case for the EMS arrangement.
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4.5 Challenges for the Bundesbank in the 1990s
The currency union^^ between the 'East German Mark' and the D-Mark was attained 
on the 1 July 1990, regarded as the “most important challenge in the history o f  the 
Bundesbank”^ ^\ The monetary authorities had to overcome immense difficulties prior 
to the accomplishment of the currency union, arising mainly from the structure of the 
GDR's banking and money system and the deep economic and social divergence 
between the two currency areas. Furthermore, strong political constraints were 
imposed on the Bundesbank in the process of defining the technical and institutional 
features of the monetary unification. The centrepiece of political and economic 
concern was the conversion rate of 'Marks' into 'D-Marks'. This rate was the factor 
which decided the competitiveness of East German products in the all-German and 
the international market. Moreover, it was highly significant for the determination of 
the D-Mark amount of wages and rents in the GDR, although this significance proved 
short-lived due to factors whose discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
The Bundesbank's greatest concern was the determination of the conversion rate for 
financial stocks since an overstating of this position would have had a significant 
inflationary impact on the enlarged currency area. The monetary authorities 
calculated that the non-inflationary money stock totalled about 120 billion D-Mark, 
which implied a conversion rate of 2:1, since the 'Mark' money stocks of private non- 
banks amounted to DM 240 billion prior to the currency union. However, the 
governm ent acknowledged the strong political im plications and pushed the 
Bundesbank to accept an average conversion rate of 1.6:157 which equalled an initial
55 Although this notion is widely used, it is rather misleading in this case and does not apply in the 
usual sense. An extension of the D-M ark to the area of the German Democratic Republic or a new 
definition of the DM -area seems more conect, since a 'currency union' in the usual sense requires two 
equal and independent partners (countries) which form jointly a supranational monetary order . [See: 
Bofinger/Kloten (1995) and K bnig (1995)] One should therefore be careful with drawing parallels 
between the German currency union of 1990 and the coming European monetary union, since the 
initial situation is significantly different within Europe.
55 Bofinger/Kloten (1995, p. 1)
57 Tw o separate conversion rates were applied at the end. A limited amount of deposits was converted 
1:1 (depending on their age, East Germans could convert an amount of M 2.000, M 4.000, or M 6.000 
at this conversion rate), while all other deposits, currency, and bank credits were subject to a 2 ; 1 
conversion rate.
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provision of DM 180 billion of central bank money. The lower conversion rate 
implied an excess money stock of DM 60 billion for the whole DM-area-5^. The 
Bundesbank did not, however, try to neutralise the excess money supply.
A fter unification, the Bundesbank was challenged once again by the task of 
determining, according to its 'Potentialformel', the annual monetary growth rate for 
the whole of Germany. In terms of inflation, the annual value which had been set at 2 
per cent since 1984 was m aintained for the all-German currency area. The 
Bundesbank did not allow a higher normative inflation rate for the adjustment period 
and “tailored a relatively tight 'monetary coat' for the entire German econom y”^ ^^ . 
Furthermore, the estimation of the velocity of circulation proved rather difficult since 
a long-term trend of the velocity of M 3 was not available for the whole of Germany. 
This prompted the monetary authorities simply to include the West German trend 
value in the calculation of the all-German monetary targets from 1991 onwards, 
which was 0.5 per cent for the years 1991 and 1992, resulting, according to Bofinger 
and Kloten (1995), in rather ambitious targets. In 1993, the Bundesbank eventually 
changed the value of the velocity variable in the 'Potentialformel' to one percentage 
point. Another factor which proved difficult, was the calculation of sound values for 
the Pan-German production potential due to the exceptional circumstances of the 
transition period. The Bank employed once again a rather pragmatic approach by 
using the West German trend values, whereas only small adjustments were made to 
consider the East German production potential. The monetary targets and their 
outcome for the post-unification are shown in figure 4.4.
58 It equals 4.5% of Ihe Pan-German money slock. (Bofinger/Kloten, 1995, p. 9)
59 Bofinger/Kloten (1995, p. 12)
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% i4~ P  Money arowinf
FIGURE 4.4: Money Supply Developments
(source: OECD Economic Survey, 1994, p. 43)
The first years after unification were marked by a strong monetary growth, which 
only decelerated in m id-1994. Nevertheless, the strong monetary expansion did not 
cause great inflationary pressures, which cannot be attributed to an instability of the 
Germ an dem and-for-m oney function, since the money dem and rem ained 
astonishingly stable. Bofinger and Kloten assume on basis of these observations that 
the Pan-German monetary targets were set too cautiously (too low) in the initial post­
unification period. However, to justify the Bundesbank, it has to be said that the 
calculation of Pan-German target values was substantially aggravated by the 
uniqueness of the situation and the resulting high degree of unpredictability and 
impossibility in obtaining precise information about the actual state of 'affairs'. 
Furthermore, between 1989 and 1994 the D-mark appreciated in real terms by more
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than 10 per cent against the currencies of the other Community members, which was 
as Konig (1995) argues, not initially triggered by German unification, but rather 
represented a delayed appreciation of the D-Mark. A fter unification, various 
co m m en ta to rsem p h as ised  the need to form  a broad coalition between the 
government, the Bundesbank, trade unions, and employers which provide the ground 
for a co-ordinated approach, directed at counteracting inflationary pressure and to 
create favourable conditions for economic recovery in Eastern Germany.
After the crisis in September 1992, the EMS bands of fluctuation were widened to 
±15 per cent on 2 August 1993, leading to a de facto suspension of fixed exchange 
rates and a floating of the system. Prior to the crisis, the Bundesbank was confronted 
with the dilemma of internal versus external stabilisation and made its choice in 
favour of the former^k The domestic situation urged the Bundesbank to adopt a 
tighter monetary stance in Germany. The decision to widen the fluctuation bands, 
however, had direct implications for the planned European Monetary Union (EMU). 
Exchange rate stability, during the two years preceding transition to the final stage of 
EMU had previously always been advocated as one of the essential requirements to 
secure a smooth transitions^. It needs to be seen whether this criteria will be dropped 
or if applied, on which grounds the fulfilment of exchange rate stability will be 
assessed.
4,6 Concluding Remarks
Although the Bundesbank only succeeded in meeting half of the announced monetary 
targets between 1974 and 1994, it acquired a high degree of credibility over the
50 Spahn (1993) and Heise (1992)
51 W inkler (1994, p. 73) remarks lo the Bundesbank's choice that "f/te insistence on fighting inflation 
in Germany by raising interest rates may have protected the anchor currency status o f  the Deutsche 
Mark, but destroyed the currency area built upon the anchor currency"'.
52 (le Grauwe (1994) doubts the necessity of
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decades. This credibility is rooted in the Bank's constitutional mandate to protect the 
internal value o f the D-Mark and the continuous pursuit of an anti-inflationary 
monetary policy, which makes the Bundesbank an accountable 'player' in the 
monetary policy game^k Although, the Bank has the legal obligation to support the 
general economic policy of the governments^, the objective of price stability takes 
precedence over other policy goals in German monetary policySS On occasions of 
serious disagreement between the government and the Bundesbank, the Bank's 
independence was often the decisive device which restrained the government from 
conducting too expansionary policies and imposed more discipline on policy 
decisions.
Over the past decades, inflation in Germany was on average lower than in other 
industrial countries, such as the United Kingdom. The pursuit of price stability by the 
Bundesbank has often been im peded by external constraints. Under the fixed- 
exchange rate system of Bretton Woods, the Bundesbank was frequently obliged to 
intervene on foreign exchange rate markets, leading to an expansion of the domestic 
money stock, which jeopardised internal price stability. The so-called 'N-1 situation', 
which came to be criticised so often by politicians in the EMS framework, was at the 
heart of Bretton Woods. The collapse of the system enabled the Bundesbank to regain 
control over the money stock and allowed more latitude for the monetary policy of 
the Bundesbank in its pursuit of price stability. The D-Mark was, however, not totally 
shielded from external influences since the Bank was obliged to intervene under the
Lang and Welzel (1992) estimated monetaiy reaction functions for Germany to investigate whether 
electoral business cycles have led in the past to money supply changes. Using the rational partisan 
theory, the evidence suggests a relationship between election dates, outcomes, and money supply 
changes.
In 1975, the former President of one of the Ltind Central Banks von Schelling, proposed to increase 
the independence of the Bundesbank by making the pursuit o f price stability its only policy goal. This 
proposal, however, did not ultimately receive much attention. Roll (1993) argued that in cases where 
the central bank has a mandate lo achieve a single, quantifiable objective, it is more democratically 
accountable.
The results o f a study by Baum (1983) show that the Bundesbank always supported employment 
whenever price stability was not endangered, or at least not as much as the employment objective.
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'snake' arrangement and developments in the dollar exchange rate sometimes required 
stabilising intervention also.
In the EMS, the Bundesbank's refusal to compromise on internal price stability, as 
originally stipulated in the policy of 'burden-sharing' between the low- and high- 
inflation participants, and its anti-inflationary credibility made the D-mark the 
'anchor' currency of the system. As already mentioned, an asymmetric arrangement 
usually ends up with one leader and many followers, the leader in the case of the 
EMS was Gemiany^^. The assumption is that the leader is able to determine its policy 
relatively independent from the other members. The Bundesbank, however, 
frequently participated in co-ordinated interventions in the exchange rate market to 
support other currencies of the EMS. Germany's EMS membership and the role the 
D-M ark had involuntarily assumed in the system, coupled with its role as an 
international reserve currency, impeded the Bank's ability to maintain internal price 
stability. This 'double responsibility' proved particularly difficult to adhere to, 
whenever the developments of the other EMS currencies and the dollar required 
intervention in the same direction (von Hagen, 1989). The dilemma between external 
and internal stability, which the Bundesbank had already felt in the mid-1970s, was 
aggravated by German EMS membership.
Recently, the Bundesbank's institutional arrangement and the conduct and outcome of 
its monetary policy have come to attract increasing attention in the light of a 
transition to the third stage of EMU, where an independent European Central Bank 
(ECB) will be charged with the conduct of monetary policy for the whole of the 
Community. The institutional features of the arrangement for the future European 
'custodian' closely resemble the set-up of the Bundesbank, Econom ists'^ express 
concern at the incautious 'exportation' of German central bank practices and at
Fratianni and von Hagen (1990), however, argue that, although Germany has surely been an 
important player in the EMS, there have also been other players, such as the Banque de France, which 
had an important impact and, therefore, reject the hypothesis o f Gennan dominance, 
i.e. Bofinger and Van bel (1995)
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applying them within the wider European framework. As Bundesbank President 
Schlesinger did not exclude the possibility of using monetary targets à la 'German- 
style' in the ECB, scepticism was expressed whether such a step would actually 
contribute to building an anti-inflationary reputation for the new authority, 
considering the Bundesbank's poor recent tai’geting record^^.
Dunkel/Jiinemann (1995)
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Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to show that there is indeed a case for central bank 
independence. The arguments against discretion in monetary policy have been 
convincingly dem onstrated by the gam e-theoretical literature, which has been 
reviewed in great detail in chapter one. The findings demonstrate that monetary 
policy decisions should be embedded in a framework, which eliminates the possibility 
of recourse to monetary expansion as a device to improve the government's prospects 
of re-election. It has been argued that one of the major difficulties of a 'rules-based' 
solution is its rigidity, which does not leave monetary policy with sufficient latitude 
to engage in necessary adjustment actions, whenever unanticipated disturbances 
occur. It is this context which establishes the superiority of an independent central 
bank committed to price stability, since such an arrangement combines the necessary 
flexibility with the credibility needed to provide a sufficient level of stability for the 
economy .^
The indices of central bank independence, discussed in chapter two, which reflect the 
monetary arrangements in the respective countries, do not display the existence of a 
clear-cut inverse relationship between central bank independence and the rate of 
inflation, as put forward by the literature^. Cukierman (1994) refers to indices of 
central bank independence as the second pillar, the empirical test case, of central bank 
independence. The difficulty with this kind of analysis is, that it is not really designed 
to investigate whether inflation is negatively related to CBI, but rather provides the 
possibility to establish a ranking among different central banks, according to their 
degree of independence by applying an uniform assessment procedure. An interesting 
issue in this context is considered by Cukierman (1992) who tried to find measures of 
actual central bank independence. The limited evidence suggests, however, that there 
is no significant deviation of the actual conduct of monetary policy from the legal 
arrangements in industrial countries. The comparison of the monetary regimes in the
 ^ Neumann (1991)
^ The findings of a study by Havrilesky and G ranato (1993) show that only the degree o f central bank 
autonomy explains the comparative inllation performance in the sample countries.
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United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, by applying the index of 
Grilli et ah, shows that the Bundesbank and the Bank of England are based on 
fundamentally different institutional arrangements. The Bundesbank pursues its 
monetary policy independent of government directives and has the constitutional 
responsibility to protect the internal value of the D-Mark. In contrast, the Bank of 
England lacks political independence since it is subordinate to the government, yet 
does enjoy a high degree of functional independence in comparison to other central 
banks.
The conduct of monetary policy and its outcome in the two countries has been 
examined in great detail in chapter three and four. The inflationary performance of the 
German economy in the last decades was on average better compared to the record of 
the United Kingdom. Although there has been a general marked decline in the 
purchasing power of money in the industrial world throughout the whole post-war IIperiod, the comparative data for Germany shows that this decline was less steep. |
The comparatively healthy inflationary performance in Germany can be attributed to 
the continuous pursuit of price stability by the Bundesbank. Its independence from the 
government and its responsibility for stable prices, as enshrined in the Bundesbank 
Act of 1957, enabled the German central bankers to follow the path of price stability, 
even in situations where the governm ent favoured the application of more 
expansionary monetary measures and where external pressures were imposed upon 
the Bank to ease the monetary stance. Although the Bundesbank has also paid 
attention to other objectives over the decades, such as the balance of payments 
equilibrium, within the interplay of different political interests, the Bank has always 
regarded its function of safeguarding the currency as its pre-eminent task. The 
continuous pursuit of price stability by the Bundesbank allowed the building of an 
ant-inflationary reputation. The difficulties faced by the Bank in meeting the 
monetary targets announced annually since 1974 were frequently of external origin.
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In conjunction with its monetary targeting the Bundesbank's 'pragmatism'^ has often 
been stressed, thus, its clear commitment to price stability must have been the 
decisive factor for building up such high credibility. The Bundesbank's adherence to a 
tight monetary stance forced on occasions the government to refrain from further 
expansion of the budget deficit and imposed discipline on the government's decisions. 
It was for these reasons that the change of government in 1982 did not represent such 
a cornplete break with the past as there had been in the United Kingdom in 1979, 
mainly due to the fact that the Schmidt government had been pledged to a policy of 
fiscal consolidation. Within the EMS framework the D-Mark served as a monetary 
'anchor' for the other currencies in the system, owing to the credibility of German 
m onetary policy. The German monetary record suggests that central bank 
independence produces better results. Furthermore, the recent attempts in many 
countries to make their respective central banks more independent and the fact that 
the statute of the European Central Bank was drawn up closely along the lines of the 
Bundesbank's statute seem to acknowledge the merits of having an independent 
monetary authority.
The inflationary record of the past decades in the United Kingdom displays on 
average a higher rate of inflation and is marked by episodes of steep inflationary 
upsurges. The negative experiences with the policies of the 1970s also led to a shift 
towards fiscal consolidation and counter-inflationary policies in the UK after the 
Conservative government had assumed office. The commitment to fighting inflation 
was made the centre-piece of the MTFS and inflation was indeed brought down, yet 
the monetary targeting record is rather poor and seems to display a lack of enthusiasm 
on the side of the government to adhere to its promise. This commitment of the 
government to price stability was pursued by using changing devices intended to 
make it more credible. The changes in such devices are, however, associated with a 
loss of some credibility and induce a certain degree of instability in the economy.
3 Bofinger/Klolen (1995); Issing (1994)
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Britain's departure from the EMS in 1992 urged the authorities to look for another 
credible framework for monetary policy. The new strategy, which was launched in 
1993 committed the government to achieving an annual inflation target"^. The 
government is confident that the new approach will have a positive impact on 
inflationary expectations. Yet the financial markets remain rather sceptical whether 
this new strategy will impose a credible constraint on the government's future 
decisions and actions, monetary policy is, despite all these commitments, still at the 
discretion of the policy makers.
The operational framework and legal status of public institutions is always strongly 
affected by their past and by the extent to which the present circumstances allow the 
existing operational and organisational patterns to continue. Historical facts of more 
recent German history were taken into account in the formulation of the Bundesbank's 
constitution as factors of decisive importance. Fischer (1994) remarked that the 
effective independence of the central bank reflects the underlying inflationary 
preferences of society. All Germans should be thankful that the writing of the 
Bundesbank's constitution coincided with a moment when a broad anti-inflationary 
conscience supported the idea of making the new Bundesbank independent from the 
government.
^ Inflation rate targeting is also practised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which has an 
explicit mandate to achieve an inflation rate not exceeding 2%.
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APPENDIX
Appendix I
V ariables for Legal C en tra l B ank Independence
V ariable D escription of V ariab le W eight N um erical
N um ber Coding
1 C hief executive officer (CEO) 0.20
a  term of office
- over 8 years 1.00
- 6 to 8 years 0.75
- 5 years 0.50
- 4  years 0.25
- under 4  years or at the discretion of appointer 0.00
b. Who appoints CEO?
- board of central bank 1.00
- a council of the central bank board, 0.75
executive branch, and legislative branch
- legislature 0.50
- executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers) 0.25
- one or two members of the executive branch 0.00
c. dismissal
- no provision for dismissal 1.00
- only for reasons not related to policy 0.83
- at the discretion of central bank board 0.67
- at legislature's discretion 0.50
- unconditional dismissal possible by 0.33
legislature
- at executive's discretion 0.17
- unconditional dismissal possible by executive 0.00
d. mav CEO hold other offices in government?
- no 1.00
- only with permission of the executive branch 0.50
- no rule against CEO holding another office 0.00
2 Policy Form ulation 0.15
a  Who formulates monetarv policy?
- bank alone 1.00
- bank participates, but has little influence 0.67
- bank only advises government 0.33
- bank has no say 0.00
b. Who has final word in resolution of conllicts?
- the bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as l.(X)
its objectives
- government, on policy issues not clearly 0.80
defined as the bank’s goals or in case of
conOict within the bank
- a council of the central bank, executive branch. 0.60
and legislative branch
- the legislature, on policy issues 0.40
- the executive branch on policy issues, subject to 0.20
due process and possible protest by the bank
- the executive branch has unconditional priority 0.00
c. Role in the government’s budgetary process
- central bank active 1.00
- central bank has no influence 0.00
(continued)
Variable Description of Variable Weight Numerical
Number coding
Objectives 0.15
- price stability is the major or only objective I n 1 .(X) 
charter, and the central bank has the final word in
case of conflict with other government objectives
- price stability is the only objective 0.80
- price stability is one goal, w ith other compatible 0.60 
objectives, such as a stable banking system
- price stability is one goal, with potentially conllicling 0.40 
objectives, such as full employment
- no objectives stated in the bank charter 0.20
- stated objectives do not include price stability 0.(X)
Limitations on lending to the government
a  Advances (limitations on nonsecuritized 0.15
lending!
- no advances pemiitted 1.00
- advances pemiitted, but with strict limits (e.g., 0.67 
up to 15 percent government revenue)
- advances permitted, and the limits are loose 0.33 
(e.g., over 15 percent of government revenue)
- no legal limits on lending 0.(X)
b. Securitized lending 0.10
- not permitted 1 .(X)
- permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., up to 15 0.67 
percent of government revenue)
- permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15 0.33 
percent o f government revenue)
- no legal limits on lending 0.(X)
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount! 0.10
- controlled by the bank 1.00
- specified by the bank charter 0.67
- agreed between the central bank and executive 0.33
- decided by the executive branch alone 0.(X)
d. Potential boiTOwers from the bank 0.05
- only the central government 1 .(X!
- all levels o f government (state as well as central) 0.67
- those mentioned above and public enterprises 0.33
- public and private sector 0.(X)
c. Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.025
- currency amounts I .(X!
- shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital 0.67
- shares o f government revenue 0.33
- shares of government expenditures 0.(X)
f. Maturity of loans 0.025
- within 6 months 1.00
- within 1 year 0.67
- more than 1 year 0.33
- no mention of maturity in the law 0.(X)
g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025
- above minimum rates 1 .(X)
- at market rates 0.75
- below maximum rates 0.50
- interest rate is not mentioned 0.25
- no interest on government borrowing from the 0.(X) 
central bank
II
(continued)
Variable Description of Variable Weight Numerical
Number coding
h. Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.025 
government securities in the primary market?
yes 1 .(X)
no 0.00
III
